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Since the 1980’s, wage inequality in the U.S. has been dramatically increasing.
I investigate the impact of occupational structure, measured at the three-digit
level, on this trend of growing wage inequality. The investigation is conducted
in terms of three major research tasks.
First, I test the validity of the ‘disaggregate structuration’ view in re-
lation to growing wage inequality. The ‘disaggregate structuration’ view is
suggested as an alternative to big class theories. Theorists of the ‘disaggregate
structuration’ view assert that an occupation is a gemeinschaftlich community
characterized by internal homogeneity. Thus, this view implies that most of
vii
the rise in inequality occurs between occupations and that within-occupational
inequality is actually decreasing, due to the progress of ‘occupationalization.’
My analyses, however, find that the majority of the growth in inequal-
ity has occurred within occupations. Secondly, I thus seek a more delin-
eated explanation for the causes of rising within-occupational inequality. I
investigate whether previously proposed hypotheses can account for this phe-
nomenon. Hypotheses that I test include demographic change, deindustrial-
ization, unions, insecure employment relations, increases in the return to skill,
and changes of firm organizations.
Although smaller than within-occupational inequality, between-occupa-
tional inequality has also been growing during this period. Thirdly, I therefore
investigate the changes of between-occupational inequality. Since between-
occupational inequality is a weighted sum of occupational mean wages, I ex-
amine whether the same hypotheses tested for within-occupational inequality
can explain the changes in occupational mean wages over time.
Using the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1983 to 2002, I find
that as within-occupational inequality has grown faster than between-occu-
pational inequality, the direct association between occupational structure and
wage inequality has declined over this period. While the importance of general
skills (i.e., education) in determining workers’ wages is growing, the impor-
tance of occupation-specific skills is declining. For regression models of hourly
wages, the amount of R-squared increase by adding three-digit occupational
codes (331 occupational dummies) in addition to general skills (5 dummies
of education) has decreased for this period. Therefore, the strong version of
‘aggregate structuration’ and ‘occupationalization’ is not supported. I would
like to note, however, that the R-squared of hourly wage increases jumped
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significantly when we use three-digit occupational codes instead of one-digit
occupational codes even after adjusting for the degrees of freedom. Thus, the
weak version of structuration is not rejected.
For multivariate tests, inequality indexes and other variables by detailed
occupation are extracted from each year’s CPS and merged into one panel data
file with occupation as a unit of analysis. Multi-level growth models are then
estimated using detailed occupational categories as the unit of analysis in
order to assess how the structural characteristics of occupations affect changes
in mean wages and wage inequality over this time period.
Contrary to the expectations of the skill-biased technological change
hypothesis, changes in the distribution of education do not affect the growth
of wage inequality within occupations. In contrast to the traditional view of
unions as promoting wage equality, within-occupational inequality is increased
by unionization. The increase of female labor market participation seems to
pull down inequality in an occupation. Deindustrialization does not account
for the rise of intra-occupational inequality, while insecure employment rela-
tions do. As expected by the organizational change view, inequality grows
faster in high skill jobs and service jobs.
Regarding between-occupational inequality, traditional explanations do
better jobs in accounting for its change than for within-occupational inequality.
Skill biased technological changes and unions have positive effects on occupa-
tional mean wages. Deindustrialization has a negative effect on occupational
mean wages.
Multi-level growth models provide additional evidence against disaggre-
gate structuration. The disaggregate structuration view assumes that occu-
pational common interests will be achieved as accomplishment of active occu-
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pational associations. Thus, the changes of occupational mean wage, which is
a clearly common interest of members in an occupation, should be explained
by occupation itself, not by other demographic and institutional variables.
Contrary to this expectation, most of the within-occupational variation are
not explained well by other demographic and institutional variables, including
race, gender, and unions.
In conclusion, although sociologists often view occupation as the back-
bone of the stratification system, the rise in within-occupational inequality
suggests that broader, more complex approaches may be needed in order to
better explain the increasing disparity in wages. I suggest that more attention
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The reduced economic mobility and the declining real value of workers’ wages
at the lower end of the distribution (Gottschalk 1997; Farley 1996; Morris
and Western 1999; Levy 1998; Bernhardt et al. 2001) imply that, for the first
time in recent American socioeconomic history, the succeeding generation of
the non-college population can now reasonably expect its standard of living to
remain stagnant or to actually decline. It is also well known that, for the upper
quintiles, incomes have concurrently been increasing, so that inequality in the
overall distribution has grown substantially during the past several decades
(Karoly 1993; Levy 1987; Morris and Western 1999; Piketty and Saez 2003).
The combined effects of these two trends actually lend some credence to the
old adage that “the poor get poorer and the rich get richer.”
Given the dramatic nature and significance of this substantial increase
in economic inequality, it is surprising that this phenomenon has been largely
ignored by sociologists, for whom inequality has traditionally been a topic
of keen concern. They seem to have unfortunately taken all too seriously
Grusky’s (2001:21) remark that “most sociologists seem content with a disci-
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plinary division of labor that leaves matters of income to economists.” What-
ever the reasons for the neglect, the sociological sources of this important
increase in income inequality are rarely studied and thus poorly understood.
In my view, this lacuna represents a major shortcoming of contemporary re-
search in the sociology of stratification and inequality.
This neglect stems in part from the sort of topics that have been em-
phasized in sociological research on stratification and inequality. The first is
the study of occupations. They are often believed to be the “backbone of
the reward structure” (Parkin 1971:18). For this reason, many sociologists
have focused on occupational attainment as the primary outcome of interest
(e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Goldthorpe 1987;
Grusky 2005; Grusky and Sørensen 1998; Kelley and Evans 1993; Weeden and
Grusky 2005; Wong 2002). Even in neo-Marxist studies that seek to develop
their own distinctive approach to studying inequality, occupational variables
nonetheless continue to play an important role in their depiction of the class
structure, albeit in terms of a more refined nomenclature (Wright 1984, 1997).
Another common concern in stratification research has been individual
differences in income attainment (e.g., Eliason 1995; Hollister 2004; Kalleberg,
Wallace, and Althauser 1981; Morgan and Morgan 1998; Weeden 2002). In this
regard, a major interest in recent years has been differentials by race/ethnicity
and gender (e.g., Grodsky and Pager 2001; McCall 2000, 2001; Peterson and
Morgan 1995; Reskin and Bielby 2005; Western 2002). Although certainly
important, this research does not seek to ascertain the sources of increased
dispersion in the overall distribution of income.
Sociological studies of aggregate inequality do exist, but they are older
and use cross-sectional data that largely predate the recent rise in the disper-
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sion of inequality (Bloomquist and Summers 1982; Jacobs 1985; Nelson and
Lorence 1988; Sakamoto 1988). A few more recent studies of household income
inequality have appeared, but their focus is on global inequalities (Alderson
and Nielsen 2002; Firebaugh and Goesling 2004; Nielsen and Alderson 1995).
One sociological study of household income inequality across U.S. counties in-
vestigates the effects of “farm/non-farm sector dualism” (Nielsen and Alderson
1997:21) and other factors. None of these studies directly consider, however,
the sources of the trend towards dramatically increased wage inequality in the
U.S. labor force in recent decades.
A few studies (Grodsky and Pager 2001; McCall 2001; Peterson and
Morgan 1995; Kilbourne, England, and Farkas 1994) have recently adopted
occupational approaches in studying income or wage inequality. But their
interests are mostly about gender or racial wage gaps rather than about the
growing wage inequality itself. They have focused on how occupations work in
maintaining gender and/or race inequalities. I admit that studies of inequali-
ties between demographic groups, including racial, ethnic, and gender groups,
are important. However, focusing only on these between group inequalities
limits the sociological contribution to understanding the recent unexpected
and problematic for most sociologists, growth of inequality, especially inequal-
ities within demographic groups, which accounts for most inequality.
In studies of inequality between demographic groups, sociologists have
mostly tested the effect of the compositional changes of occupations and/or
the effect of between-occupational differences. This approach assumes homo-
geneity of an occupation, which has long been supported in the study of strat-
ification. The beginning of this approach goes back to the founding fathers
of sociology, including Durkheim. Using this assumption, sociologists have
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established many fruitful theories and have tested them empirically. Status
attainment theorists, who have studied stratified positions by detailed occupa-
tions, as well as class theorists, who have preferred to use reclassified groups
rather than occupation itself in their studies, have constructed and tested
their hypotheses under this assumption. Emphasis on occupation has even
intensified in recent years, as epitomized by the theory of “disaggregate struc-
turation” (Grusky and Sørensen 1998; Weeden 2002; Grusky and Sørensen
2001; Grusky 2005). According to this view, detailed occupational categories
are the critical and most fundamental components of social stratification and
inequality.
The notion of occupational homogeneity is not limited to sociologists.
Ordinary people around the world have also perceived occupations as distinct
homogeneous groups and a legitimate basis for differential income (Treiman
1976; Hout and DiPrete 2006). Individuals across countries widely agree on
which occupations should be paid more; however, individuals have different
opinions on adequate remuneration for such high-paying occupations (Kelley
and Evans 1993).
This assumption may also be implicitly shared by economists. In the
study of wages, economists have included occupation as a proxy variable repre-
senting skill differences among workers (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Levy
and Murnane 1992). Economists have paid relatively more attention to the
growing wage inequality itself than sociologists have, but they have not tested
the legitimacy of occupational homogeneity nor studied within-occupational
variation. In many economics studies, occupations are used as control variables
rather than as the main subject of interest (Nickell and Layard 1999).
Recent studies show that inequalities within gender, race, educational
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level, and industrial sectors have grown for the last quarter century and that
they have outgrown between-group inequalities (Morris and Western 1999;
Gottschalk 1997; Karoly 1993; Juhn et al. 1993; Gustafsson and Johansson
1999; Juhn 1999; Levy and Murnane 1992). There is no reason to limit socio-
logical interest to between-occupational variations when within-group inequal-
ities are growing faster. And it is necessary to scrutinize the legitimacy of the
assumption of occupational homogeneity as well as its limitations. By doing
so, we can enrich sociological understanding of the relation between occupation
and the recent growth of inequality.
As a start, we need to have a basic understanding of occupational wage
inequality. At a given point in time, do all occupations show similar levels
of wage heterogeneity/homogeneity? If some occupations have higher levels
of inequality than others, what are the sources of this variability? Next, we
need to understand the trends of between- and within-occupational inequal-
ity over time. Do the changes of between- and within-occupational inequali-
ties show similar patterns over time? Are the amounts of change of within-
occupational-inequalities similar across occupations? Or do occupations show
variant amounts of increasing or decreasing within-group inequalities? By an-
swering these questions, we can test the legitimacy of the disaggregate struc-
turation theories.
If the direction and amount of change of within-occupation inequality
differ significantly across occupations, the sources causing these differences
should be investigated thoroughly. Several explanations of the growing in-
equality have been proposed so far, including demographic change deindustri-
alization, skill biased technological change (SBTC), institutional change, and
organizational culture change. One of the reasons why there are so many pos-
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sible explanations, of which no one is sufficient, is that, among others, growing
inequality can not be differentiated by group characteristics. All ages, cohorts,
genders, and even industrial sectors show similar patterns of growing inequal-
ity.1 Even among union members, within group inequality is growing. If there
are significant variations in patterns of changing inequality across occupations
in contrast to other variables, different characteristics by occupations could
be a promising source in finding the causes of growing wage inequality. This
does not necessarily mean that existing explanations are wrong. Rather, test-
ing these possible causes in the context of occupational structure can help
to clarify which theory is more plausible. I will investigate the effects of the
suggested factors in occupational context. This study would provide a better
understanding of the mechanisms involved. These multivariate analysis can
also provide indirect evidence for the hypotheses of disaggregate structuration.
Thus, in this research, I am following the sociological tradition, which assumes
that occupations are a fundamental context for the generation of inequality.
The rest of the dissertation will be organized into six chapters. Chap-
ter 2 will review the theory of “disaggregate structuration” and previously
proposed explanations for growing inequality and will result in several related
hypotheses. Chapter 3 will describe the procedure used to construct the data
and the statistical methods used to empirically test the suggested hypothe-
ses. Chapter 4 will present the results regarding “disaggregate structuration.”
Chapter 5 will show the multivariate test results investigating the causes of
within-occupational inequality. Chapter 6 will discuss between-occupational
inequality. And finally, Chapter 7 will summarize and discuss the implications
of the findings.






In traditional sociological research on socioeconomic inequality, occupation has
often been seen as the backbone of the stratification system, or at least as the
primary dependent variable of interest (e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967; Feath-
erman and Hauser 1978; Hall 1969; Sorokin 1959; Kelley and Evans 1993;
Treiman 1976). One of the core themes in the classic debate of stratification
between Davis and Moore (1984) and Tumin (1953) was how to interpret the
roles of certain occupations in a society. Almost all studies on social mobility
between generations are based on the occupational mobility between father
and son (Lipset et al. 1959; Featherman, Jones, and Hauser 1978; Grusky and
Hauser 1984). Status attainment theorists have explicitly used occupation
as a basic unit of stratification (Blau and Duncan 1967; Sewell et al. 1969;
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Hodge 1981; Treiman 1976). Neo-Weberian class theorists like Goldthorpe
(1987) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) have classified distinctive classes
based on occupation. Even neo-Marxists like Wright (1984) have also sorted
out their classes using occupation. Gradational models of stratification have
chosen disaggregated occupations as a fundamental analytic unit, and cate-
gorical models of class have had occupations grouped in various ways (Grusky
and Sørensen 1998). Thus, the sociological study of inequality could not be
performed without occupation.
This general tradition has enjoyed a renewed impetus and extension in
recent years in terms of a theory of “disaggregate structuration.” This ap-
proach “rests on the realist claim that occupations are often gemeinschaftlich
communities as well as positional sources of exploitation and inequality” (Grusky
and Sørensen 1998:1191). That is, at the level of detailed categories, occupa-
tions are assumed to be relatively homogeneous groups of workers who share
similar socioeconomic rewards and interests, processes of market and social
closure, political awareness, propensities for collective action, “lifestyles and
dispositions,” as well as personal identity (Grusky and Sørensen 1998). Grusky
(2005) defines occupations as local organizations that “act collectively on be-
half of their members, extract rent and exploit nonmembers, and shape life
chances and lifestyles” (67). “Disaggregate structuration” has been proposed
as a “realist” model of class structure that is said to represent the solution
to an “ongoing retreat from class analysis,” which reflects an increasing dis-
satisfaction with the analytical and explanatory power of “big social classes”
(Grusky and Sørensen 2001; Grusky 2005).
As noted by Sørensen (2000:1526), conceptualizations of class structure
typically involve some description of differences in “life chances.” In other
8
words, the components of a class scheme are usually proposed to be, at least to
some extent, correlated with variations in socioeconomic rewards such as pres-
tige, work conditions, income, or protection from exploitation. In the case of
“disaggregate structuration,” the correlation between socioeconomic inequal-
ities and detailed occupational categories is implicitly presumed to be quite
high. As a general mapping of the “site of production,” detailed occupational
categories are said to represent the most fundamental unit at which the nexus
of social closure, training opportunities, wages and income, prestige, exploita-
tion, and the extraction of rents all purportedly converge in the generation of
positional inequality (Grusky and Sørensen 1998; Weeden 2002; Grusky 2005).
That is, according to Grusky et al., detailed (or 3-digit) occupations are real
classes.
2.1.1 Occupation-Specific Skill and Wage Inequality
Based on the Durkheimian tradition of class analysis, theorists of the dis-
aggregate structuration view assert that unit occupations are social barriers
constructed through closure generating devices of various kinds (Grusky 2005).
Through diverse procedures such as social closure against members of differ-
ent occupations, collective action, and identification in everyday interactions,
occupations become communities. Grusky (2005) calls this procedure “oc-
cupationalization.” These occupational communities may act as classes, as
traditional class theorists have expected. That is, disaggregate structuration
of occupations is a class system of a society, and occupationalization is a pro-
cess of class formation.
Although what makes occupations ‘occupationalized’ occupations (e.g.,
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occupations as classes) is not simply occupation-specific skills, the most basic
material foundation that defines an occupation as a distinguishable unit must
be shared functions, principal duties and tasks, and similar technical skills by
workers. Otherwise, the reasons for an occupation to form as an independent
group beyond the sites of production (firms or establishments) and the final
products/services that workers produce (industry) can not be accounted for.
The concept of occupation as shared occupation-specific skills therefore seems
to be similar to the Marxist concept of class-in-itself , while an occupationalized
occupation is to the concept of class-for-itself. For Marxist theorists, class-in-
itself refers to a class defined objectively by its socio-economic conditions, and
class-for-itself denotes a class with a self-consciousness and a unifying ideology
(Thompson 1966).
Davis and Moore’s (1945) classic argument of occupational importance
starts from the fact that skills of some occupations are hard to be obtained
and therefore require the investment of individuals’ time, including mental and
physical efforts as well as financial assets. Hauser and Warren (1997) define
an occupation as an abstract category used to group and classify similar jobs.
The similarity of jobs is determined by the similarity in typical activities, the
form of job tenure, the product or service that results from the job, and the
skill requirements of the job (Hauser and Warren 1997:180). Put simply, the
technical division of labor is fundamental to occupational classification. With-
out occupational skill barriers, it would be much easier for workers to switch
from one occupation to another, creating a situation in which the occupation
a worker has at a given time is less deterministic of his/her life chances. Given
these traits of occupations, if the importance of occupation-specific skills in
deciding workers’ life chances has dwindled, it is harder for an occupation to
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be a distinct class via “occupationalization.”
Indeed, Grusky (2005) himself asserts that what makes ‘functionally
similar jobs’ relatively homogenous categories is ‘social clothing.’ What he em-
phasizes in this assertion is ‘social clothing,’ but his starting point is nonethe-
less functional similarity.1 The fundamentality of occupation-specific skill in
disaggregate structuration is reconfirmed in Grusky’s own discussion of incom-
plete occupationalization in the lower manual sector. He says that “occupa-
tionalization has not yet taken hold in the lower manual sector, presumably
due to low skill levels, limited investments in training, and relatively rapid
changes in manufacturing process” (63).
As discussed above, “disaggregate structuration” presumes that the cor-
relation between socioeconomic inequalities and detailed occupational cate-
gories is high. Further embedded in this view is the implication that these
detailed occupational categories are relatively homogeneous.2 Given the as-
sumption that detailed occupations represent gemeinschaftlich communities
as well as “realist” structures of exploitation and inequality, the theory pro-
posed by Grusky and Sørensen (1998) indirectly underscores the significance of
between-occupational inequality. That is, socioeconomic inequality is viewed
as deriving primarily from mean differences between detailed occupational cat-
egories, not from inequalities (i.e., dispersion in socioeconomic rewards) within
these categories. Indeed, Grusky (2005) argued that disaggregate structura-
tion can capture much of the important variability in life chances and other
outcomes of interest. He asserts, “We have thus defined unit occupations in
1In this sense, the Durkheimian version of ‘social clothing’ seems to differ from the social
constructionism of post-modernism, which denies objective (or fundamental) criteria for
defining a variety of social classifications. Grusky starts from functional similarity, which is
surely an objective criteria.
2This assumption seems entirely compatible with the status attainment tradition.
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terms of the social boundaries that are constructed through closure-generating
devices of various kinds” (Grusky 2005:66). This implies that a substantially
large amount of inequality should be derived from between occupational dif-
ferences. Thus, changes in the aggregate level of inequality should derive
primarily from changes in the occupational structure.
The ‘disaggregate structuration’ view implies that the recent rise of
wage inequality is a result of reinforced determinant forces of occupation-
specific skills. In other words, this view implies that the between-occupational
inequality, which is mainly grounded in different occupation-specific skills,
may be prevalent in this period of growing inequality. It also implies that
the amount of changes of within-occupational inequality may be negligent. If
these assumptions were not true, the growing wage inequality will be irrelevant
(or at best marginally relevant) phenomenon with disaggregate structuration,
and making a focus on disaggregate structuration will be much less beneficial
in studies of social inequality and stratification.
2.1.2 “Occupationalization” and Wage Inequality
Although fundamental, occupation-specific skills are not all that occupations
represent . Theorists of the ‘disaggregate structuration’ view insist that mem-
bers of an occupation use a ‘language of occupation’ and interact with each
other on a daily basis; such actions effectively create a gemeinschaftlich occu-
pational community. Thus, an occupation provides a ‘master identity’ for its
members and becomes a unit of collective action for the common interests of
its members (Grusky 2005:67-72). Collective action by members of an occupa-
tion does not necessarily include all of the occupation’s members. Sometimes
12
collective action is carried out by a majority of the occupation’s members and
other times by a small portion of the members. This variation depends on
the degree of occupationalization (Weeden 2002), as the actions of aggregate
classes depend on the degree of class formation (Thompson 1966).
Theorists of the disaggregate structuration view also assert that We-
ber’s closure theory can be reinvented through occupations. The ‘real’ work-
ing institutions of closure are largely local associations, and the underlying
mechanisms of closure occur at the more detailed occupational level (Grusky
2005:67-72). Social closure occurs “wherever the competition for a livelihood
creates groups interested in reducing that competition” (Weeden 2002:58).
And “occupational closure is a specific instance of social closure” (59). There-
fore, occupationalization through social closure may reduce competition within
the occupation. Given such discussions from theorists of disaggregate struc-
turation, we can infer that occupationalization will reduce within-occupational
inequality.
Occupational closure, however, does not necessarily mean that every
member of an occupation will earn the same wage. The level of benefits enjoyed
by members in an occupation, thanks to closure, can be heterogeneous among
members, due to other social factors. The distribution of rewards, mainly
measured by wages, inside an occupation will be determined by other market
and social forces. Within-occupational inequality would presumably reflect
the influence of factors such as gender, race/ethnicity, education, industries,
firms, and other sociological variables.
To the extent that socioeconomic inequalities within occupations are
large, then the assumption that the latter determine or at least structure those
inequalities seems less substantively obvious and requires further theoretical
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clarification. While “disaggregate structuration” does not explicitly deny the
relevance of these latter variables (e.g., race and gender), neither does it sys-
tematically incorporate them. In order for occupations to somehow remain the
fundamental components of the class structure, as envisioned by ‘disaggregate
structuration,’ however, these other variables should presumably be consid-
ered as influencing socioeconomic inequalities within occupational categories,
as the relevant contextual unit (e.g., Grodsky and Pager 2001).
For example, race or gender may affect the amount of benefits that each
individual member in an occupation received from closure (Weeden 2002:59).
This argument implies that other market and social components will explain
within-occupational inequality. That is, the amount of variation explained by
these variables (i.e., R-squared for models of the changes of within-occupational
inequalities) should be relatively large within an occupation. When the effects
of social factors other than occupation, such as gender, race, union, or indus-
tries, is diminishing, the distribution of rewards within an occupation should
be narrowed. With deeper occupationalization, within-occupational inequality
should recede although the degree of such recession could vary.
Despite the possibility of within-occupational variation, the variation in
an occupation should be as small so as not to harm the pursuit of the common
interest of that occupation. Weeden (2002) states that “the social conditions
that characterize an occupation will benefit (or harm) all its members, albeit to
different degrees” (59). The pursuit of common interests through occupation-
alization connotes that the gains or losses of common merits of an occupation
will be achieved actively by diverse kinds of occupation-specific actions, rather
than they will be enforced passively by the results of changes of other social and
economic elements. That is, when occupationalization is mature, occupational
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collective action or occupational closure will bring about common benefits for
its members. In addition, the effects of other elements, including race, gender,
or industrial composition, which create within-occupational heterogeneity will
be minimal.
Regarding wage, this expectation entails that the changes of occupa-
tional mean wages over time, which is clearly a common interest of members
within an occupation, will be explained by characteristics of the occupation
itself, rather than by other variables. In terms of statistical models, this im-
plies that the total variation in the changes of occupational mean wage over
time explained by other variables (i.e., R-squared for models of the changes of
occupational mean wages) will be small.
All the traits of occupation discussed above are something class theo-
rists, including Marxists, have tried to find in aggregate classes. Occupations
as classes connotes that occupation plays a pivotal role in social conflicts over
the distribution of economic, political, and social goods. Thus, social and eco-
nomic institutions deeply embedded in social conflicts should work through
occupational structure. For example, unions, which directly affect the wages
of their members by collective negotiation and indirectly affect the wages of
non-members by wage spillover effects or by union closure effects, should have
the greatest effects within occupations. Although the complexity of contempo-
rary union organization can make these expected effects of occupation union-
izing unrealistic (Weeden 2002:64), the extension of union memberships within
an occupation should work to, at least marginally, reduce within-occupational
inequality.
How unions and occupations are related, however, is not discussed inten-
sively among disaggregate structuration theorists, indicating that a consensus
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has not been reached among them. Weeden (2002) expects that unions will
work through occupations. Since unions work successfully only through indus-
tries, she cautions that the observed effects of unionization on an occupation’s
rewards should be carefully interpreted. However, Grusky (2005) sees unions
as organizations competing against occupations, implying that unions can dis-
turb the formation of an occupation as a class. For Grusky, this is one of the
reasons why blue collar, manual occupations, where unionization is relatively
high, show low occupationalization. If we accept Weeden’s assumption, we can
expect that the reduction of unionization rates increase within-occupational
inequality by small amounts or not at all. However, if we accept Grusky’s
assumption, we will expect that the reduction of unionization rates will de-
crease within-occupational inequality, because the reduction of unionization
will remove heterogeneity among workers in the same occupation, thus it will
facilitate the progress of occupationalization.
The foregoing views motivate the general objective of this research,
which is to investigate the role of occupational structure in the trend in ag-
gregate wage inequality. I use three-digit occupational categories, which are
the most detailed in my data, to investigate this relationship. This increases
the number of occupations in the analysis and thus increases the possible ex-
planatory power of occupational structure (at least in a statistical sense). The
use of three-digit occupational categories is more consistent with the “disag-
gregate structuration” approach of Grusky et al. My findings are thus directly
relevant to the empirical testing of this theory.
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2.1.3 Previous Empirical Researches
Despite sociologists’ traditional enthusiasm for occupation, the above assump-
tions are huge and cannot be accepted without careful empirical scrutiny.
For example, how occupational structure relates to aggregate income inequal-
ity remains largely unknown. To the extent that sociologists have investi-
gated aggregate income inequalities (i.e., Morris and Western 1999; Bernhardt
et al. 2001), occupation is notably absent. Although Weeden (2002) includes
the characteristics of detailed occupational categories as contextual effects on
workers’ earnings in a hierarchical model using cross-sectional data, aggregate
inequality in wages is considered only as an afterthought that arises when the
variance of the error terms are reported. Sociologists have not analyzed how
occupational structure systematically relates to the increasing level of aggre-
gate wage inequality that has been occurring over time as a critically important
trend in its own right.
The one exception is Raffalovich (1993). He investigates earnings in-
equality from 1968 to 1982. His results indicate that the increase in inequal-
ity in the last few years of his data was not significantly related to employ-
ment changes in occupations, as indicated by a categorization consisting of 10
groups. According to his decomposition, the increase in earnings inequality
occurred within occupations and did not derive from a between-occupational
component that would reflect changes in the employment of workers across
occupational categories.
Generally speaking, economists have paid more attention to increas-
ing wage inequality (Autor and Katz 1999; Bound and Johnson 1992; Card
and DiNardo 2002; Gottschalk 1997; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1993; Levy
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1998; Levy and Murname 1992). Their results confirm that, by any mea-
sure of inequality, the dispersion in wages and earnings has certainly been
increasing since 1980. This economics literature has not, however, sufficiently
considered occupation because it does not play any significant conceptual role
in microeconomic theory. One study (i.e., Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1993)
does include one-digit occupational groups as miscellaneous control variables
in their regression analysis, but the assumption seems to be that occupation
simply indicates human capital that is not indicated by schooling (rather than
representing a structural position in the labor force). In any event, Juhn,
Murphy and Pierce (1993) find that the increases in wage inequality among
men from 1963 to 1989 occurred within these occupational categories; changes
in employment across one-digit occupational groups were mostly unrelated to
increases in wage inequality.
2.1.4 Analytical Strategies
In assessing the role of occupational structure in affecting wage inequality, I
investigate two sorts of empirical relationships. First, I analyze bivariate de-
scriptive statistics that refer to the extent to which wage inequality is between
occupations (i.e., derives from differences in mean wages across occupations)
rather than within them (i.e., reflects wage inequalities within occupations).
I consider this descriptive approach to represent the most direct test of ‘dis-
aggregate structuration’ theory in its strongest form. That is, if detailed oc-
cupational categories are indeed the most fundamental class structure that
generates socioeconomic inequalities in advanced capitalist societies, then de-
tailed occupational categories should be directly and highly correlated with
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wage inequality and its growth in recent years. In other words, most wage
inequality (and most of the growth in wage inequality) should be between
occupations.
The second empirical relationship that I investigate involves the multi-
variate analysis of the mean wage and of wage inequality within occupations.
This part of my research attempts to explain temporal changes in the mean
and the dispersion of wages in terms of other sociological variables, while using
occupation as the unit of analysis. Given the importance of improving the soci-
ological understanding of the growth in wage inequality, I believe that this part
of my investigation is substantively significant in its own right. In addition,
however, this part of the analysis may be viewed as constituting an indirect
test of Grusky et al.’s ‘disaggregate structuration’ theory in a weaker form.
That is, even if most wage inequality (and its growth) is not primarily be-
tween detailed occupational categories, these detailed occupational categories
may nonetheless be considered a “fundamental” class structure in some sense.
This may be the case if occupational categories are an appropriate and useful
unit of analysis in explaining wage inequality and its growth. In the next sec-
tion, I will review the suggested sociological variables that could account for
temporal change in the mean and the dispersion of wages.
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2.2 Linking Occupational Structure with Grow-
ing Wage Inequality
2.2.1 Demographic Change: Increase of Female Work-
ers
The simple economic logic that the increase of labor supply puts downward
pressure on wages leads us to consider demographic change as a primary cause
of inequality growth. All supply side explanations follow the same logic.
An influx of baby boomers into the labor market is expected; thus it is
not surprising that a supply side argument was once popular. However, the
effect of the baby boomers on the labor market is known to be small, and there
is a time mismatch between the peak entry years of the baby boomers and the
historical trends of wage inequality (Dooley and Gottschalk 1982; Morris and
Western 1999). And even though it is true that the entry of baby boomers
may have lowered the wages of unskilled workers, this does not provide an
explanation for why the wages of skilled workers are rising. As is well known,
the disproportionate increase in the upper tail of the wage distribution has
played a big role in the recent growth in inequality. According to Dooley and
Gottschalk (1985), even the decline of wages of low skilled workers can not
be fully accounted for by the influx of baby boomers. After controlling for
cohort size as well as levels of education and experience, they found that the
proportion of men with low earnings still showed an upward trend from 1967
to 1978.
Moreover, the inequality within cohorts is bigger than the inequality
between cohorts. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) analyzed the changes in
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inequality by cohort between 1963 and 1989, finding that changes of within-
group inequality for all age cohorts show basically the same pattern. There
is little difference between the newly entered baby boomers and old workers.
Juhn et al.’s (1993) result shows “an accelerating increase in inequality with
time that cannot be explained by any combinations of cohort and age effects.”
Unlike the cohort effect of baby boomers, which was early on elimi-
nated from the possible list of causes of increasing wage inequality, the female
effect, which has been intensively discussed, has not yet been eliminated due
to a lack of universal agreement. The relationship between occupation and the
gender wage gap has been the subject of prior research. For example, Peterson
and Morgan (1995) investigate the sources of the wage gap between men and
women using establishment-level data. They find that, within establishments,
the largest component of the gender wage gap derives from the allocation of
men and women into different job categories, while gender differences in wages
within job categories are relatively small. They argue that “occupational segre-
gation accounts for about 40 percent of the wage gap, while human capital and
other variables account for about 40 percent” (Peterson and Morgan 1995:361).
In addition, jobs that have a larger proportion of female workers tend to have
lower wages. This latter pattern has been further studied in the comparative
worth literature (England 1992; Kilbourne et al. 1994). Also, the fact that
female workers are likely to have less experience than male workers, net of age
(Smith and Ward 1989), could be a source of a gender wage gap within the
same occupation. Cultural feminists explain these phenomena as a result of
valuative discrimination, and neoclassical theorists attribute these phenomena
to the result of compensating differentials (Kilbourne et al. 1994). Whatever
the logic, both theories predict a net negative effect of a higher proportion of
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female workers on the average wage in an occupation.
Although informative, this literature has not sufficiently investigated
the role of increasing numbers of female workers on the trend in wage inequal-
ity. The issue is briefly raised by Morris and Western (1999), but they do not
investigate it using multivariate analysis. Dooley and Gottschalk (1985) sug-
gest that the increasing labor supply of women could increase the proportion
of male workers with low earnings, but their study does not find strong evi-
dence to support this hypothesis. As Dooley and Gottschalk (1985) noted, the
general labor supply theory may predict that an increase in the proportion of
female workers would bring an increase in inequality. The logic is that women’s
wages are, on average, substantially lower than men’s wages, and therefore. as
more female workers enter into the low end labor market, the unskilled labor
market becomes more competitive. This, in turn, puts downward pressure on
male workers’ wages at the lower tail. That is, the increase of women’s labor
market participation would increase inequality by further lowering unskilled
male workers’ wages.
But this argument is not supported by empirical evidences (Morris and
Western 1999). In this regard, it should be noted that occupational segre-
gation between men and women is substantial (Weeden 1998; Peterson and
Morgan 1995), so female workers are not perfect substitutes for male work-
ers. Furthermore, the increasing labor supply of women during the past few
decades seems an unlikely significant factor in the increase in inequality at the
upper end of the distribution of wages.
On the contrary, empirical studies have found that the increase in the
number of female workers did not affect male workers’ wage distribution or
even negatively affect inequality by reducing male workers’ wages at the up-
22
per end of the distribution (Juhn and Kim 1999; Hyslop 2001). Juhn and Kim
(1999) attributes this to the heightened competition at the upper end. They
found that since the 1980s, well-educated women with upper-middle class fam-
ily backgrounds have mostly contributed to the growth of female participation
(Juhn and Murphy 1997; Juhn and Kim 1999; Maxwell 1990). That is, in-
creased female labor market participation since the 1980s is mostly due to
the influx of highly educated female workers. College educated women sub-
stitute for college educated men, not less educated, unskilled male workers.
This finding seems to suggest that the increase in female labor participation
suppressed, if not lowered, the further increase in inequality. The effect of
female labor force participation on inequality, however, looks to differ by the
unit of analysis. Hyslop (2001) shows that the female labor supply accounts
for over 20 percent of the increase in family inequality and 50 percent of the
increase in female inequality. Maxwell (1990) also reported that the increase
of female workers did not change the distribution of income of male-headed
families and female-headed families but it did widen the dispersion of dual-
income families.3 This positive effect of female labor force participation on
family inequality was an unobserved phenomenon before the 1970s, in which
female labor participation was relatively higher among poor families.
Nonetheless, given that female workers tend to have lower wages than
male workers, whether due to comparative worth considerations or other rea-
sons, I predict that increases in the proportion of female workers within an
occupational category will increase the category’s aggregate wage inequality,
ceteris paribus. From the perspective of microeconomic theory as well, the
3Unlike other studies, Nielsen and Alderson (1997) and Cancian and Reed (1999) reported
that increased female participation decreased family income inequality.
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increase in labor supply (deriving from the increased labor force participation
rates of women) is likely to drive down wages for some occupations, due to the
resulting increased competitiveness. Because women tend to have lower wages
than men, occupations in which the proportion of female workers increases
over time will likely have below average wages. Increases in the proportion of
female workers in an occupation will further lower the average wage in that oc-
cupation, which will thus result in increased between-occupational inequality,
unless the increase of female participation is mostly observed among skilled
occupations. We therefore arrive at the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1-A: Increases in the proportion of female workers within
an occupation will, ceteris paribus, increase growth in wage inequality in that
occupation.
Hypothesis 1-B: Increases in the proportion of female workers within an
occupation will reduce the occupation’s growth in mean wage and will therefore
tend to increase between-occupational wage inequality, ceteris paribus (since
occupations with increasing proportions of female workers will tend to have
mean wages that are below the overall average).
2.2.2 Deindustrialization
Industrial change—in terms of changes in the proportions of the labor force—
that is employed in various industrial categories is another source of increasing
wage inequality. As is well known, industries have substantial net effects on
wages even after controlling for the human capital and occupational charac-
teristics of workers (Krueger and Summers 1988). Net of these variables, the
industrial composition of the labor force therefore affects inequality in the
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distribution of wages (Sakamoto 1988). The most influential theory of the re-
lationship between industrial composition and income inequality was proposed
by Kuznets (1955) which was recently revisited by Nielsen and Alderson (1995,
1997) and Alderson and Nielsen (2002).
Kuznets (1955) explained the rising inequality in terms of the change of
industrial composition. He argued that at the early stage of industrialization,
inequality would grow due to the income gap between agricultural sector and
industrial sectors, but inequality would decrease as the proportion of agricul-
ture diminishes and the proportion industrial sector grows. Thus at the later
stage of industrialization, most workers engage in industrial sector so that
wage gap between agricultural and industrial sectors does influence little on
the distribution of wage of a society. Indeed, until the early 1970s, historical
trends of inequality of the United States and other European countries shows
the inverted-U pattern.4 Sometimes Kuznets thesis is said to be that economic
development is curvilinearly related with inequality. This curvilinear relation
is still widely tested through international comparison or in intranational spa-
tial labor market settings (e.g., Nielsen and Alderson 1997; Milanovic 1994).
Put summarily, Kuznets’ thesis suggests that the change of wage inequality
depends on the economic development and accompanying change of industrial
composition.
Recent debates of deindustrialization focus particularly on the effect
of decreased manufacturing sector. As reviewed by Sakamoto (1988) and
Alderson and Nielsen (2002), previous studies based on cross-sectional data
4Piketty and Saez (2003), however, argues that the inverted-U pattern observed in Amer-
ica from the early 20th century to the 1970s is not the result of the changes of industrial
composition of Kuznets thesis, but the outcome of progressive taxation and other haphazard
factors. Piketty (2003, 2005) shows that the same pattern of inequality change as observed
in America is also found in other advanced capitalists countries such as France and Britain.
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typically find that increases in employment in the manufacturing sector de-
creases income inequality. Many of “good jobs” especially for high school
educated workers were traditionally concentrated in manufacturing sectors.
Those manufacturing jobs used to be well paid and provide chances for up-
ward promotion within internal labor markets. The decrease of manufacturing
sector, deindustrialization, caused by globalization and/or outsourcing could
reduce the supply of these good jobs. And newly created jobs in service in-
dustries are mostly low paying and low skilled jobs (Bluestone and Harrison
1988; Lorence and Nelson 1993). Thus, deindustrialization increases inequal-
ity mainly by substituting good jobs of manufacturing sectors with bad jobs
of service sectors.
With the panel analysis of 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census data from the
largest 124 Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Lorence and Nelson (1993) con-
cludes that “Service Sector growth generates more bifurcated occupational
structures with greater percentages of high-paying managerial and low-paying
service positions” (172). Bloomquist and Summers (1982) also contend, by
doing cross-sectional comparison between non-metropolitan areas, that com-
positional changes of industry cause the change of occupational mix and it,
in turn, induces the increase of workers with low earning and therefore higher
levels of inequality. And an international comparative study of Gustafsson
and Johansson (1999) finds that deindustrialization brings about the increase
of inequality.
But other scholars did not find strong correlations between deindustri-
alization and growing inequality. Murphy and Welch (1993) showed that most
of inequality changes come from within industrial sectors and the amount of
change due to shifting compositional mix is small. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
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(1993) analyzed the change of inequality of male workers, reaching the same
conclusion that compositional change accounts for less than 15 percent of to-
tal inequality change. They have studied the role of occupation in the context
of industry. In their analysis, however, occupation was just a proxy variable
representing skill differences. They insisted that increased inequality cannot
be explained by the characteristics of industry, because most industries have
experienced the same direction of change and within industrial change is far
more important. Although they do not deny that deindustrialization did play
some role in increasing inequality but they argue that the amount of its effect
is tiny.
Some researchers insists that even substantial correlation between dein-
dustrialization and inequality could not tell the whole story of inequality
growth. Regional concentration of manufacturing sectors and their declines
has been said to be reasons of limitation of deindustrialization hypothesis.
Morris and Western (1999) say that although the decline of manufacturing
can explain the increase of inequality in traditional manufacturing cities in
the northern states, it cannot explain the increase of inequality in other states
where manufacturing sectors never occupy a significant portion of labor forces.
They also argue that the deindustrialization hypothesis is supported at the
state level, but it is not consistently supported at the national level.5
In addition to industrial compositional change, the widening mean wage
gaps between industries can also cause the increased inequality. Some indus-
tries respond well to the change of outside environments while others do not.
5Some argued that the effects of deindustrialization vary by demographic groups. Lorence
and Nelson (1993) said that the increase of the service sector employment has less of an effect
on female earnings distribution than on male earnings distribution. And Wilson (1996) pays
attention to racial variation of the effects of deindustrialization. He attributes the decline
of wages of urban African-Americans to deindustrialization.
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When high wage industries respond better to the changes than low wage indus-
tries, this could result in increased differences of productivity and increased
wage gaps. Raffalovich (1993) argued that “change in ... between-industry
earnings differentials has contributed substantially to total inequality change”
(130), while industrial restructuring has done little with the growth of in-
equality as discussed in the previous chapter. That is, without compositional
changes of industries, decrease of average wages of manufacturing sectors—
either because of the reduction of average wage at all levels of manufacturing
workers or because of the decline of opportunity of upward mobility of in-
ternal labor markets without reduction of wages of entry level manufacturing
workers—could bring about the increase of total inequality. We therefore in-
vestigate the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2-A: Reductions in the proportion of workers that are em-
ployed in the manufacturing sector will increase growth in within-occupational
wage inequality, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 2-B: Because the manufacturing sector has traditionally sup-
ported the wages of semi-skilled and low-skilled workers (who otherwise would
earn below-average wages), decreases in employment in the manufacturing sec-
tor will, ceteris paribus, increase growth in between-occupational inequality.
2.2.3 Unions
During the 1970’s and 1980’s, the proportion of the U.S. labor force that was
unionized declined by about one-half percentage point per year. This decline
in the proportion unionized has probably been an institutional factor that
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has contributed to increasing inequality.6 Freeman (1993) estimates that a
10 percent decline in the proportion unionized explains about half of the ob-
served growth in the variance in earnings among blue-collar workers from 1978
to 1988. Freeman (1993) also argues that the proportion unionized reduces
within-group inequality because the distribution of wages is more equal within
the union sector than within the non-union sector (see also Freeman and Med-
off 1984; Nickell and Layard 1999; Hedström and Swedberg 1985). Freeman
(1993) estimates that about 20 percent of the increase in within-group earn-
ings inequality can be attributed to the decline of the proportion unionized.
Similar conclusions are discussed by Card and DiNardo (2002).
Additional evidence of a union effect is provided by studies involving
international comparisons (Dinardo and Lemieux 1997; Alderson and Nielsen
2002; Atkinson 1999; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Gustafsson and Johans-
son 1999).7 Countries with higher proportions of their labor force unionized
tend to have lower levels of wage inequality. In the international context, an
6In addition to unions, the level of the minimum wage could be another institutional
factor. The relative level of the minimum wage compared to the mean wage has dropped
from 50 percent to 20 percent during the last two decades. Western (1995) asserts that
17 percent of the growth in the gap between college and high school graduates is driven
by the stagnant minimum wage (Morris and Western 1999). Dinardo and Lemieux (1997)
contend that the change in union density and the change in the minimum wage accounted
for a third of the difference in inequality between Canada and the United States. Some
economists argue that the increase in the minimum wage will bring about the growth in the
unemployment of unskilled workers. And, in turn, the increased unemployment accelerates
competition among unskilled workers and lowers their wages. But evidence supporting this
argument is scarce (Nickell and Layard 1999).
7DiPrete and McManus (1996) argue that we cannot adequately observe the effects of
institutional factors by comparing the effects over time in one nation. They assert that
institutional factors include general culture and whole institutions that can only be inves-
tigated by comparing different nations. This logic attributes all national differences that
are not explained by other factors to institutional factors. In their model, all residuals are
considered to be a result of institutional differences. This assumption could be too broad
to be tested as a scientific hypothesis.
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additional factor is the institutional setting of the wage-bargaining process.
European nations with centralized wage-bargaining systems (e.g., Sweden or
Germany) tend to have less inequality than nations with less centralized bar-
gaining systems such as the U.S. or Canada (e.g., Western 1995).
Although cross-sectional comparisons exhibit a substantially negative
relationship between the proportion unionized and inequality (see e.g., Free-
man 1980), a high proportion unionized does not, by itself, guarantee decreas-
ing wage inequality over time. Even countries with the highest proportions
unionized (e.g., Sweden and Norway) have experienced increases of inequality
in recent years. Thus, in regard to the temporal growth in wage inequality, the
initial level of the proportion unionized may be less significant than changes
in the proportion unionized.
An additional effect of unions is the spillover effect, which refers to
the upward pull of the unionized sector on the average wage of non-union
members (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Leicht 1989). This pressure occurs as
non-union firms try to prevent the unionization of their workers. To keep
so-called “healthy labor relations,” firms provide wages equivalent to those
provided by union firms. In other cases, unionized firms offer the same wages
to non-union members and union members to preclude further unionization.
The spillover effect often reduces inequality, as it raises the wages of workers
who would otherwise have below average wages (Freeman and Medoff 1984).
Unions seek to reduce wage inequality within firms because union decisions
are based on a political process in which the majority rules, and the majority
of workers is likely to have below average earnings. Also, union members are
likely to favor a less-dispersed distribution of earnings because of ideological
reasons and organizational solidarity (Freeman and Medoff 1984:16-17). The
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spillover effect may be especially equalizing when the proportion unionized is
quite high and unions have significant power over broad segments of the labor
force, or society more broadly.
The equalizing force of the spillover effect is not, however, inevitable,
as it is only an empirical tendency rather than a theoretically logical conse-
quence. That is, if the spillover effect is small or negligible, then the monopoly
effect of unions may dominate (Freeman and Medoff 1984). In this case, unions
increase inequality because the average wages of union workers increase while
the wages of other non-union lesser-skilled workers do not. Indeed, the average
wages in the non-union sector may even decline due to the excess labor supply
that is generated by the high wages of union workers (Pindyck and Rubinfeld
2001). This latter scenario portrays unions as primarily a monopolistic insti-
tution that increases inequality between union workers and non-union workers
(e.g., Weeden 2002). Freeman and Medoff (1984) found that unions have a
substantial monopoly wage impact; thus, unionized workers earn more than
non-unionized workers of equal skill.
In spite of these monopoly effects, unions can promote wage equaliza-
tion by increasing the wages of blue-collar workers relative to the wages of
white-collar workers. Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that the inequality-
reducing effects of unionism outweigh the inequality-increasing effects, despite
the monopoly effects of unionism. Indeed, inequality between white-collar
workers and blue-collar workers inside the unionized sector has traditionally
been low. However, this within-group equalizing force seems to be changing.
Whereas in previous decades the wage setting policies of unions specified a sin-
gle wage for a broad array of union members, in recent years unions have lost
their negotiation power as universal wage setters (Western 1995), and unions
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are more likely to accept differentiated wages for their members according to
individual workers’ productivities.
It does not seem likely that this trend of diminishing power of unions
will be reversed in the future (Hirsch and Schumacher 2001), given that most
of the decline in union membership is due to differential employment growth
rates across industries. Such differential growth rates are, again, due largely to
broader market and regulatory forces rather than changes in union organizing
activity (Farber and Western 2001). In addition to this, the change in wage
determination norms among union members may be further weakening the
inequality-reducing function of unionism. Unions have recently been more
likely to withdraw the policy of a universal wage for their members and to
accept differentiated wage settings by the skill levels of their members (Mitchell
1985). This trend might increase inequality within firms and therefore within
occupations. Unions may thus be becoming less successful at establishing
similar wages across a large number of unionized workers. Given these facts,
the level of inequality among union workers may be rising to the level among
non-union workers.
In sum, unions traditionally have promoted equality by reducing within-
sector inequality and by raising the average wages of non-union workers (via
the spillover effect). However, both of these processes may be declining, as
unions lose their bargaining power in the context of reduced union membership
and political power in the U.S. labor force. Therefore, the net effects of unions
on wage inequality needs to be further investigated empirically. I propose the
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3-A: Reductions in the proportion of unionized workers in
an occupation will increase both within-occupational and between-occupational
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wage inequality, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 3-B: Since unions have protected the wages of semi-skilled
and low-skilled workers, a decline of the proportion of unionized workers will
increase between-occupational wage inequality, ceteris paribus.
2.2.4 Insecure Employment Relations
Since the 1970’s, cost reduction has become a critically important basis of
competition. This tendency may be exacerbated by the “shareholder revolu-
tion,” which encourages companies to be more interested in short term gains
rather than in long term development. Both of these considerations may lead
to increases in the employment of contingent workers. These workers may
help firms reduce their short-term labor costs by hiring the cheapest possi-
ble workers for a particular set of jobs. However, this “casualization” in the
labor market may increase wage inequality. This may occur both as because
contingent workers tend to have lower wages and because firms are usually un-
interested in promoting or training such workers for higher skilled and better
paying positions, which are often, to some extent, eliminated by the increased
employment of contingent workers.
During the 1980s, the number of contingent workers increased signif-
icantly. Belous (1989) reports that while the total labor force grew by 14
percent during this period, part-time employment grew by 21 percent. In
1989, the proportion of part-time workers among the total labor force was 18
percent. Since the late 1950s, the fraction of part-time workers has grown
gradually, rising from 12.1 percent in 1957 to 18 percent in 1989 (Tilly 1991).
Part of the reason for this growth is due to the relatively rapid growth of
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the industries that use the most part-timers. But the demand of part-time
workers by employers of other industries has also grown (Hipple and Stewart
1996). Companies have shifted to part-time employment because as a way to
cut labor costs. The wage gap between full-time and part-time workers has
widened (Tilly 1991). This trend of growing contingent workers seems to hold
in the 1990s, despite the strong labor market (Hipple 2001). This trend, if
continued, is very likely to increase wage inequality.
Some empirical evidence regarding these processes is provided by Mc-
Call (2000), who analyzes inequality in many local areas in the U.S. Her results
indicate higher levels of inequality in places with higher rates of flexible and
insecure employment patterns. To measure the latter, she uses the unem-
ployment rate, the proportion of part-time workers, and the proportion of
immigrant workers. She argues that in explaining within-group inequality, in-
secure employment conditions are more important than technological change
or industry.
Between-occupational inequality is most likely increased by the expan-
sion of part-time workers, who tend to have lower wages and are often con-
centrated in “bad secondary jobs” (e.g., Tilly 1991). To be sure, contingent
workers are not limited to low income jobs. High-skilled or high-educated
independent contractors may actually earn more than their counterparts in
traditionally secure employment relations (Hipple and Stewart 1996; Polivka
1996). These sorts of workers are, however, only a tiny proportion of those
who are employed on a part-time basis, in terms of hours worked per week
(and the latter measure is the indicator that is available to us in the data that
we use). I therefore propose the following hypotheses that may be empirically
investigated using my data.
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Hypothesis 4-A: Growth in wage inequality will be greater in occupations
that are experiencing an increase in the proportion of part-time workers, ceteris
paribus.
Hypothesis 4-B Between-occupational inequality will be increased to the
extent that the proportion of part-time employment in an occupation increases,
ceteris paribus.
2.2.5 Increases in the Return to Skill
Recent technological developments may have increased the demand for high
skilled workers but may have decreased the demand for low skilled workers.
This explanation is known as the skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
hypothesis and has been popular in economics (Atkinson 1999; Murphy and
Welch 1997). According to this view, increased demand for (and hence returns
to) skilled labor is the primary cause of the increases in wage inequality in
recent years. While high skilled workers are now earning more than before,
the wages of low skilled workers are not increasing and may even be declining.
Underlying the increased demand for skilled labor is technological change,
which is becoming increasingly complex and hence requires the sophisticated
work skills of more highly educated workers.
The SBTC hypothesis is popular among economists because it is inher-
ently compatible with their view of the labor market as highly competitive and
relatively efficient. Unlike institutional perspectives, which emphasize forces
that are largely outside of market processes, the SBTC view explains increas-
ing inequality in terms of the traditional economic framework of supply and
demand. Within this framework, sociological or special theoretical innovation
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is not required, implicitly confirming the explanatory power of conventional
economics.
The 1970’s is known as a period of declining inequality in educational
gaps (e.g., Featherman and Hauser 1978; Farley 1996). The increased supply of
highly educated labor was further exacerbated by the entry of the baby-boom
cohort into the labor force as they became of working age. Consequently, the
wage differential between high school graduates and college graduates nar-
rowed throughout the 1970’s. In keeping with the basic economic principles of
supply and demand, the decline in the college premium is usually explained by
the increased supply of educated labor during the 1970’s (Levy and Murnane
1992; Karoly 1993; Murphy and Welch 1993; Morris and Western 1999).
The narrowing wage differential was, however, reversed in the 1980’s.
During this decade as well as in the 1990’s, the college premium rose, despite
the increased number of workers with a college degree. At first glance, this
result seems inconsistent with the basic operation of supply and demand, since
the increased supply should drive down the college premium, similar to what
occurred during the 1970’s (Thurow 1975). However, in spite of an increased
supply of college graduates, the labor return to college education has risen
since the 1980s. This seemingly contradictory result is easily explained by the
SBTC view, however, as an upward shift in the demand function for highly
educated labor has outweighed the increased supply (Juhn et al. 1993). In
the 1980s, the demand for college graduates has increased more due to global
competition and key technological change. Thus, the relative supply of college
graduates has declined compared to the relative supply of college graduates in
the 1970s.
While the deindustrialization hypothesis focuses on global competition,
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which reduces the needs of manufacturing sectors, the SBTC hypothesis does
not explain why the need for college graduates has increased in manufactur-
ing sectors as well as in other sectors. The educational composition within
manufacturing sectors, which used to be disproportionately comprised of high
school graduates, has shifted towards a higher proportion of college graduates.
Employment has shifted toward industries and occupations that demand more
skilled workers, even in the face of rising skill premiums (Juhn et al. 1993).
Occupations are often used as an indicator of different skill levels. In-
deed, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles Index classifies occupations by
various skill criteria. Thus, the rise in the demand for skilled workers implies
that the increase in the demand for skilled occupations and the faster growth
of income within these occupations will result in a widening wage gap between
highly skilled and unskilled occupations. Therefore, the SBTC hypothesis may
envisage the growth of between-occupational inequality.
The skill premium is not limited to having a college degree. Techno-
logical change may have increased the demand for other types or indicators
of various work skills, broadly construed. These other types of skills (e.g.,
perseverance, reliability, creativity) are, however, typically difficult to mea-
sure directly. The focus on educational attainment is to some extent due to
the availability of data on this skill indicator. For example, Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998) tried to find the answer on why skill demand rises in the
computer revolution. They ran regression analyses with skill demands and
computer usage rates as independent variables, reporting that industry skill
upgrading is more intensive in computer-intensive sectors. They insist that the
computer revolution caused the widening productivity gap and thus resulted
in growing inequality. For this reason, my hypotheses are also stated in terms
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of educational attainment.
Hypothesis 5-A: Ceteris paribus, wage inequality will increase in occu-
pations that experience increases in the variability of educational attainment.
Hypothesis 5-B: Ceteris paribus, increases in the proportion of college
educated workers in an occupation will increase between-occupational inequal-
ity.
2.2.6 Changes of Firm Organizational Culture
Lindbeck and Snower (1996) propose a new approach, the change of organi-
zational cultures. They insist that the mechanism determining workers’ wage
levels in organizations has been altered fundamentally. They call this orga-
nizational change the organizational revolution, which refers to a shift from
Tayloristic organizations to holistic organizations. Holistic organizations, they
argue, are characterized by a flatter structure, greater production flexibility,
more individual treatment of employees, and multi-tasking over occupational
or divisional boundaries. In Tayloristic organizations, what determines work-
ers’ wages is not actually how much productivity workers exert, but what kind
of task workers perform and/or to which departments in the division of labor
workers belong. This kind of wage determination system is well described by a
sociological view that attributes marginal productivity to jobs rather than to
individuals (Thurow 1975; Granovetter 1981). That is, productivity belongs
to the tasks workers perform, not to workers themselves.
The organizational revolution does not simply increase the need for
skilled workers; it also redefines what the required skills are (Snower 1998).
Contrary to Tayloristic organizations, holistic organizations do not limit in-
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dividual workers’ tasks to one division in an organization. Workers are more
likely to perform tasks across divisions. As information technology develops,
more and more data is accumulated at the site of production. In addition
to this cross-divisional multi-tasking, analyzing, interpreting, and making de-
cisions regarding this accumulated data becomes more important than ever
before. Newly required skills include versatility across tasks, the ability to
learn new tasks, the aptitude to take advantage of complementarities between
different tasks, and the ability to communicate. Divisional boundaries that dis-
tinguish production from the customer service become obscure. All divisions
share the same goal, customer satisfaction. Communicative skills are neces-
sary for all workers. That is, general skills are required more than task-specific
skills.
In addition to this, the development of information technology allows
employers to better gauge individual workers’ productivity. Because employers
can provide the ‘objective’ (numerical) data on individual workers’ productiv-
ity, employees are also more likely to accept employers’ judgements of their
productivity. Thus, in holistic organizations, workers’ wages are more likely to
be determined by individual workers’ own productivity, rather than by tasks
workers perform. In this regard, the wage deterministic system of holistic
organizations would seem to be more consistent with neoclassical human cap-
ital theory which attributes productivity primarily to something belonging to
individual workers.
Unlike traditional human capital theory, theorists of the organizational
change view argue that the college premium arises not because college gradu-
ates learn new skills in college but because college graduates are more likely to
be versatile and to learn new and adequate skills quickly. Within-educational
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group inequalities are rising because workers with equal educational levels have
different abilities for multiple tasks.
Some scholars of this view assert that (skill-biased) technologies and
organizational changes are complementary to each other. Caroli and Reenen
(2001) call the organizational changes “skill-biased organizational change.”
Using firm-level data, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) shows that
introducing information technologies (e.g., more usage of personal comput-
ers) in a firm does not guarantee the improvement of productivity. Rather,
without accompanying occupational changes, a simple increase of information
technologies usage drops productivity. Caroli and Reenen (2001) also find a
similar result with British and French establishment-level data.
The organizational change view seems to provide an answer to the pro-
ductivity paradox of information technology (Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang
2002; Bresnahan et al. 2002). A paradox arose as, in spite of increased invest-
ment in information technology in the 1980s, productivity did not increase at
the same pace. However, as organizational adjustments spread in the 1990s,
productivity increased, perhaps retroactively. This view implies that the in-
crease in inequality may happen across firms, which are the principal bodies
required to implement organizational changes. While some firms succeed both
in the investment in new information technologies and in the process of or-
ganizational redesign, other firms fail at both or one or the other of these
productivity increasing activities, and thus, in terms of productivity, get left
behind. As productivity gaps across firms widen, so does inequality across
firms. Indeed, using manufacturing sector data from 1975 to 1992, Dunne
et al. (2004) finds that virtually the entire increase in overall dispersion in
hourly wage is accounted for by the between-plant components.
40
For scholars of this view, the decline of centralized bargaining is seen
as a reflection of these changes in organizations. Where workers’ wages are
determined by individual workers’ own productivity, materialistic bases for
equal pay for equal work are eroding. Especially since equal work is usually
judged by the definition of tasks, the increased requirement of versatile ability
across tasks seems to be an obvious factor in the corrosion of material bases
for equal pay for equal work. In addition to this, Snower (1998) asserts that
the reason why the gender gap is narrowing is that women are more likely
than men to have temporal flexibility, interpersonal skills, and the ability to
multi-task; thus, employers have begun to prefer women over men.
It might be difficult, however, to test their argument directly because
data limitations. For this reason, I will test this hypothesis indirectly. From
the argument that occupational barriers become obscure and workers’ versatile
ability becomes more important, we can expect the following;
Hypothesis 6-A: Within-occupational inequality will grow faster in high
skill jobs, which have a higher proportion of college graduates and in service
jobs, which require more communicative skills.
Hypothesis 6-B: Among highly educated workers, between-occupational





Given my research agenda, I utilize the Current Population Survey Merged
Outgoing Rotation (CPS-MORG) 1982-2002 files. First, I test bivariate re-
lationships between occupation and growing wage inequality using the CPS-
MORG. Then, I construct longitudinal datasets using CPS-MORG to test the
hypotheses of Chapter 2. The identifying unit of these newly constructed
longitudinal data is the three-digit occupational code.
3.1 Methodological Issues
The causes of inequality can be studied best with longitudinal data, but it is
difficult to find a dataset that has a big enough sample size and a long enough
time period. Most big datasets are cross-sectional, and panel data usually
have small samples and may only cover specific cohorts.
Because of these limitations, scholars apply two alternative strategies.
One is to use cross-sectional data at two or more different time points and
compare the results (Borjas et al. 1996; Cancian and Reed 1999; Levy and
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Murnane 1992; Murphy and Welch 1993; Weeden 1998). To do this, first
they run the wage regression model for each different group. Using a regres-
sion decomposition method, the amount of total change is decomposed into
rate change and compositional change. This is a good way to find the effect
of growing between-group differences by comparing the change of parameter
estimates across groups. With this method, however, we can only infer the
causes of growing within group inequality indirectly. Growing within group
inequality is explained indirectly with the residual variance.
The other strategy is to compare different geographic regions that show
different amounts of inequality (McCall 2000; Grodsky and Pager 2001). Most
international comparison studies (Atkinson 1999; Dinardo and Lemieux 1997;
DiPrete and McManus 1996; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997) use this strategy.
Comparing states across the U.S. is methodologically similar. This method
can tell us the sources of inequality; however, such sources are not necessarily
the causes of growing inequality. The study of the effect of unions is a good
example. In nations where union density is high, wage inequality tends to
be lower in a given year. However, such nations have experienced the same
amount of inequality growth over time as other nations. Some scholars use
multi-level models with individual data, setting individual characteristics as
level one (i.e., micro level) and regional characteristics as level two (i.e., macro
level). This appears to be a better way to identify the sources of inequality
over comparing the coefficients of different regions. However, we are interested
in the growth of inequality over time, not regional differences.
To overcome these weaknesses and to study the causes of growing in-
equality, we need to construct longitudinal data. Unfortunately, there is no
feasible individual level longitudinal data. One alternative is to construct a
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group level data set that has summary descriptive statistics by group. Using
group level data in the study of inequality is not rare. For instance, Gustafs-
son and Johansson (1999), Autor et al. (1998), and Lee (2004, 2005) use group
level inequality data across regions. For group level longitudinal data, group
identity should stay unchanged over the time period so as to be comparable
over time. A group category satisfying this condition could be occupation. By
using this kind of data, we can test the causes of growing inequality directly.
3.2 Data
For this research, the Current Population Survey, which is a fairly large data
set collected annually, is utilized. I use the data files for the Merged Outgo-
ing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey (CPS-MORG) from
1983 to 2002. These data have been used in previous research by economists
(e.g., Juhn et al. 1993), as the CPS-MORG provides reliable information on
hourly wages. Furthermore, during this time period, the CPS-MORG uses a
consistent occupational classification, which is critical for my study, given the
important role of occupation in the hypotheses that I wish to investigate.1
My target population for the analysis includes the non-institutionalized,
non-military population aged 18 to 65 who were employed in the labor force
at some time during the survey year. Self-employed persons were deleted
from my sample, however, because their income data are subject to greater
measurement errors (Lillard et al. 1986) and because the self-employed tend
1Prior to 1983, the CPS-MORG used the 1970 U.S. Census occupational classification,
which is difficult to compare at the three-digit level with the 1980 U.S. Census occupational
classification that has been used since 1983 for the CPS. Although additional changes to
this occupational classification were made in 1998, they are relatively minor.
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to represent a separate labor market sector that is not critical to my research
hypotheses. Hourly wages are adjusted for inflation during this time period
using the Consumer Price Index (i.e., CPI-X) to convert all wages to 2002
constant dollars. For salaried workers, I compute the hourly wage based on
weekly earnings and hours worked during the week. I impute hourly wages for
persons with top-coded values on wages or earnings based on the assumption
of a log-normal distribution.2
In order to ensure sufficiently reliable estimates of occupational charac-
teristics, I limit the analysis to those three-digit occupational codes for which
a sample size of at least 100 is available in each year from 1983 to 2002. Oc-
cupational categories that had sample sizes of less than 100 were collapsed
together (often with the corresponding “other” or “miscellaneous” category)
until a sufficient sample size was obtained. This process yielded a total of 331
occupations consisting of either separate three-digit codes or slightly grouped
categories of three-digit codes.3
For each of these occupations in each year, I compute indices of wage
inequality as well as a variety of other variables, which are used to construct
a new dataset. In order to further reduce the influence of random sampling
variability, all of the occupation-specific statistics were computed using three-
year moving averages. In sum, using the occupational category as the unit
of analysis, the total sample size is 5,958, which encompasses 331 three-digit
occupational categories observed over 18 years. This newly constructed longi-
tudinal data set is used for my multivariate analysis.
2I used a log-normal distribution instead of the more popular Pareto distribution to avoid
arbitrary cutting points of the Pareto distribution. Similar results were obtained using the
Pareto distribution with various cutting points.
3For example, “miscellaneous precision workers n.e.c.” were combined with other specific
sorts of precision workers. See Appendix A for the complete list of 331 occupations.
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3.3 Measures of Wage Inequality












where N refers to the total number of persons, yi refers to the wage of
the individual i, and ȳ refers to the grand mean. The Gini index is thus equal
to the average absolute difference between all pairs of wages divided by twice
of the mean. I use the Gini index in my descriptive statistics to measure the
growth of wage inequality. As is well known, the Gini index ranges from 0
to 1, where higher values indicate greater inequality. Unlike other measures
of inequality, however, the shortcoming of the Gini index is that it cannot
be uniquely decomposed into between-group and within-group components
(Allison 1978).
Because different measures of inequality have different degrees of sen-
sitivity to transfers at different parts of the wage distribution (e.g., the Gini
index is usually most sensitive to transfers in the middle of the distribution), I
also compute other indices of inequality for my descriptive statistics, including
the Theil index, the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD), and Half the Square
of the Coefficient of Variation (HSCV), which have minimum values of zero
(for perfect equality) and unbounded upper values (Allison 1978). The Theil
index, the MLD, and HSCV are based on entrophy theory. Among them, the
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MLD is more sensitive to transfers at the lower end of the distribution, while
the HSCV is more sensitive to the upper end of the distribution. The Theil
































The MLD, the HSCV, and the Theil index may each be additively de-
composed into between-group versus within-group components. For example,















where yk refers to the mean wage of the kth subgroup and Tk refers to
the Theil index for the kth subgroup. The first component on the right-hand
side of the equation 3.5 is thus the within-group inequality, and the second
component is the between-group inequality. As shown in Equation 3.5, within-
group inequality is a weighted average of inequality in each subgroup, where
weight is yk/ȳ. The sum of the weight will sum to one for the Theil index but
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will not sum to one for the MLD or the HSCV (Cowell 1995).
The final measure of inequality that I calculate is the Atkinson index,
which is based on a social welfare approach. Like the Gini index, the Atkinson













Equation 3.6 shows the formula for the Atkinson index. Atkinson in-
dexes are constructed to measure inequality based on the social welfare func-
tion. The Atkinson index can be interpreted as the percent of transferred
income required to maximize the social welfare. The inequality aversion pa-
rameter, ε, is a special feature of the Atkinson index and indicates the degree
of sensitivity towards inequality that a researcher wishes to assume. A larger,
more positive aversion parameter implies greater sensitivity to transfers at
the lower end of the wage distribution and less sensitivity to transfers among
top income recipients (Jenkins 1999; Coulter 1989). For inequality aversion













































The Atkinson index can be decomposed, albeit not additively. The
within-group Atkinson inequality index can be written as equation 3.7 and
between-group Atkinson inequality can be formulated as equation 3.8. Unlike
the generalized entropy measures, the sum of the between-group and within-
group components of the Atkinson inequality index is not the total inequality
of Equation 3.6.
3.4 Statistical Models
I estimate multi-level growth models to test hypotheses described in Chapter
2. First, I investigate models to study within-occupational inequality. In this
part of the analysis, the dependent variable is the level of wage inequality
in each occupation, while the independent variables are relevant descriptive
statistics for each occupation in each year. The model of within-occupational
inequality also tests the homogeneity of an occupation after controlling for
variables other than occupation itself. If an occupation is a homogeneous
group and its heterogeneity is caused by intervention of other social and demo-
graphic factors as the disaggregate structuration theorists insist, the majority
of within-occupational inequality should be explained by other social and de-
mographic variables such as race, gender, and industry. That is, the variation
explained by these independent variables should be large.
In the subsequent part of the analysis, the concern is with understanding
the sources of between-occupational inequality. For these multi-level growth
models, the dependent variable is the occupation-specific mean wage. Al-
though I do not directly compute between-occupational inequality with these
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models that use mean wage as the dependent variable, between-occupational
inequality may be assumed to be increasing to the extent that the mean wage
is reduced in low-wage occupations or that it is increased in high-wage occu-
pations.
The model of occupational mean wage is testing whether an occupa-
tional common interest, which is mean wage in my model, is driven by oc-
cupational associations themselves. The disaggregate structuration theorists
assert that through occupationalization, occupations become classes and oc-
cupational associations pursue their common interests. Thus, changes of the
occupational mean wage, which is clearly a common interest of an occupation,
should be driven by occupations themselves, not by ‘other variables.’ There-
fore, the amount of R-squared explained (=Proportionate Reduction in Error)
by ‘other variables’ in the model of occupational mean wage should be small.
3.4.1 Within-Occupational Inequality
The Baseline Model is the unconditional growth model that contains no sub-
stantive predictors. As is shown in equation 3.9, this model includes the year
as the only independent variable. In particular, the first line of equation 3.9
shows the level 1 model in which INEQjt refers to the Gini index of wage
inequality in occupation j at time t. Thus, this model investigates within-
occupational inequality, which is specified to be a function of the initial level
of wage inequality (αj) and its yearly change (βj). The initial level of inequal-
ity and the yearly change in inequality are specified as random variables that
vary across occupations. Time, T is centered to the initial year, 1983-85, thus
it is ranged from 0 to 17.
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INEQjt = αj + βjTt + εjt
αj = α + u1j
βj = β + u2j
(3.9)
The second and third lines of equation 3.9 define the level 2 portion of
the growth model. Both the initial levels of inequality and their yearly change
vary across occupations. The initial level of inequality consists of the grand
mean for inequality across all occupations, α, and the deviation of occupation
j from the grand mean, u1j. Similarly, the yearly change consists of the grand
mean of yearly change for all occupations, β, and the deviation of occupation
j from the grand mean, u2j.
INEQjt = αj + βjTt + γXjt + δ(Tt × X̄j.) + ζX̄j. + εjt (3.10)
To extend the Baseline Model, three sets of predictors are added to
obtain Model 1, which is shown by equation 3.10. The first of predictors in-
cludes the explanatory variables, Xjt, which refer to the occupation-specific
proportions for each of the following characteristics: female, African American,
Hispanic, other race,; Southern residence, college graduate, the educational di-
versity index, public sector employment; unionized; and manufacturing sector
employment. Xjt is a JT ×K matrix with k explanatory variables, which are
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measured 18 times (t = 0, . . . , 17) for j occupations. The parameter estimates
for the net effects of these variables (i.e., γ) indicate the extent to which the
growth of wage inequality within an occupation is affected by each explanatory
variable.
The second set of predictors consists of interaction terms between the
occupation-specific means of the explanatory variables and time (i.e., Tt×X̄j).
These occupation-specific means are by definition constant across all years.
The coefficients for these interaction terms (i.e., δ) refer to the changes in the
net effects of the explanatory variables without compositional change. The last
set of variables in equation 3.10 includes the unchanging occupational charac-
teristics themselves, which are simply the occupation-specific means (i.e., X̄j)
that are associated with the coefficients referred to as ζ. The coefficients in
the vector refer to the net effects of changes in the independent variables on
changes (i.e., growth) in wage inequality over this time period. The effects
of the occupation-specific means (i.e., ζ) predict variation in wage inequality
across occupations in any cross-sectional year, while the δ coefficients for the
interaction terms between year and the independent variables may be inter-
preted as the increase in wage inequality within a given independent variable
over this time period.
A common issue in panel models with random effects is that the random
effects may be correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables (which
are also occupation-specific), thus causing estimation bias. For this reason,
Halaby (2004) and Wooldridge (2004) suggest a fixed-effects specification. In
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my particular application, equation 3.10 includes the group means of the ex-
planatory variables (i.e., X̄j), which, as in the fixed-effects model, eliminates
the problem of correlation between the random effects and the explanatory
variables (Kittel and Winner 2005). Hausman test statistics for my results
clearly indicate that I can fail to reject the null hypothesis that the random
effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
INEQjt = [α + βTt + γXjt + δ(Tt × X̄j.) + ζX̄j.] + [u1j + u2jTt + εjt]
where,

















Equation 3.11 shows the composite model where [α+βTt+γXjt+δ(Tt×
X̄j.)+ζX̄j.] refers to its structural components and [u1j+u2jTt+εjt] refers to its
stochastic elements. For the purpose of estimating this model, I assume that
the growth of wage inequality over time is normally distributed, conditional
on the sample data for the explanatory variables. The stochastic element for
the intercept,(i.e., u1j) and the stochastic element for the growth rate, (i.e.,
u2j), are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with zero means and a
given variance-covariance matrix. In particular, σ21 represents the amount of
variability in the intercepts across occupations, and σ22 refers to the amount
of variability in the slopes over time. The reductions in and relative to the
Baseline Model given by equation 3.11 indicate the variation that is explained
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by the explanatory variables.
The level 1 error component, εjt, has a mean of zero and a variance of
Σ. The Baltagi-Li test for first-order serial correlation for the random effects
model is statistically significant. In order to control for this serial correlation at
level 1, a covariance-structure known as “Toeplitz with two Bands” is assumed.
According to this assumption, the (i,j) element of Σ when i 6= j is equal to
σ|i−j|+11(|i−j| < 2), where 1(|i−j| < 2) equals 1 if |i−j| < 2, and 0 otherwise.
Thus, the diagonal matrix Σ (a T ×T matrix) is σ2εs, while one column or row
off the diagonal component is σtoep(2).
4 When i = j, Σ is 1.
A zero correlation between occupations is assumed, given that the values
on the occupation-specific explanatory variables are based on individuals in
each occupation who were randomly sampled by the survey. This assumption
may further be justified on the grounds that the 331 occupations are randomly
sampled from a larger population of occupations. To empirically consider the
hypothesis of a cross-occupational correlation, however, I also estimated the
panel-corrected standard-error model (Beck 2001), using the same data and
variables. The results were substantively very similar to those discussed in
following chapters.
3.4.2 Between-Occupational Inequality
Equation 3.12 is essentially the same as equation 3.11 except that the for-
mer uses a different dependent variable, namely, the mean wage in the jth
4Although the assumption of AR(1) autocorrelation is popular, it did not work well in
the estimation of my model.
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occupation. As expressed in equation 3.5, between-occupational inequality
is a weighted sum of occupational mean wages. The parameter estimates
of equation 3.12 refer to the net effects of the explanatory variables on the
occupation-specific mean wage and thus indirectly indicate the sources of
between-occupational inequality.
MEANWAGEjt = [α + βTt + γXjt + δ(Tt × X̄j.) + ζX̄j. + θ(Xjt ×Dj.)]
+ [u1j + u2jTt + εjt]
(3.12)
In order to facilitate the latter interpretation more clearly, equation 3.12
includes interaction terms between the time-variant explanatory variables and
two dichotomous variables, which indicate high-income occupations and low-
income occupations, respectively (i.e., Xjt × Dj.). High-income occupations
are defined as those where the mean wage is greater than $21.20 per hour,
which is more than one standard deviation above the grand mean (i.e., $15.5
per hour). Low-income occupations are defined as those where the mean wage
is less than $9.82 per hour, which is one standard deviation less than the grand
mean.5 For example, if the coefficient for the interaction between female and
high-income occupations is highly negative while the coefficient between female
and low-income occupations is highly positive, then female employment can be
5Wages are in 2002 constant dollars throughout the analysis.
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interpreted as reducing between-occupational inequality. This is because the
combination of these highly negative and highly positive coefficients indicates
a reduction in the mean wage of high-income occupations but an increase in
the mean wage of low-income occupations.
3.4.3 Dependent and Independent Variables
Table 3.1 shows the list of dependent and independent variables applied in
these analyses.
Dependent Variables
For the models of within-occupation inequality discussed above, the
Gini inequality index is used as a dependent variable because of its popularity.
The use of alternative inequality indexes do not change the substantial findings
reported in the following chapters. Gini inequality indexes used in actual
estimations are multiplied by 100, making the range of within-occupational
inequality, INEQjt, 0 to 100.
The yearly mean wage by occupation is used as a dependent variable
for the estimation of between-occupational inequality. Thus, estimated coef-
ficients of models of between-occupational inequality capture the net dollar

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The independent variables consist of five parts: (1) time, (2) slope
change by the change of proportion, (3) yearly slope change of group mean,
(4) effect of group mean, and (5) interaction effects. Except for the ‘time’
variable, each part consists of the combination of eleven variables, which are
classified into four groups.
These are (1) demographic variables, including percent female (Female),
percent black (Black), percent Hispanic (Hisp), and percent living in southern
states (South); (2) education variables, including percent college graduate or
advanced degree holders (BA+) and the educational diversity index (Edu.Div);
(3) industrial change variables, including percent public sector (Public) and
percent manufacturing sector (Manuf); (4) institutional variables, including
percent part time workers (PartTime) and percent unionized or union covered
workers (Union).
Except for Edu.Div, all variables indicate the percent share in an occu-
pation j at time t and range from 0 to 1. For the convenience of interpretation,
I multiply all variables by 100. Thus, the parameter coefficients refer to the
point change of the inequality index for a 1 percent point increase in the in-
dependent variable.
The educational diversity index indicates the educational diversity within
an occupation j and ranges from 0 to 1. Simpson’s Diversity Index is applied to
estimate the educational diversity. Simpson’s Diversity Index can be written
as 1−∑(nk/N)2, where nk refers to the number of workers at education level
k and N refers to the total number of workers at occupation j. The higher the
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index, the greater the variability of educational attainment in the particular
occupation. In this data there are five levels of educational attainment, and
the the maximum number of EduDiv is .8, when all educational categories are
evenly found in an occupation. I also multiply this index by 100.
Among the interaction terms, Sales and Service refer to the sales
industrial sector and service industrial sector dummy variables, respectively.
LowWage and HighWage refer to the high-wage occupation and low-wage oc-
cupation dummy variables. Thus, interaction effects estimate the additional ef-
fect of each independent variable. For instance, the coefficient of Public×LowWage
indicates the expected Gini inequality change by one percent point change in
percent public sector among low-wage occupations. I also tested the models in-
cluding other interaction effects (e.g., such as Manufacturing×LowWage), but
the interactions were not statistically significant; thus, in order to maintain
parsimony, I do not include them in my models.
As shown in Table 3.1, only six variables are used for the group of ‘yearly
slope change of group mean’ to obtain parsimonious results. I also estimated a
model using all eleven variables in ‘yearly slope change of group mean,’ finding






Figure 4.1 shows the trend in the Gini index from 1983 to 2002. As is evident
in Figure 4.1, wage inequality increased sharply during the early 1980’s and
then tapered off during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Since that time, wage
inequality has again continued to increase.1 The Gini was .313 in 1983-1985
1Similar results for the 1980’s and 1990’s are provided by Bernstein and Mishel (1997).
Card and DiNardo (2002) insists that inequality growth has leveled off in the 1990s. They
assert that most of the rise of inequality happened in the early 1980s and that after that no
significant increase of inequality is observed. In their analysis, they restricted their sample
to full-time-full-year workers, ignoring all part-time and part-year workers. They did not
treat top-coding appropriately. They adjusted top-coding by multiplying all top-coding by
1.4, regardless of the diversity of top-coding across the year. Inconsistent with Card and
DiNardo’s argument, Mishel et al. (1999) found that hourly wage inequality (Gini inequality
index) after various top-code adjustments has continued to grow in the 1990s, although at
a slower rate than the 1980s. Mishel et al. (1999) obtained the same results using both the
March CPS and CPS-MORG data.
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and .337 in 2000-2002. The first question is what amount of this increase can



















1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Figure 4.1: Gini Index of Wage Inequality from 1983-1985 to 2000-2002
4.1 Declining Explanatory Power of Occupa-
tion
Table 4.1 shows the R-squareds (or coefficients of determination) for regression
models of wage inequality in which dummy variables are used as independent
variables to indicate occupations, industries, and educational categories. As
shown in Table 4.1 for 1983 to 1985, using 330 dummy variables to indicate 331
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Table 4.1: Explanatory Power of Occupation, Industry, and Education on
Hourly Wage
Occupationa Industry Educationg
Total BA+b ≤HSGc 1 digitd 3 digite 1 digitf
1983-85 .2856 .2019 .2555 .1559 .1585 .0545 .1230
1990-92 .2751 .1689 .2301 .1552 .1468 .0550 .1632
2000-02 .2454 .1396 .1885 .1546 .1088 .0253 .1807
%4 btw 83-85
and 00-02
−.141 −.309 −.263 −.008 −.314 −.546 +.469
Notes: Numbers in the table are R2s of regression analysis of each explanatory variable on
hourly wage. Source: Author’s own calculation using the same data as Table 4.3.
(a) Three digit occupation code.
(b) Among college-graduate or more.
(c) Among high-school-graduate or less.
(d) Technician, Service, Precision Workers, and Laborers. Reference group is Man-
ager/Professional.
(e) Three digit industry code.
(f) Manufacturing, Transportation, Sales, and Services. Reference group is
Agri/Mining/Construction.
(g) High-school-graduate, some-college, BA, and graduate-degree. Reference group is less-
than-high-school.
three-digit occupations yields an R-squared of .2856, while for 1990 to 1992
the corresponding R-squared for this model is .2751, and for 2000 to 2002, it
is .2454. The R-squared of this model is down by 14.1 percent from 1983-1985
to 2000-2002. That is, the amount of between-occupational variance in wages
declined over this period from .2856 to .2454, which implies that the amount
of within-occupational wage variance (i.e., the additive reciprocal) increased
from .7144 (in 1983 to 1985) to .7546 (in 2000 to 2002). In sum, Table 4.1
shows that three-digit occupations are becoming less predictive of wages and
that about three-quarters of all of the variance in wages is currently within
three-digit occupational categories.
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When levels of employees’ general skill, which is usually estimated by
levels of Education, are controlled for, the decline of the explanatory power
of occupation seems to be even more obvious. Among workers with at least
a college degree, the amount of explained variance by occupation is .2019
in 1983-1985. This explanatory power is reduced to .1689 in 1990-1992 and
further down to .1396 in 2000-2002. This decline represents a 30.9 percent
decrease over this period. The similar amount of decreased explanatory power
of occupation is observed among workers with a high school degree or less. The
same model, which yields an R-squared of .2555 for 1983-1985, renders only
an R-squared of .1885 for 2000-2002. That is, coefficients of determination for
occupation on wages diminished by 26.3 percent for the given period.
Table 4.1 does show, however, that occupations do better than in-
dustries in explaining the variance in wages. The R-squareds for the model
that uses dummy variables to indicate three-digit industries are substantially
smaller than the R-squareds for the model that uses three-digit occupations.
In making this comparison, however, it should be noted that the number of
dummy variables used to indicate three-digit industries is about 235 (it varies
slightly by year), which is significantly fewer than the 330 used to measure
three-digit occupations. The regression model using more than 200 dummy
variables to indicate detailed industries yields an R-squared of .1585 for 1983-
1985. The R-squared is reduced to .1468 for 1990-1992 and reduced further to
.1088 for 2000-2002. Only slightly more than 10 percent of the wage variation
can be explained by industry type. Furthermore, the percentage decline in the
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R-squared for the three-digit industry model is much greater than the decline
in the R-squared for the three-digit occupation model, over this time period.
Between 1983-1985 and 2000- 2002, the R-squared accounted for by detailed
industries is down by more than 30 percent.
To compare the association between occupation and wage inequality
with the association between education and wage inequality, I estimate a model
of wages, which includes four dummy variables for occupation (listed in the
column labeled “1-digit” in Table 4.1), and another model, which includes
four dummy variables for the highest level of education completed (listed in
the last column of Table 4.1). As shown in Table 4.1 for the 1983 to 1985
period, the R-squared for this one-digit occupation model is .1559, while the
R-squared for the education model is .1230 for the same time period. For the
2000-2002 period, the R-squared for the occupation model is .1546, indicating
little change from the earlier period. However, the R-squared for the education
model for the 2000-2002 period increases to .1807. That is, when measured
using the same number of dichotomous variables, the explanatory power of
education is greater than occupation, at least in terms of predicting wages.
There is now more variance in wages between broad educational categories
than between broad occupational categories.
Sociologists have concentrated on occupational and industrial differ-
ences of wages in an effort to illustrate the organizational bases of stratifica-
tion (e.g., Thurow 1975; Kalleberg et al. 1981; Jacobs 1985). According to this
tradition, in addition to the individual sources of inequality caused by differ-
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ent levels of marginal productivity, organizational characteristics are predicted
to create the other sources of wage inequality. And organizational sources of
inequality cannot be reduced to individual sources. The findings of Table
4.1 suggest that the importance of occupation and industry as organizational
sources of inequality has diminished in recent years.
Both occupation and education represent workers’ skill levels. Thus,
both wage differences by occupation and by education represent differentiated
returns according to workers’ skill levels. But the implications of these two
wage gaps are different. The wage gap by education indicates individual dif-
ferences, which become an individual source of inequality, while the wage gap
by occupation signals positional differences beyond gaps due to individual dif-
ference of ability. Such a gap by occupation is acknowledged as a structural
source of inequality. Especially when occupational wage differentials persist
after controlling for education, a structural source of inequality is evident.
The findings of Table 4.1 show that, in determining wages, the importance
of structural position decreases, while the importance of individual difference
becomes more powerful.
These findings, coupled with Hollister’s (2004) finding that shows that
the amount of variation explained by firm size is also down for the last two
decades, implies that the rise of wage inequality parallels the decline of tra-
ditional structural sources of inequality. The decline of structural sources of
inequality, however, does not indicate that a structural explanation is wrong.
Instead, it suggests that rather than occupation or industry, which have tra-
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ditionally been given attention, other structural sources might be becoming
more important as structural determinants of wages.2
Regarding skills, education indicates workers’ general skills and occupa-
tion signals workers’ occupation-specific skills. Thus, the wage gap across edu-
cation can be attributed to the differentiated return to general skills, which are
mostly obtained in school, while the wage gap across occupations after control-
ling for education can be ascribed to the differentiated return to occupation-
specific skills, which are mostly learned on the job. Therefore, the declining
explanatory power of occupations coupled with the growing explanatory power
of education on wages connotes that the effects of general skills have caught
up with or overtaken the effects of occupation-specific skills .
Table 4.1 gives us additional understanding regarding the occupational
bases of stratification. Grusky and Sørensen (1998) ask, “Does disaggregation
greatly increase the explanatory power of class models?” (1222). Table 4.1
shows that 3-digit occupational categories explain wage inequality significantly
better than one-digit occupational categories.3 F -test statistic of the differ-
ence in explanatory power between a regression model with 1-digit occupation
dummy variables a regression model with 3-digit occupation dummy variables
is statistically significant at any conventional level. That is, at least in terms
2 It is important to investigate the systematic study of this correlation between growing
inequality and diminishing institutional effects on wages, but this topic is beyond the scope
of my dissertation. Thus, I will limit my discussion to the relation between occupation and
inequality.
3In other results, however, there is only modest improvement in the explanatory power
of three-digit occupations relative to two-digit occupations (which are represented by only
44 occupational categories rather than the 331 occupational categories for the three-digit
codes).
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of wages, disaggregate structuration seems to improve the explanatory power
of class models substantially.
Table 4.1 focuses on the contrast between 1983-1985, 1990-1992, and
2000-2002. In order to provide more information about the entire period,
Figure 4.3 shows the R-squareds for each year in regression models of individual
wages. The graph for all workers (as shown in the graph on the left side of
Figure 4.3) again illustrates the basic pattern of a trend towards declining R-
squareds across this time period, depicting regression models using 330 dummy
variables to indicate occupation. This same basic downward trend is also
evident among workers when they are broken down (in the same graph) by
high-skilled (i.e., workers with a college degree or more) or by low-skilled (i.e.,
no more than a high school degree).
When broken down by gender, however, slight variations on this overall
pattern are evident. For men, as shown in the graph in the middle of Figure 4.3,
the R-squareds actually increase until the early 1990’s and then begin declining
after that. For both low skilled workers and high skilled workers, a similar
trend is evident in Figure 4.3. The R-squareds for high-skilled male workers
grew in the 1980s and it decreased in the 1990s. For low skilled workers, the
R-squareds remained stable until the early 1990s and then started to go down
after that. The R-squared for male workers is down for this period, when
broken down by skill levels. For women, as shown in the graph on the right
side of Figure 4.3, the general trend is downward, but the annual fluctuations
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Figure 4.2: Incremental R-squared for Occupation and Education in Regres-


















































































































































These fluctuations observed in Figure 4.3, however, disappear when we
control for the effect of education. Figure 4.2 shows the incremental R-squareds
of occupation and education in regression models of individual wages across
this time period. Occupation is again indicated by 330 dummy variables, while
education is indicated by 4 dummy variables (based on the same educational
levels used in Table 4.1). Thus, the net occupational effect in Figure 4.2 refers
to the R-squareds estimated by subtracting the R-squareds of the regression
model with 4 educational dummy variables from the R-squared’s of the regres-
sion model with 330 dummy occupational dummy variables in addition to 4
educational dummy variables (i.e., Net Occupational Effect = R2edu,occ−R2edu).
The net education effect is calculated in the same way by subtracting the
R-squareds of the model with 330 occupational dummy variables from the R-
squareds of the model with both occupation and education dummies (i.e., Net
Educational Effect = R2edu,occ −R2occ).
Not surprisingly, the incremental R-squareds are larger for occupation
than for education, given the fewer degrees of freedom used in measuring
the latter. However, the incremental R-squareds for occupation are clearly
declining systematically in Figure 4.2, while the incremental R-squareds for
education are slightly increasing over this time period. This same basic pattern
is obvious for male workers separately, female workers separately, or for both
genders combined.
In the meantime, occupation and industry are closely intertwined. Thus,
it is possible that this declining explanatory power of occupation is the mere
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reflection of changing industrial mix. To check this possibility, I ran additional
models that including three-digit industry dummies (about 300 industries) in
addition to educational dummy variables and occupational dummy variables.
Table 4.2 shows that even after controlling for industries, the same pattern
of declining explanatory power of occupation is evident. Net of educational
dummies, the incremental R-squared’s of about 300 industry dummy variables
have declined more than 50 percent for this period (from .1369 for 1983-1985
to .0601 for 2000-2002). This decline, however, does not fully account for the
decline of incremental R-squared’s of occupational variables. After controlling
for education and industry variables, R-squared’s of 330 occupational dummy
variables was down 27.4 percent in 2000-2002 comparing to the R-squared for
1983-1985 (from .0930 for 1983-1985 to .0675 for 2000-2002).
In sum, the increase in within-occupational wage inequality is espe-
cially apparent after controlling for education and it is also evident even after
controlling for industry. In other words, the effect of occupation, which repre-
sents one structural component of inequality, has a declining impact on wage
inequality for this period. That is, the effects of occupation-specific skills are
declining, while the effects of general skills are growing.
For explanatory purposes, I consider some additional statistics that
provide a general description of the relation between wage inequality and oc-
cupational structure from 1983 to 2002. Table 4.3 shows the mean, standard
deviation, and coefficient of variation of the socioeconomic index (SEI) scores
for the labor force from 1983 to 2002. The SEI scores are based on the three-
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Table 4.2: Incremental R-squared for Occupation, Industry, and Education
in Regression Models of Individual Wage
1983-1985 1991-1993 2000-2002
R2edu
a .1230 .1734 .1807
R2edu,ind
b .2599 .2747 .2408
R2edu,ind,occ
c .3529 .3600 .3083
Incremental R2 of Industry
R2edu,ind −R2edu .1369 .1013 .0601
Percent Change from 1983-1985 n.a. −26.0 −56.1
Incremental R2 of Occupation
R2edu,ind,occ −R2edu,ind .0930 .0853 .0675
Percent Change from 1983-1985 n.a. −8.3 −27.4
Notes: (a) R-squared of 5 educational dummy variables on hourly wage.
(b) R-squared of around 300 industrial dummy variables and 5 educational dummy
variables on hourly wage. Each year has slightly different number of industries.
(c) R-squared of 330 occupational dummy variables in addition to 5 educational
dummy variables and 300 industrial dummy variables on hourly wage.
digit occupation of the labor force for 331 occupations in the CPS-MORG
over this time period. I estimated SEI following the method of Nakao and
Treas (1994).4 Nakao and Treas’s (1994) SEI equation can be written as
SEIj = 9.24 + .64(EDUj) + .31(INCOMEj) where EDUj refers to the per-
cent of workers of college or more educated of occupation j and INCOMEj
refers to the percent of workers who earn more than 15,000 dollars a year in
occupation j. In my calculation of SEI, I used the mean hourly wage instead
of the percent of workers earning 15,000 dollars a year. Thus, my SEI is not
exactly congruent with Nakao and Treas’ SEI, but the SEI shown in Table 4.3
4Hauser and Warren (1997) also applied Nakao and Treas’ method in their paper of the
socioeconomic index.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Socioeconomic Index for the Labor Force
Employed in 331 Occupations, 1983-85 to 2000-02
Year Mean Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation
1983-1985 46.45 17.69 .3809
1984-1986 46.60 17.69 .3796
1985-1987 46.77 17.68 .3779
1986-1988 46.95 17.68 .3766
1987-1989 47.11 17.71 .3759
1988-1990 47.27 17.75 .3755
1989-1991 47.42 17.78 .3550
1990-1992 47.59 17.78 .3736
1991-1993 47.75 17.79 .3727
1992-1994 47.88 17.83 .3724
1993-1995 48.03 17.91 .3728
1994-1996 48.19 17.99 .3733
1995-1997 48.35 18.04 .3731
1996-1998 48.54 18.07 .3722
1997-1999 48.79 18.09 .3708
1998-2000 49.00 18.10 .3694
1999-2001 49.23 18.11 .3678
2000-2002 49.39 18.09 .3663
Total 47.85 17.87 .3735
Source: Author’s own calculations using pooled CPS Merged Rotation Group
(MORG) files. Statistics are based on three-year moving averages.
Note: Aged 18-65 employed workers only. Top coding is adjusted using the log
normal distribution imputation method.
should be very similar to Nakao and Treas’ SEI, given workers’ hourly wages
and their annual incomes are highly correlated.
The results in Table 4.3 indicate that, from 1983 to 2002, the mean SEI
score increased from 46.45 to 49.39, while the standard deviation increased
only slightly from 17.69 to 18.09. Inequality in the SEI scores, as measured by
the coefficient of variation (i.e., the standard deviation divided by the mean),
declined significantly from .3809 to .3663 over this time period.
As was discussed above, three-digit occupations are often implicitly as-
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sumed to be relatively homogeneous groups of workers with similar socioeco-
nomic attainments (Grusky and Sørensen 1998; Weeden 2002; Grusky 2005).
Based on the Durkheimian tradition, Grusky (2005) developed his theory
that occupations represent gemeinschaftlich communities that are “destined
to emerge at the site of production and shape individual values, life chances,
and lifestyles” (55). He went on to say that since occupations work as a
modern institution of closure and rent-extraction, occupations become the
elementary unit of skill-based exploitation (74). Furthermore, because this
exploitation is skill-based, Grusky argues, “inter-occupational differentials in
earnings are typically regarded as acceptable, whereas intra-occupational dif-
ferentials are closely scrutinized and are sometimes taken as evidence of dis-
crimination” (75). According to Grusky’s theory, it is hard to justify intra-
occupational inequality, which should decline with the social development of
anti-discriminatory movement. Indeed, he noted that “anti-discrimination
legislation seeks to outlaw intra-occupational disparities in wages, whereas
comparable worth legislation seeks to prohibit entrenched inter-occupational
disparities”(75). Therefore, if inequality increases in a modern society, it
would more likely be in the form of between-occupational rather than within-
occupational inequality.
The results in Table 4.3 suggest, however, that the SEI scores of three-
digit occupations do not accurately indicate the trend in aggregate wage in-
equality. As was previously discussed and as is evident in Figure 4.1, wage
inequality has significantly increased in recent decades. However, Table 4.3
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shows that, by contrast, inequality in occupational SEI has actually declined.
Therefore, three-digit occupational SEI scores do not accurately predict in-
creasing wage inequality over this time period because wages and SEI scores
have opposing trends. This conclusion is generally consistent with my interpre-
tation of Table 4.1. Sociologists’ preoccupation with occupation perhaps helps
to explain why they have not paid sufficient attention to increasing inequality;
in terms of occupational status, inequality has actually not increased.
4.2 Decomposition Analysis
To estimate how much of the increase in inequality can be accounted for
by inter-occupational inequality, I decompose diverse inequality indexes into
between-occupational and within-occupational inequalities. Figure 4.4 shows
the trends of decomposed Theil indexes with their combined total inequality in-
dex. The trend of total inequality of the Theil index in Figure 4.4 is congruent
with the trend of the Gini index in Figure 4.1. The Theil was .166 in 1983-1985
and .198 in 2000-2002, which represents a 19.4 percent increase of inequality
for this period. In Figure 4.4, then, both within-occupational inequality and
between-occupational inequality show upward trends when total inequality is
decomposed into within and between occupational inequality. Throughout the
given period, within-occupational inequality dominates between-occupational
inequality. The trend of within-occupational inequality determines the trend
of total inequality. Between-occupational inequality does not have much of an























Figure 4.4: Theil Index of Wage Inequality from 1983-1985 to 2000-2002
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Table 4.4: Hourly Wage Inequality: Between- and Within- Occupational
Inequalitya
MLDb Theil HSCVc AKI(.5)d AKI(1)d AKI(2)d
1983-1985
Total .16095 .16551 .21423 .07968 .15418 .29397
Betweene .06222 .06019 .06136 .02922 .05645 .10549
Within .09873 .10532 .15287 .05046 .09773 .18848
% Within (.613) (.636) (.714) (.633) (.634) (.641)
1991-1993
Total .16881 .17385 .22942 .08360 .16147 .30572
Between .06781 .06562 .06699 .03179 .06127 .11345
Within .10100 .10823 .16243 .05181 .10020 .19227
% Within (.598) (.623) (.708) (.620) (.621) (.629)
2000-2002
Total .18426 .19762 .28461 .09394 .17778 .33017
Between .07168 .06974 .07151 .03302 .06170 .10890
Within .11258 .12788 .21310 .06092 .11608 .22127
% Within (.611) (.647) (.749) (.648) (.653) (.670)
% Change between 1991-93 and 2000-02
Total .09152 .13673 .24056 .12368 .10101 .07998
Between .05707 .06279 .06747 .03869 .00702 -.04012
Within .11465 .18156 .31195 .17583 .15848 .15083
% Within (.750) (.827) (.918) (.881) (.974) (1.186)
% Change between 1983-85 and 2000-02
Total .14483 .19401 .32853 .17900 .15301 .12314
Between .15204 .15866 .16542 .13005 .09300 .03233
Within .14028 .21420 .39400 .20729 .18776 .17397
% Within (.594) (.703) (.856) (.734) (.778) (.906)
Sources: Author’s own calculation using pooled CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group
(MORG) files. Aged 18-65 employed workers only. Top coding problem is adjusted using
the log normal distribution imputation method. Less than 50 cents an hour after the
adjustment to 2002 constant dollar using CPI-X is trimmed.
b Mean Logarithmic Deviation
c half the square of the coefficient of variation
d Atkinson Index. Numbers in parenthesis are inequality aversion parameters.
e Three digit occupational code is used. Total number of occupations is 331. Calculation
using two digit occupational code basically produces the same results.
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Table 4.4 shows the levels of wage inequality in 1983-1985, 1991-1993,
and 2000-2002 for MLD, the Theil index, HSCV, and the Atkinson index, with
three different values of the inequality aversion parameter (i.e., 0.5, 1.0 and
2.0). Consistent with the results for the Gini index, as shown above in Fig-
ure 4.1, all of these other measures also indicate increases in wage inequality
across this time period. For example, Table 4.4 shows that HSCV increased
from .2142 in 1983-1985 to .2846 in 2000-2002 (an increase of 33 percent). In
addition to the general trend of inequality, Table 4.4 shows the decomposition
of each inequality measure into between- and within-occupational inequalities
using the 331 three-digit occupational categories (except for the Gini index
which cannot be uniquely decomposed). The results shown in Table 4.4 indi-
cate that for each of the inequality measures, in either 1983-1985, 1991-1993,
or 2000-2002, within-occupational inequality is clearly greater than between-
occupational inequality.5 For example, in 1983-1985, the within-occupational
component for the Theil index is .1053 while its between-occupational com-
ponent is .0602 which together equal the (overall) value for the Theil index
of .1655. As is also shown in Table 4.4, these numbers imply that 64 percent
of the wage inequality in 1983-1985, according to the Theil index, is within
occupations.
Table 4.4 furthermore shows the decomposition in terms of the increase
in inequality for each measure between 1983-1985 and 2000-2002. For each
measure, the bottom row of Table 4.4 shows that most of the increase in in-
5Previous studies (Jenkins 1999; NRC 1999) also find that there is more inequality within
occupations than between occupations.
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equality over this time period has occurred within the 331 occupations. The
lowest figure is for MLD, indicating that 59 percent of the increase in inequal-
ity was within occupations. The highest figure is for the Atkinson index, with
ε=2.0, indicating that 91 percent of the increase in inequality was occurring
within occupations. During the 1990’s within-occupational inequality grew
even faster. The MLD shows that 75 percent of the increase occurred within-
occupation, which is the lowest of all inequality indexes used. For the Atkin-
son index, where ε=2.0, the entire increase in inequality is attributable to the
rise of within-occupational inequality during the 1990s. Between-occupational
inequality measured by Atkinson (ε=2.0) has decreased by 4 percent, while
the total inequality has increased by 8 percent. Thus, the 15 percent in-
crease in within-occupational inequality just offsets the decrease in between-
occupational inequality.
Diverse inequality indexes reported in Table 4.4 allow us to infer at
which parts of the wage distribution within-occupational inequality grows
faster. As discussed in Chapter 3.3, among Entrophy inequality indexes, HSCV
is more sensitive to transfers at the upper end of the distribution, MLD is more
sensitive to transfers at the lower end of the distribution, while Theil is evenly
sensitive to all parts of the distribution. The amount of the growth of total
inequality is the greatest for HSCV and the lowest for MLD. Furthermore,
HSCV shows greater growth of the share of within-occupational inequality
than MLD. That is, inequality grows faster at the upper end of the wage dis-
tribution where within-occupational inequality grows faster. Thus, the fact
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Table 4.5: Proportion of Within-Occupational Inequality in Total Inequality
MLD Theil HSCV AKI(.5) AKI(1) AKI(2)
High School Graduate or less
1983-1985 .670 .687 .743 .680 .675 .668
1991-1993 .693 .711 .769 .702 .696 .688
2000-2002 .723 .745 .811 .738 .735 .728
College Graduate or more
1983-1985 .742 .756 .806 .748 .741 .730
1991-1993 .738 .758 .820 .748 .737 .720
2000-2002 .783 .806 .866 .796 .787 .770
that HSCV shows more relative growth of within-occupational inequality in-
dicates that heterogeneity among workers with the same occupation is larger
within high-income occupations. The increase of heterogeneity of wages among
workers with the same occupation implies that occupations have become less
gemeinschaftlish, especially among high-wage occupations. Atkinson indexes,
which are based on social welfare theory, also show similar trends. As the
inequality aversion parameter increases, Atkinson indexes become more sensi-
tive to the upper end of the wage distribution. As shown on the last row of
Table 4.4, as the inequality aversion parameter increases, so do the percents
of inequality Change, due to the increase of within-occupation inequality.
It is evident in Table 4.4 that most of the increase in wage inequality
from 1983-1985 to 2000-2002 has occurred within occupations. This trend,
however, is not uniform for both the 1980’s and the 1990’s. As seen in Table
4.4, compared to 1983-1985, the proportion of within-occupational inequality
decreased in 1991-1993. For example, the proportion of within-occupational in-
equality, as shown by a Theil of .636 for 1983-1985, drops to .623 for 1991-1993.
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This decrease is consistent across all measures. Does this finding imply that
the 1980’s can be characterized as a period of growing between-occupational
inequality and the 1990s as a period of growing within-occupational inequality?
The results shown in Table 4.5 show that this may not be likely. When bro-
ken down by educational level, every inequality measure among workers with
a high school degree or less demonstrates that within-occupational inequality
grew faster than between-occupational inequality throughout both the 1980’s
and the 1990’s, resulting in a growing share of within-occupational inequal-
ity. For Theil, the proportion of within is up to .711 in 1991-1993 from .687 in
1983-1985 and up again to .745 in 2000-2002. Among highly educated workers,
the trends look rather mixed. What is clear is that inequality measures do not
unanimously decline during the 1980s, as shown in Table 4.4. These findings
are consistent with what we found in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.2. The trends of
the explanatory power of occupation seem mixed for the 1980’s and 1990’s at
first, but when we control for education, the explanatory power of occupation,
which is measured by either R-squareds or portions of between-occupational
inequality, is falling continuously for these two decades.
These descriptive results indicate that, even at the detailed level of 331
occupational categories, wages are becoming less closely associated with oc-
cupation. Although wage inequality has been systematically and significantly
growing, this increase is not at all operating through increasing inequality in
the distribution of occupational status. Rather, most of the increase in wage
inequality has occurred within occupations. Although most of the wage in-
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equality was already within-occupational in 1983-1985, the percentage that is
within-occupational has continued to grow, as inequality has increased over
this time period.6 Thus, as a bivariate association, wages are becoming in-
creasingly decoupled from occupation.
4.3 Summary and Discussion
In sum, the findings of bivariate associations indicate that occupations are
becoming less directly associated with wages, even when using a large number
(i.e., 331) of detailed occupational categories, as suggested by the “disaggre-
gate structuration” approach. From 1983 to 2002, the between-occupational
variance declined, while the within-occupational variance increased to approx-
imately three-fourths of the total variance. In terms of the decomposition of
measures of inequality, five out of the six measures show an increase in the pro-
portion of wage inequality that is within occupations (i.e., to about 65 percent
or 75 percent) over this time period. Furthermore, all of the measures indicate
that most of the increase in wage growth over this time period was within
occupations. These results show that increasing within-occupational wage in-
equality is generally consistent with the basic conclusion of Table 4.3, which
indicates that inequality in occupational status has actually not increased over
this period (despite increases in wage inequality of 12 percent to 33 percent,
according to the results in Table 4.4).
6The only exception is MLD for which the percentage within declined very slightly over
this time period.
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These findings provide some implications for “disaggregate structura-
tion.” As noted earlier, Grusky and Sørensen (1998:1191) claim that detailed
occupations are, among other things, “positional sources of exploitation and
inequality.” My results indicate, however, that most of the wage inequality is
within detailed occupational categories and that most of the growth in wage
inequality has been within them as well. In other words, most wage inequal-
ity cannot be directly explained by detailed occupations, and occupations are
increasingly becoming decoupled from wages. These findings therefore do not
support the strong version of the “disaggregate structuration” view.
I suggested earlier that a weaker form of “disaggregate structuration”
assumes that occupations may still be seen as fundamental if they remain a
useful unit of analysis in explaining wage inequality, even if statistically there
is more variance in wages within rather than between detailed occupations.
Evaluating this weaker form of “disaggregate structuration” is more a matter
of opinion regarding what constitutes being “useful,” but I suggest that the
explanatory power resulting from the use of detailed occupations as the unit
of analysis in predicting wage inequality is far from conclusive. While I do
not doubt that occupations have and will continue to serve important roles in
both descriptive and analytical studies of social inequality and stratification,
my results nonetheless do not support taking this usefulness to its logical
extreme by postulating that detailed occupations represent the only important
feature of the class structure and that they override the need to theoretically





5.1 Changes of Mean Wage and Wage Inequal-
ity by Occupation
Before estimating causes of growing inequality, we need to see if there is enough
variation in changes of inequality across occupations. If within-occupational
inequality increases (or decreases) equally in every occupation, then different
characteristics of different occupations are not very useful in explaining the
growth of within-occupational-inequality. Previous studies find that within all
age groups, all cohorts, both genders, and even all industrial sectors, within-
group inequalities grew in the last couple of decades. Thus, different group
characteristics within these categories do not provide much insight about what
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causes the rise of inequality.
Table 5.1 shows the cross-tabulation of changes in the mean wage and
in wage inequality by occupation. In order to construct this table, I estimate
a simple regression model, INEQjt = β0j + β1jY EARt + εjt, where INEQjt
refers to the Gini index of occupation j at time t, β0j refers to the baseline Gini
index of occupation j in 1983-1985, β1j refers to yearly change in inequality
over time, Y EAR refers to time, and εjt refers to the error term.
In Table 5.1, decreases in inequality represent the number of cases where
the slope coefficient β̂1j is negative and statistically significant at α=.05, while
increases in inequality represent the number of cases where the slope coefficient
is positive and statistically significant. No change in inequality is seen where
β̂1j is not statistically significant at α=.05. Changes in the mean wage by oc-
cupation were ascertained in a similar manner using the same simple regression
except that, in this case, mean wage serves as the dependent variable. Table
5.1 thus reports the results of 331 regression models using within-occupational
Gini indexes as dependent variables and another 331 regression models using
occupational mean wages as dependent variables.
The cross-tabulations shown in Table 5.1 indicate significant variation
across three-digit occupations in the patterns of annual change in mean wage
and in wage inequality over this time period. One common pattern is no
change in mean wage but an increase in wage inequality (i.e., 47 occupations,
which employed 25 percent of all workers in the sample in 2002). Another 43
occupations (employing 17 percent of all workers) experienced an increase in
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Table 5.1: Changes of Average Wage and Inequality Within Occupations
Mean Wageb Total
Decrease No Change Increase
Inequalityc
Decrease 38 24 5 67
(.123) (.096) (.011) (.229)
No Change 49 63 34 146
(.103) (.088) (.100) (.291)
Increase 28 47 43 118
(.059) (.254) (.167) (.480)
Total 115 134 82 331
(.285) (.438) (.278) (1.000)
a Source: Author’s own calculation using pooled CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation
Group (MORG) files. Same as Table 4.3. Numbers in the tables are number of
occupational categories. Numbers in parenthesis are share of workers in 2002.
b Mean hourly wage
c Gini index
mean wage as well as an increase in wage inequality. In terms of the number
of occupations, the most common pattern is no change in either mean wage
or in wage inequality (i.e., 63 occupations), although these occupations em-
ployed only 9 percent of workers. Employing 23 percent of workers, a total
of 67 occupations experienced a decline in wage inequality, of which 38 also
experienced a decline in mean wage. On the other hand, another 48 percent
of workers, a total 118 occupations, underwent an increase in wage, of which
43 occupations also experienced an increase of mean wage. In sum, Table 5.1
shows that occupations vary significantly in terms of the variation and pat-
terns of changes in mean wages and in wage inequality over this time period.
The sources of these differences merit more detailed multivariate analysis.
Figure 5.1 shows associations between changes of mean wages and changes
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Figure 5.1: Change of Hourly Wage Inequality between 1983-85 and 2000-02
categories). Each dot in Figure 5.1 represents one occupation of 331 de-
tailed occupational categories. The x-axis scales the change of the within-
occupational Gini index between 1983-1985 and 2000-2002, and the Y-axis
scales the change of the dollar amount of mean wages (2002 constant dol-
lars). For example, the middle graph on the first row shows the associations
of changes of mean wage and inequality among professional occupations. The
majority of the dots are located in the right upper corner of the graph, in-
dicating that in most professional jobs both mean wages and inequality grew
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during this period. The graph on the right graph on the second row shows
the pattern of association within service occupations. Many service jobs ex-
perienced an increase in within-occupational inequality, but their mean wages
do not change significantly. Summarizing Figure 5.1, managerial, professional,
technical, and sales occupations seem to show positive associations between
mean wages and inequality, while the other occupations appear to exhibit no
clear associational pattern.
If we break down Table 5.1 into these broad occupational categories,1
there are more interesting findings. Among 81 managerial and professional
occupations, 46 occupations show an increase in inequality, and only 6 occu-
pations show a decrease in inequality. Among those 46 occupations, the mean
wages of 23 occupations increase, and the mean wages of 18 occupations do not
show a significant change. Thus, it seems that both mean wages and inequality
have increased in managerial and professional occupations. If we distinguish
between managerial and professional occupations, however, we find that this
positive association between mean wage and inequality is found only for pro-
fessional jobs. Among executive administrative and managerial occupations,
inequality increases in most occupations, while their mean wages do not go up
at the same time.
Technical occupations also experience the similar pattern as executive
administrative and managerial occupations. Administrative support occupa-
tions seem to have experienced reduced inequality but at the cost of a de-
1See Appendix Table C.1 for detail information.
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creased mean wage. Seventeen occupational categories out of 47 show de-
creased mean wages, and 18 occupations show decreased inequalities. Unlike
technical occupations, service occupations tend to show increased inequality
with the increase of mean wage, which is a similar pattern observed in profes-
sional occupations.
Precision production and craft jobs seem to undergo the decrease of
mean wages and the increase of inequalities. Thirty-one out of sixty-four
occupations within these categories show a decrease in mean wages, while only
nine occupations show a decrease in inequality. Operators, fabricators, and
laborers also show downward equalization, similar to administrative support
occupations. In these job categories, both the mean wage and inequality have
decreased.
In sum, we can classify occupations into three broad groups according
to their patterns of association between changes of inequality and mean wage.
The first is upward polarization. Professional, sales, and service occupations
are likely to show increased inequality with a higher mean wage. The second
is polarization without changes of mean wage. Executive, administration and
managerial workers, technicians, and precision production and crafts workers
tend to experience increased inequality, which is not necessarily accompanied
by an increase in the mean wage. The third pattern is downward equalization.
Administrative support workers and low skilled laborers are likely to show
lowered mean wages with decreased levels of inequality. In sum, although
overall inequality has increased in the last two decades, there are substantially
92
large variations in the changes in within-occupational inequality and mean
wage across occupations. Understanding the factors causing such differences
will merit sociological investigating in the studies of growing inequality.
5.2 Causes of Within-Occupational Inequality
5.2.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 show changes of descriptive statistics between 1983-
1985 and 2000-2002. The former table shows changes of demographic and
social variables for this period among ‘inequality-growing occupations’ (118
occupations out of 331 detail occupations) and ‘inequality-declining occupa-
tions’ (67 occupations). Inequality growing or declining occupations are deter-
mined according to the results of a regression model used for Table 5.1. Table
5.3 displays changes in demographic and social variables for the same period
by ‘high-inequality occupations’ (44 occupations) and ‘low-inequality occupa-
tions’ (49 occupations). High-inequality occupations refer to the occupations
in which a group mean of within-occupational Gini across time is higher than
one standard deviation above the grand mean of Gini (the grand mean of Gini
is .2471 and the standard deviation is .0477), and low-inequality occupations
denote the occupations where a group mean of Gini is lower than one standard
deviation below the grand mean. That is, I classified occupations by longitu-
dinal directions of inequality changes in Table 5.2 and divided occupations by
cross-sectional amounts of inequality in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics by Inequality Growing and Inequality Declin-
ing Occupations
Among Occupations Among Occupations
with Decreased Inequality with Increased Inequality
(67 Occupations) (118 Occupations)
Variable 1983-85 2000-02 Change 1983-85 2000-02 Change
Female .3974 .4252 +.0278 .5201 .5184 −.0017
(.3232) (.3151) (.3289) (.2722)
Black .1382 .1488 +.0106 .0737 .0939 +.0202
(.0666) (.0525) (.0459) (.0448)
Hispanics .0777 .1660 +.0883 .0435 .0729 +.0294
(.0324) (.0807) (.0289) (.0445)
Other Races .0226 .0387 +.0161 .0273 .0518 +.0245
(.0086) (.0177) (.0188) (.0356)
BA+ .0690 .0937 +.0247 .3504 .4331 +.0827
(.1024) (.1309) (.2940) (.2827)
Edu. Div. .6381 .6378 −.0003 .6412 .6391 −.0021
(.0333) (.0316) (.0951) (.1076)
South .3458 .3633 +.0175 .3248 .3456 +.0208
(.0453) (.0357) (.0508) (.0368)
Public Sector .1249 .1109 −.0140 .2334 .2126 −.0208
(.1773) (.1851) (.2899) (.2860)
Part Time .1993 .1609 −.0384 .1448 .1209 −.0239
(.1570) (.1222) (.1602) (.1217)
Union .2622 .1530 −.1092 .2097 .1594 −.0503
(.1184) (.0851) (.2200) (.1944)
Manufacturing .3296 .2487 −.0809 .2073 .1534 −.0539
(.3022) (.2923) (.2618) (.2163)
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics by Occupations with High Level and Low
Level Inequality
Among Occupations Among Occupations
with High Inequality Level with Low Inequality Level
(44 Occupations) (49 Occupations)
Variable 1983-85 2000-02 Change 1983-85 2000-02 Change
Female .3898 .4470 +.0572 .6347 .6392 +.0045
(.2080) (.1706) (.3513) (.3095)
Black .0612 .0778 +.0166 .1282 .1403 +.0121
(.0670) (.0284) (.0717) (.0577)
Hispanics .0364 .0717 +.0353 .0700 .1408 +.0708
(.0209) (.0509) (.0394) (.1010)
Other Races .0221 .0448 +.0227 .0349 .0595 +.0246
(.0169) (.0266) (.0186) (.0217)
BA+ .4001 .4519 +.0518 .0981 .1446 +.0465
(.2016) (.1957) (.1565) (.1958)
Edu. Div. .6960 .6819 −.0141 .6146 .6149 +.0003
(.0980) (.1173) (.0373) (.0532)
South .3352 .3504 +.0152 .3476 .3520 +.0044
(.0417) (.0330) (.0890) (.0590)
Public Sector .0962 .0826 −.0136 .1338 .1178 −.0160
(.1523) (.1281) (.1972) (.1996)
Part Time .1352 .1069 −.0283 .2618 .2224 −.0394
(.1700) (.1030) (.1938) (.1357)
Union .0820 .0620 −.0200 .2599 .1659 −.0940
(.0817) (.0772) (.2183) (.1718)
Manufacturing .1733 .1482 −.0251 .2344 .1467 −.0877
(.1656) (.1496) (.3812) (.3133)
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There are several notable differences between inequality-growing oc-
cupations and inequality-declining occupations. First of all, the proportion
of female workers is up among inequality-declining occupations for this period
while it is down among inequality-growing occupations. This result casts doubt
about a hypothesis that female labor market participation increases inequal-
ity. The proportion of Hispanic workers increases more in inequality-declining
occupations (8.8 percent point) than in inequality-growing occupations (2.9
percent point). Other demographic characteristics seem to change similarly
for both occupational groups in Table 5.2.
Regarding educational variables, inequality-growing occupations consist
of more educated workers than inequality-declining occupations. 35 percent of
workers of inequality-growing occupations have a bachelor degree or more in
1983-1985, although only 6.9 percent of workers of inequality-declining occu-
pations have the same level of education. Furthermore, over this time period,
inequality-growing occupations gain an even greater percentage of workers
with a bachelor degree or more than inequality-declining occupations. Thus,
the educational gap between inequality-growing occupations and inequality-
declining occupations has widened. Both occupational groups lose similar
amounts of educational diversity for this period.
Another visible difference can be found in the change of union rates.
While union rates drop in both occupational groups, the amount of drop is
twice as big among inequality-declining occupations than among inequality-
growing occupations. This result does not seem to be consistent with Hypoth-
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esis 3-A. A bigger decrease of union rates does not appear to yield a bigger
growth of inequality. The pattern of change within the manufacturing sector
is also not congruent with my expectation. The proportion of the manufac-
turing sector has decreased more among inequality-declining occupations than
among inequality-growing occupations.
Comparison between occupations with high inequality levels and oc-
cupations with low inequality levels in Table 5.3 gives us some interesting
insights. The proportion female has increased substantially more among high-
inequality occupations (5.7 percent point) than among low-inequality occupa-
tions (.5 percent point) between 1983-1985 and 2000-2002. Coupled with the
fact that % female grows more in inequality-declining occupations in Table
5.2, the finding in Table 5.3 implies that more female workers may decrease
inequality rather than increases it.
The amount of changes of % highly educated workers is similar both
in high-inequality occupations and in low-inequality occupations. The educa-
tional diversity of high-inequality occupations falls by .0141 points, while it
does not change among low-inequality occupations. This difference of changes
of educational diversity may simply reflect the fact that % BA+ is already
high enough for high-inequality occupations in 1983-1985; thus, the increase
of % BA+ makes educational diversity for high-inequality occupations smaller,
mathematically.
The decline of % union is substantially larger among low-inequality
occupations. Considering that inequality-declining occupations lose more %
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union in Table 5.2, it is plausible that low-inequality occupations become
lower-inequality because of the decline of unions. To test what I found in the
descriptive statistics using multivariate analysis, I estimate multi-level growth
models.
5.2.2 Multivariate Analysis: Multilevel Growth Models
Table 5.4 shows the estimates of the multi-level growth models of the occupation-
specific Gini index (which is multiplied by 100).2 The results for the Baseline
Model (i.e., equation 7, which does not include any substantive predictors)
indicate that, across occupations, on average, wage inequality increased by
.0491 points annually. This finding is generally consistent with the earlier re-
sults for the Gini index, as in Figure 4.1 (which is directly based on the entire
sample of workers, however, without any occupations). The additional results
that are obtained for the Baseline Model are the variations in the intercepts
and slopes across the occupations. As reported in Table 5.4, the variance
of the slopes across the occupations for the Baseline Model is .0286. Thus,
within two standard deviations, the slopes range from −.2891 to .3873 (i.e.,
.0491 ± 2 × √.0286). Regarding the intercepts (i.e., the initial values of the
Gini index in 1983-1985), the range is from 14.19 to 33.63, within two standard
deviations (i.e., 23.9101±2×√23.6162). The multi-level growth model, which
can explain both the fixed structural component and the stochastic random
component, is thus appropriate to employ given this variability in intercepts
2I also estimated these models using the different inequality indices discussed above and
obtained similar results to those reported in Table 5.4, which is based on the Gini index.
98
Table 5.4: Models of Inequality Change over Time
Base Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Weight On) (Weight Off) (Weight On)a (Wt+Interact)
Intercept 23.9101∗∗∗ 16.1591∗∗∗ 16.6108∗∗∗ 16.3396∗∗∗
Year .0491∗∗∗ -.0321 -.0489 -.0479
Slope Change by the Change of Proportion
Femalejt -.0219∗ -.0470∗∗∗ -.0483∗∗∗
Blackjt -.0201 -.0131 -.0141
Hispjt .0169 .0022 .0029
Othersjt -.0249 -.0237 -.0231
Southjt .0536∗∗∗ .0592∗∗∗ .0600∗∗∗
BA+jt -.0026 .0056 .0066
Edu.Divjt .0114 .0078 .0072
Publicjt -.0241∗ -.0535∗∗∗ -.0532∗∗∗
PartTimejt .0395∗∗∗ .0131 .0410∗∗∗
Unionjt .0373∗∗∗ .0294∗∗ .0319∗∗∗
Manufjt -.0007 -.0079 -.0050
PartTimejt × Salesj -.0589∗∗
PartTimejt × Servicej -.0645∗∗∗
Yearly Slope Change of Group Mean
YEARt × BA+j. .0022∗∗∗ .0023∗∗∗ .0024∗∗∗
YEARt × Edu.Divj. .0004 .0006 .0006
YEARt × Publicj. -.0012∗ -.0012∗ -.0011∗
YEARt × PartTimej. -.0009 -.0008 -.0010
YEARt × Unionj. .0037∗∗∗ .0036∗∗∗ .0036∗∗∗
YEARt × Manufj. -.0010∗∗ -.0011∗∗ -.0010∗∗
Effect of Group Mean
Femalej. -.0293∗ -.0032 -.0059
Blackj. -.0136 -.0220 -.0185
Hispanicj. .0287 .0455 .0370
Othersj. -.2150∗ -.2226∗ -.2213∗
Southj. -.0462 -.0575† -.0609†
BA+j. .0795∗∗∗ .0700∗∗∗ .0648∗∗∗
Edu.Divj. .1285∗∗∗ .1288∗∗∗ .1344∗∗∗
Publicj. .0054 .0345∗ .0342∗
PartTimej. .0696∗∗ .0932∗∗∗ .1147∗∗∗
Unionj. -.1001∗∗∗ -.0905∗∗∗ -.0957∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Base Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Weight On) (Weight Off) (Weight On)a (Wt+Interact)
Continued from previous page
Manufj. -.0122 -.0033 -.0057
σ2int 23.6162
∗∗∗ 16.3954∗∗∗ 16.3422∗∗∗ 15.5909∗∗∗
σint,t -.2207∗∗∗ -.2942∗∗∗ -.2577∗∗∗ -.2352∗∗∗
σ2t .0286
∗∗∗ .0233∗∗∗ .0218∗∗∗ .0207∗∗∗
σtoep(2) .0010∗∗∗ .8176∗∗∗ .0009∗∗∗ .0009∗∗∗
σ2e .0022
∗∗∗ 1.9646∗∗∗ .0022∗∗∗ .0022∗∗∗
r2 bint .3336 .3080 .3398
r2 ct .2862 .2370 .2755
-2LL 21746.1 21433.1 19752.5 19502.0
AIC 21760.1 21503.1 19762.5 19576.0
BIC 21786.7 21636.1 19781.5 19716.7
Note: (a) Weight variable is share of occupations at given years.
(b) Pseudo-R2 (PRE) calculated by (σ2int,BaseModel − σ2int,FullModel)/σ2int,BaseModel)
(c) Pseudo-R2 (PRE) calculated by (σ2t,BaseModel − σ2t,FullModel)/σ2t,BaseModel)
† < .10, ∗ < .05, ∗∗ < .01, ∗∗∗ < .001
and slopes.
Model 2 in Table 5.4 shows the results of the estimation of the equation
3.11.3 An increase in the proportion female in an occupation (i.e., an increase
of 1 percentage point) reduces growth in wage inequality (as measured by the
Gini index) in that occupation by .0470, net of the other variables. This net
effect is statistically significant at the .001 level and is obtained from Model
2, which also controls for several occupation-specific group means (which are
defined as being constant over this time period). Thus, this estimated effect
3In the estimation of my growth models, I weigh each occupation by the proportion of the
total sample of workers that is employed in the particular occupation. Unweighted results
are available upon request from the author, although the unweighted results are generally
very similar to the weighted results that I report.
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is net of the overall average proportion of female workers in an occupation
and therefore indicates that occupations that experienced increases in female
workers actually had less inequality growth over this time period. This finding
is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1-A, which predicts that increases in female
employment would increase the growth of wage inequality.4
Although not shown in Table 5.4, I estimated another specification that
included a quadratic term for the proportion female. The coefficient for this
term was positive, indicating that the negative effect of the proportion female
declines as the proportion increases. Using this model, I calculated the net
effect of an increase of 1 percentage point in female employment for occupa-
tions where the proportion female is 90 percent and for occupations where the
proportion female is 10 percent. In both cases, the net effects are still negative
and are thus consistent with the basic result given by Model 2 in Table 5.4.
Another statistically significant result in Model 2 in Table 5.4 is the net
effect of employment in the public sector. A 1 percentage point increase in pub-
lic sector employment in an occupation reduces growth in within-occupational
inequality by .0535, net of the other variables. Furthermore, the interaction
between year and public sector employment is statistically significant in Model
2, indicating that inequality in the public sector is declining (after controlling
for the other variables) over this time period. This interaction coefficient in-
dicates that within-occupational wage inequality decreases by .0012 per year
without changing the proportion of public sector employment.
4Cancian and Reed (1999) similarly find that the increase in female labor force partici-
pation has reduced household income inequality.
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In contrast to public sector employment, employment in manufacturing
does not have a direct net effect on growth in within-occupational inequality,
according to the results for Model 2. The coefficient for manufacturing is
not statistically significant. This finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2-A,
which predicts that increases in manufacturing employment reduce growth in
wage inequality. Also noteworthy is that there is no statistically significant net
effect of the mean level of manufacturing employment, indicating that, net of
the other variables, occupations with more manufacturing employment are not
more equal during this time period. Although the interaction between year
and the mean level of manufacturing employment is statistically significant,
this negative effect indicates a temporal reduction in the level of inequality
within the manufacturing sector, which has not been the major concern of the
deindustrialization argument.
The net effect of unionized employment is a statistically significant pre-
dictor of growth in within-occupational inequality. A 1 percentage point in-
crease in unionized employment increases growth in the occupation-specific
Gini by .0294. This finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 3-A, which predicts
that increases in unionized employment reduce wage inequality. Furthermore,
the coefficient for YEAR×Union is statistically significant and positive, indicat-
ing that wage inequality within the unionized sector increased over this time
period. Although the net effect of Union is statistically significant and neg-
ative, this result only shows that inequality tends to be lower in occupations
where union membership is high for any given year.
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Considering unions have long been viewed as an inequality reducing
institution, this positive effect of unions is surprising. This finding surely
needs further consideration. Unions can reduce inequality either by lower-
ing the dispersion of earnings among their members or by increasing wages
of less-skilled workers. On the other hand, unions can increase inequality
by alienating non-union members and exclusively increasing union members’
wages (monopoly rents). Only if the inequality reducing function of unions
outweighs the inequality-enhancing function of unions can unions serve as an
equalizing institution. Table 5.5 demonstrates that the inequality reducing
function of unions has substantially weakened during this period. Inequality
has grown faster among union members than among non-union members dur-
ing this period. The Theil index gains .04403 (from .18642 to .21246) among
union members, which is almost twice as large as the index among non-union
members where the Theil index increases by .02604 (from .09092 to .13495). In
both groups, within-occupational inequality dominates between-occupational
inequality.5
Furthermore, unions fail to increase the wages of their members as much
as non-union members. In every educational group, the amount of increase
in the mean wage of union members for the given period is smaller than that
of non-union members. The wage drop for the less than high school educated
union workers is especially substantial ($3.19 per hour). Less educated union
5Additionally, it is worth mentioning that for non-union members, within-educational
inequality does not increase as much as within-occupational inequality. Rather, between-
educational inequality has grown faster among non-union members over this period.
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Table 5.5: Change of Theil Inequality Index by Union and Non-union members
of Private Sector
Among Non-union Members Among Union Members
1983-85 2000-02 Change 1983-85 2000-02 Change
Theil Inequality Index
Theil .18642 .21246 .02604 .09092 .13495 .04403
Within Occ. .11185 .13338 .02153 .06355 .09815 .03460
Between Occ. .07457 .07908 .00451 .02736 .03680 .00944
Within Edu. .15136 .15526 .00389 .08725 .11921 .03195
Between Edu. .03505 .05719 .02214 .00366 .01573 .01207
Less than High. .12969 .09792 -.03177 .08456 .10045 .01589
High Sch. .13922 .13144 -.00778 .08334 .09656 .01322
Some Col. .16910 .16092 -.00818 .09747 .10026 .00279
BA .16538 .17662 .01124 .13477 .19095 .05618
Grad. .16007 .17716 .01709 .13496 .14281 .00785
MeanWage by Education
Less than High. 10.1599 9.5230 -.6369 15.8919 12.7001 -3.1917
High Sch. 12.1974 12.6746 .4771 17.7863 16.3651 -1.4212
Some Col. 13.8975 14.5969 .6993 18.8358 18.1926 -.6431
BA 20.4240 23.2699 2.8458 21.4531 23.2692 1.8161
Grad. 25.0896 30.3405 5.2508 24.0326 26.4018 2.3692
members still earn more hourly wages than non-union members for 2000-2002,
but the mean wage gap between union and non-union members has substan-
tially narrowed. This implies that the spillover effect of unions likely did not
take place. Benefits of being a union member have been cut, and thus em-
ployers receive much less pressure from unions to raise non-union members’
wages to prevent unionization. What is worse for unions is that the decline of
wages of less educated union members comes with an increase in within-group
inequality. Among union members of both the less than high school educated
104
and high school graduates, within-group inequalities have grown, while among
non-union members, within-group inequalities for the same groups have de-
creased. Strikingly, among the less than high school educated, the Theil for
union members is higher than the Theil for non-union members. It is no longer
undoubtfably true that among union members the coefficients for education
predicting wages is lower and the variance within the same educational groups
is lower too (Freeman 1980). Rather, it seems that the norms in wage deter-
mination among unions is shifting towards an acceptance of more inequality
among members (Mitchell 1985). In sum, the net effect of union membership
on inequality is not negative but positive, mainly because of the increase in
inequality among union members themselves.
Going back to multilevel models, the results in Table 5.4 provide some
qualified support for Hypothesis 4-A that insecure employment relations, which
are measured in terms of part-time employment, increase the growth in within-
occupational inequality. Although the net effect of part-time employment is
not statistically significant in Model 2, which is weighted by the share of occu-
pation, it is highly significant in Model 1, which is unweighted. The coefficient
of part-time is the only coefficient that is meaningfully altered by weighting.
Thus, I investigate an additional specification that is shown as Model 3 in
Table 5.4. Model 3 includes interaction terms between part-time employment
and sales occupations and between part-time employment and service occu-
pations.6 In contrast to Model 2 and consistently with Model 1, the “main
6I also tested the effect of other interaction terms with part-time, but only two interaction
terms introduced in Model 3 are significant.
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effect” for part-time employment is highly positive and statistically significant
in Model 3 after the addition of these two interaction terms.
These results for Model 3 in Table 5.4 show that outside of sales and
service occupations, a 1 percentage point increase in part-time employment
increases growth in wage inequality by .0410. In sales occupations, however,
a 1 percentage point increase in part-time employment increases growth in
inequality by .0410 − .0589 = −.0179. In service occupations, a 1 percent-
age point increase in part-time employment increases growth in inequality by
.0410 − .0645 = −.0235. That is, in sales and service occupations, increases
in part-employment lead to reductions in wage inequality. Union membership
among sales and service workers is relatively rare, so increases in part-time
employment in these occupations may serve to force down the wages of full-
time sales and service workers (holding constant the other variables), resulting
in reduced within-occupational inequality.
In sum, increases in part-time employment increase growth in within-
occupational wage inequality in occupations other than sales and services. This
finding supports Hypothesis 4-A, except for sales and service occupations.
In terms of cross-sectional differences in occupational wage inequality, the
net effect of the group mean for part-time employment is highly positive and
statistically significant. This latter finding indicates that occupations with
higher levels of part-time employment tend to be more unequal.
The net effects of the educational variables do not support Hypothe-
sis 5-A, which is derived from the skill biased technological change (SBTC)
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view. In contrast to Hypothesis 5-A, the results for both Model 2 and Model
3 in Table 5.4 indicate that increases in the educational diversity index and in
the proportion of workers with a college degree do not increase the growth of
within-occupational wage inequality, as their coefficients are not statistically
significant.7 Contrary to much discussion in the economics literature, as men-
tioned earlier, increases in the dispersion in educational attainments do not
appear to have a net effect on the growth in occupation-specific wage inequal-
ity. Furthermore, there is no additional net effect of changes in the proportion
of workers who have at least a four-year college (i.e., B.A.) degree.
In addition, the coefficient for YEAR×Edu.Div is not statistically signif-
icant, which is also contrary to the SBTC view. The latter contends that the
return to having a college degree has increased in recent years, as highly skilled
workers have become more valuable to employers. This argument implies that
the average inequality in educational attainments should be increasing in its
net effect over time, as the differential between the marginal revenue prod-
ucts of highly educated workers and poorly educated workers widens. This
prediction is not borne out, however, because the coefficient for the interac-
tion between year and the mean educational diversity index is not statistically
significant in either Model 2 or Model 3 in Table 5.4.
The coefficient for YEAR × BA+ (i.e., the interaction between year and
the mean proportion of college-educated workers) is statistically significant and
7Note that the removal of one of these two variables does not result in the other becoming
statistically significant. That is, the lack of statistical significance for these two variables
does not reflect multicollinearity.
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positive, but this finding does not actually represent clear evidence in favor
of the SBTC view. This coefficient is estimated net of the mean educational
diversity index, which is my main indicator of variation in the skill levels of
workers. The positive net effect of YEAR× BA+ is therefore more indicative of
increasing wage inequality among college-educated workers, net of increases
in the returns to education. This increasing wage inequality among college-
educated workers is not of direct relevance, however, to the expectations of
the SBTC view.8
To be sure, the net effects of the group means of the proportion of
college-educated workers (i.e., BA+) and of the educational diversity index (i.e.,
Edu.Div ) are highly positive and statistically significant. These net effects
show that these two variables are important in predicting which occupations
have greater inequality in a given year (i.e., in terms of a cross-section). Be-
cause these variables are constant over time, however, they cannot explain the
growth in wage inequality, which is the main concern of the SBTC view. In
sum, the SBTC view is not very useful in explaining the growth of within-
occupational inequality, which accounts for most of the growth in inequality.
Regarding the hypothesis of organizational change, the results of Table
5.4 and Table 5.5 provide indirect evidence in favor of this hypothesis. This
8Additional evidence can be found in Table 5.5. The SBTC view implies that most of the
growth in inequality will be attributable to the growth of between-educational inequality.
Indeed, the wage gap between workers of different education levels has grown. The mean
wages of less educated workers are down, while the mean wages of highly educated workers
are up. In particular, among non-union members, 85 percent of the increase in Theil is
due to between-education inequality. When it comes to union members, however, only 27.4
percent of the growth in Theil is due to between-education inequality. Thus, the legitimacy
of SBTC is, at best, situationally dependent.
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view implies that growing inequality is due to the change in necessary skill
quality (Snower 1998; Lindbeck and Snower 1996, 2000). Proponents of this
view argue that the college premium has risen in recent decades, not because
the productivity of college educated workers at large has increased, but be-
cause the ‘new economy’ requires versatile ability across tasks. They further
state that productivity is less dependent on specific tasks or jobs and more
dependent on individuals’ versatile ability. This view, therefore, predicts a
decline in between-occupational inequality and a rise in within-occupational
inequality. As seen above, the growth of within-occupational inequality is
greater than the growth of between-occupational inequality.
According to the view of organizational change, college educated work-
ers are more likely to have versatile ability. That is, the general demand for
this group has risen, resulting in the growth of the mean wage for this group.
But not all college educated workers have this ability, so this view predicts
that, among college educated workers, inequality is likely to grow. As shown
in Table 5.4, inequality has grown fast among equally educated high-skill work-
ers (the significant coefficient of YEAR×BA+). The results of Table 5.5, showing
that inequality grows faster among well educated workers, are also consistent
with this view.
Compared to the Baseline Model, Table 5.4 shows that Model 3 explains
27.6 percent of the variance of the growth rate, while Model 2 explains 23.7
percent. The variance of the Baseline Model (i.e., .0286) is reduced in Model
3 (i.e., .0207). It is still statistically significant, however, indicating that there
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remains unexplained variation across the occupations. In terms of the model-
fit test statistics, they are all significant, which indicates that Model 1 fits the
data better than the Baseline Model and that Model 3 fits better than Model
1. Tests using AIC or BIC yield the same conclusions.
After controlling for the explanatory variables in Model 2 or Model 3,
the coefficient for Year is not statistically significant (although it is highly
significant in the Baseline Model). Thus, there is no net effect of Year on
growth in wage inequality after accounting for changes in the independent
variables and in their slopes over this time period.
Model 2 and Model 3 also explain a little more than 30 percent of the
variation in the occupation-specific intercepts relative to the variation in the
occupation-specific intercepts in the Baseline Model. In other words, around
70 percent of the variation is still left unexplained after controlling for race,
gender, education, and industrial sectors in the models of inequality. That is,
the majority of within-occupational inequality can not be regressed to these
variables. Contrary to the assertion of the disaggregate structuration theorists,
within-occupational heterogeneity does not disappear (nor is it reduced to a
negligible quantity) after controlling for these ‘other variables.’
It is also noteworthy that σtint is significant and negative in all models
of Table 5.4. This implies that the rate of inequality change for occupations
with higher level of inequality is slower.
Table 5.6 shows how much variance in the growth rate can be explained
by each variable. For example, when the education variables are excluded
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Table 5.6: Explanatory Power of Predictors on the Variation of Growth







If the following variables are excluded,
Education .02455 +.00275 .09615
Unione .02441 +.00261 .09125
Sector .02201 +.00021 .00734
Part Time .02190 +.00010 .00349
Female .02182 +.00002 .00069
Race .02173 −.00007 −
Notes: (a) σ2,RestrictedModelt − σ2,FullModelt
(a) r2 calculated by (σ2,RestrictedModelt − σ2,FullModelt )/σ2,BaseModelt
(c) Baseline Model in Table 5.4.
(d) Full Model 2 in Table 5.4.
(e) Both pulbic sector and manufacturing sector.
from the full model, the variation of the growth rate becomes .02455, which
is .00275 bigger than the variation of the growth rate of Model 2 in Table 5.4
that includes all variables. This difference is how much the variation improved
by the introduction of education variables. Thus, r2 (i.e., the proportion ex-
plained) due to education variables is .09615, which is obtained by dividing
the difference of variation (.00275) by the variation of the Baseline Model
(.02860). Other than education variables, another important variable that
explains a large amount of variation is % union. When % union is excluded
from the model, the variation of the growth rate jumps to .02441, which is
.00261 more variation than the variation that can otherwise be explained by
the full model. The proportion of variation explained by union membership
is .09125. Therefore, education variables and union membership account for
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about two-thirds of the total variation of the growth rate improvement.
Other variables explain the reduction of variation by less than 1 percent.
This is because either the variations over time of these predictors are small or
their variations over time are not significantly associated with the change of
inequality over time.
5.3 Summary and Discussion
The findings from descriptive statistics and multi-level growth analysis pro-
vide empirical evidence both supporting and refuting suggested hypotheses in
regard to growing within-occupational inequality.
Disaggregate structuration. As discussed in Chapter 2.1.2, the disaggre-
gate structuration view assumes homogeneity within an occupation. This view
argues that via ‘occupationalization,’ an occupation becomes a more homoge-
neous group. The disaggregate structuration view, however, does not rule out
the possibility of within-occupational heterogeneity. Within-occupational het-
erogeneity can be caused by demographic factors such as race and gender, and
institutional elements such as union membership and industrial mix. Thus,
these variables should explain most of the within-occupational inequality, so
that the amount of total variation explained by these variables is substantially
large and so that when these variables are controlled for, within-occupational
inequality becomes negligibly small or disappears. According to Table 5.4, con-
trary to the expectation of the disaggregate structuration view, the amount
of total variation explained by included explanatory variables is not large .
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At maximum it is 27 percent in Model 3. Three-fourths of the total varia-
tion of within-occupational inequality across occupations is left unexplained
by these variables. Therefore, even after controlling for demographic and insti-
tutional factors, there are remain significant amounts of within-occupational
heterogeneity across occupations.
In terms of wages, the history of the last twenty years does not demon-
strate the progress of occupationalization, which implies a reduction in hetero-
geneity within occupations. Unlike the expectation of the disaggregate struc-
turation view, within-occupational inequality, namely, heterogeneity within
occupations, is growing. Furthermore, this growing within-occupational in-
equality is not largely explained by other demographic or institutional vari-
ables. Contrary to the disaggregate structuration view, heterogeneity within
occupations has grown. Thus, if anything has happened to occupations, it has
been anti-occupationalization.
Hypothesis 1-A: The increase of % female in an occupation will increase
within-occupational inequality. This is not supported. The % female increased
in occupations where within-occupational inequality declined, while the %
female decreased in occupations where inequality grew. This finding indicates
that the increase of % female pulls down rather than raises inequality. The
results of multivariate analysis (Table 5.4) also backs up this interpretation. A
1 percentage point increase of % female decreases the Theil index (multiplied
by 100) by .0483. This finding is statistically significant at any conventional
confidence level.
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Peterson and Morgan (1995) reported that most of the gender wage gap
is due to occupational segregation and that the within-job gender wage gap is
small. That is, although female workers tend to have lower wages than their
male counterparts, the difference is small. Therefore, more female workers do
not necessarily lower male workers’ wages at the lower end of wage distribution.
Furthermore, female workers are not necessarily competing with male workers
at the lower part of the wage distribution in an occupation. If the skill levels
of female workers are competitive with male workers at the upper part of
the wage distribution and if female workers are paid lower, then more female
workers will put downward pressure on wages at the upper distribution, which,
in turn, will decrease inequality.
Hypothesis 2-A: The decrease of the percent of workers in the manu-
facturing sector will increase within-occupational inequality. This is not sup-
ported. The changes in of % workers in the manufacturing sector do not affect
the changes in inequality. Regardless of whether within-occupational inequal-
ity increases or decreases, the proportion of workers in the manufacturing
sector in an occupation is decreased. If a decrease in the percent of workers in
the manufacturing sectors boosts inequality, inequality-growing occupations
should show at least bigger reductions in the percent of workers in manufac-
turing sectors. However, Table 5.2 shows that a decrease in the percentage of
workers in the manufacturing sector is even larger within inequality-declining
occupations. These findings do not support the ‘deindustrialization’ hypothe-
sis.
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This conclusion is consistent with the previous research done by Murphy
and Welch (1993) and Juhn et al. (1993). Compositional changes of industrial
mix, a decrease in the manufacturing sector and an increase in the service
sector, do not seem to increase inequality. Furthermore, this finding provides
evidence against Raffalovich (1993)’s argument. Raffalovich (1993) argues that
without compositional changes of industries, a drop of average wages within
manufacturing sectors could cause an increase in inequality. If that happens,
occupations that have a greater proportion of workers in the manufacturing
sector should show growth of inequality without changes in industrial mix.
YEAR×Manuf in Table 5.4 represents yearly inequality change without changes
of % workers in the manufacturing sector. Raffalovich’s argument implies that
the coefficient of this variable should be positive. As shown in Table 5.4, how-
ever, the coefficient of YEAR× Manuf is negative. That is, without changes in
industrial mix, occupations where more workers work within the manufactur-
ing sector do not show faster increases in inequality. At least in explaining
changes of within-occupational inequality, which comprises the majority of re-
cent inequality changes, the deindustrialization hypothesis does not seem to
have much explanatory power.
Hypothesis 3-A: The decrease in the percent of union members will in-
crease within-occupational inequality. This is not supported. The most striking
result of my findings is that the effect of union membership on inequality is not
negative, but positive. The increase in the percent of union membership by 1
percentage point in an occupation is likely to increase the Theil (multiplied by
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100) by about .03. Furthermore, inequality grows faster among union mem-
bers themselves. The growth rates of inequality among union members are
higher than they are among non-union members. Although where unioniza-
tion is higher inequality in a given year is lower, longitudinally, greater union
membership seems to have brought about more inequality over the last two
decades.
This result connotes that the function of unions on inequality in Amer-
ican society has fundamentally changed during the last several decades. Con-
trary to Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) conclusion, ‘what unions do’ is no longer
‘reducing inequality among union members’ nor ‘reducing inequality by boost-
ing solidarity among equally skilled workers.’ Rather, what unions mainly do is
pursue monopoly rents for their own interests. The monopoly effect of unions
seems to be greater than the spillover effect of unions. Mitchell (1985) argues
that the norms of unions regarding wage determination are shifting toward two-
tier wage plans, which increase (or at least do not decrease) wages of current
union members at the cost of wages of newcomers. That is, unions become
less resistant to inequality among union workers themselves. Thus, unions
function as a barrier (i.e., social closure) against non-union members within
the same occupation (Weeden 2002). The increase of unionization, therefore,
will not reverse the current trend of growing inequality unless unions change
their attitude. Indeed, the results of Table 5.4 show that an increase in the
percentage of union membership would likely bring about more inequality (the
coefficient of Union is positive), and among union members, inequality grows
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faster (the coefficient of YEAR × Union is positive). The question is whether
the changes of union norms are caused by attitudinal changes among union
members/leaders. If so there is the possibility that they can be changed again
by reinforced union activities. However,if these changes are caused by deeper
structural transfers beyond the attitudes of union members, they are not likely
to be reversed.
Acemoglu, Aghion, and Vilolante (2001) explained deunionization and
the declining inequality-reducing effect of unions as phenomena mediated by
changes of skill. That is, because of the widening productivity differentials
between skilled and unskilled workers, the relative advantage of joining unions
for skilled workers drops, and productivity changes increase the competitive
market return for skilled workers and further weaken their incentives to join
the unionized sector(231). “As the more productive employees face improved
outside opportunities, wage compression becomes harder to sustain, and these
workers quit unions and cause deunionization” (251). Western (1995) also
found, in a comparison of eighteen advanced capitalist countries, that deu-
nionization is a result of fundamental structural changes in the economy. He
states that unions lacked the institutional resources to resist the decline; thus
revitalization of unions is unlikely.
Regarding the relation between unionization and occupationalization,
my result seems to support Grusky’s (2005) argument that unions and occu-
pational associations are competing institutions. When the unionization rate
is down, within-occupational inequality is also declining; thus, homogeneity in
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an occupation is strengthened. While the unionization rate among blue collar
workers is declining, the alternative occupational association does not seem to
be emerging. As Grusky himself admits, blue collar occupations are examples
of incomplete occupationalization.
In sum, within-occupational inequality is growing, not mainly because
of deunionization, but because of the shift of unions towards a monopoly insti-
tution. Furthermore, the inequality-increasing effect of unions shown in Table
5.4 is neither by chance nor a temporary phenomenon, but rather evidence of
a fundamentally altered function of unions in our society.
Hypothesis 4-A: The increase of part-time workers will increase inequal-
ity. This hypothesis is supported. The results in Table 5.4 provide supporting
evidence for Hypothesis 4-A that insecure employment relations, which are
measured in terms of part-time employment, increase the growth in within-
occupational inequality. A one percentage point increase in part-time workers
increases Theil by .0410. This positive effect of part-time workers, however,
is not uniform across occupations. Among sales and service occupations, the
net effects of part-time workers are negative. That is, more part-time work-
ers decrease inequality in these occupations. It seems that increases in part-
time employment in these occupations may serve to force down the wages of
full-time sales and service workers, resulting in reduced within-occupational
inequality.
Although the coefficient for part-time is positive, we can not blame the
change of % part-time workers for the growing inequality. The proportion of
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part-time workers has been reduced by 2.6 percent during this period. McCall
(2000) warned that the growth of insecure labor employment could bring about
higher levels of inequality. While this warning itself is legitimate, when part-
time workers, which are a form of insecure employment relations, have not
increased over the last two decades, we may not need to take her warning too
seriously. I want to note, however, that I did not study all forms of insecure
employment. To investigate the trend of insecure employment contracts and
their impacts, other forms of insecure employment relations should be closely
examined in other studies.
Hypothesis 5-A: Wage inequality will increase in occupations that expe-
rience increases in the variability of educational attainments. This is not sup-
ported. Contrary to the SBTC view, a unit increase of educational diversity
(Edu.Div) does not increase within-occupational inequality. Neither does the
increase of the proportion of workers with a college degree. Furthermore, the
coefficient for YEAR×Edu.Div is not statistically significant, which is also con-
trary to the SBTC view. Although YEAR×Edu.Div is significant and positive,
this variable does not indicate a growth of inequality due to skill biased tech-
nological change. Rather, the positive coefficient of YEAR× Edu.Div bespeaks
the growth of wage inequality among college-educated workers themselves.
These findings cast doubt on the strength of the SBTC argument that
has been popular in economics (e.g., Murphy and Welch 1997; Juhn et al.
1993). Although explaining the rise of wage inequality as the result of rise
in returns to skill, Juhn et al. (1993) also observed the majority of inequality
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growth happened within education-experience group. While Juhn et al. as-
serted that the rise of return to skill was driven by the heightened skill demand,
they did not propose anything about what kind of skill demand has been in-
creased. Others argue that computers raise the demand of college educated
workers, thus, in turn, the wages of skilled workers (e.g., Autor, Katz, and
Krueger 1998), but the introduction of computer itself does not account for
a major portion of inequality growth (e.g., Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2002).
Rather, organizational and human resources factors seems to strongly mediate
the impact of the changing economy (e.g., Black and Lynch 2001; Fernandez
2001; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2002).
I want to note, however, that my tests of the SBTC as well as deindus-
trialization thesis, union effects, and other hypothesis are obviously doing so
in the context of taking occupational structure as a given. The cases where
the SBTC or deindustrialization operates by changing occupational structure,
or where they operate in part via occupation as an intervening variable are not
fully analyzed in my research. It is possible that these hypothesis could have a
little more explanatory power in other contexts. I will indirectly examine that
possibility in the next chapter in which the effects on occupational mean wage
are tested. I leave the full scrutiny of this possibility for future researches.
Hypothesis 6-A: Within-occupational inequality would grow faster in
high skill jobs and in service jobs. This hypothesis is supported. Although
there is no variable in my data that measures organizational change directly,
the patterns of growing inequality are consistent with what this view prognos-
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ticates. While the SBTC view predicts the growth of between-occupational in-
equality and has no clearly expected impact on within-occupational inequality,
the organizational change hypothesis anticipates lowered occupational bound-
aries and thus a bigger growth of within-occupational inequality (in a weak
form) or a decline of between-occupational inequality (in a strong form). This
view assumes that materialistic bases for equal pay for equal work are eroding
(Walter and Snellman 2004; Snower 1998) and predicts growing inequality for
equal work (i.e., growing within-occupational inequality). This view also pre-
dicts the faster growth of within-group inequality for college educated workers
than for less educated workers.
Indeed, between-occupational inequality has grown not as much as
within-occupational inequality over the last two decades. As shown in Table
4.4, both between- and within-occupational inequality have been increasing
between 1983-1985 and 2000-2002. Thus, although the strong form of the or-
ganizational change view is not supported, the weak form of this hypothesis
is borne out by empirical data. Furthermore, the coefficient of YEAR × BA+,
which represents the changes of within-group inequality among college edu-
cated workers, is highly significant and positive, while YEAR× Edu.Div, which
the SBTC view predicts to be a positive coefficient, is not significant.
The organizational change hypothesis also anticipates that inequality
will grow faster in occupations where workers need to meet customers face-
to-face. Figure 5.1 shows that inequalities of most sales and service jobs have
increased substantially, while inequalities of manual laborer jobs, which entail
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limited customer contacts, have been reduced in many cases.
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2002) reported in their study of in-depth
interviews at a bank that, rather than technological changes themselves, re-
organization of tasks due to such changes lead to changes in productivity.
Thus, organizational changes seem to be related to relocations of workers
across firms. High-wage workers are more likely to be concentrated in cer-
tain establishments (Kremer and Maskin 1996), and according to Dunne et al.
(2004), the between-plant component of wage dispersion accounts for almost
the entire increase of hourly wage dispersion from 1975 to 1992 in the U.S.
manufacturing sectors. That is, inequality is growing due to organizational
changes, which are occurring at firm levels. Once again, organizations (firms)






6.1 Causes of Between-Occupational Inequal-
ity
Between-occupational inequality accounts for about 29.7 percent of the in-
crease of Theil from 1983-1985 to 2000-2002. In this section, I investigate the
determinants of growing between-occupational inequality. To this end, factors
regulating changes of mean wages of occupations are estimated. By doing
this, we can indirectly estimate the sources of changing between-occupational




As shown in Table 6.1, the occupational mean wage (2002 constant dollars)
has stayed the same between 1983-1985 and 1991-1993 and has increased by
1.6 dollars an hour between 1991-1993 and 2000-2002. Table 6.2 and Table
6.3 show relevant descriptive statistics. Table 6.2 exhibits the changes of de-
mographic, educational, and institutional variables in ‘mean-wage-declining
occupations’ (115 occupations out of 331 detail occupations) and in ‘mean-
wage-growing occupations’ (82 occupations). Whether an occupation is mean
wage growing or declining is determined by the results of a regression model
used for Table 5.1. The definitions of high-wage occupations and low-wage
occupations for Table 6.3 are consistent with the definitions for Table 5.3.
In Table 6.2, mean-wage-declining occupations show a substantial gain
of % female, while mean-wage-growing occupations have no change of % fe-
male. As expected, more female workers puts downward pressure on the wages
of male workers in the same occupation, resulting in the decline of the mean
wage of that occupation. By the way, Table 6.3 demonstrates that occupa-
tions that gain more female workers are high-wage occupations. These find-
ings imply that the growth of female labor market participation will pull down
the wages of high-income jobs, thus bringing about a reduction of between-
occupational inequality.
Another noteworthy difference between mean-wage-growing and mean-
wage declining occupations is the changes of % college educated workers. The
proportion of college educated workers was up more in mean-wage-growing
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for Change of Mean Wage of 331 Occupations,
1983-85 to 2000-02
Total 1983-1985 1991-1993 2000-2002
Meanwage Mean 15.508 15.136 15.155 16.720
(sd. dev.) (5.741) (5.344) (5.591) (6.403)
Min 5.46 5.84 5.52 6.19
Max 45.89 45.89 39.69 43.19
Sample Size (n) 5958 331 331 331
occupations than in mean-wage-declining occupations (Table 6.2). And high-
wage occupations have seen larger increases in % college educated workers
than have low-wage occupations (Table 6.3). Thus, it is reasonable to induce
that the increment of college educated workers for the given period may be
attributable to the rise of between-occupational inequality. This induction is
congruent with the SBTC view. Regarding educational diversity, substantial
differences between occupational groups are observed neither in Table 6.2 or
in Table 6.3.
The proportion of part-time workers is down in mean-wage-growing
occupations, while it is stable in mean-wage-declining occupations. Also, the
proportion of part-time workers is decreasing among low-wage occupations,
while it is increasing in high-wage occupations. The change of proportion
of part-time workers for this period therefore seems to be conducive to the
narrowing of the between-occupational wage dispersion.
Both % union and % manufacturing sectors are down substantially more
in mean-wage-declining occupations than in mean-wage-growing occupations.
The of % union has especially decreased more among low-wage occupations
than among high-wage occupations, so that the decline of % union may be
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics by Mean Wage Growing and Mean Wage
Declining Occupations
Among Occupations Among Occupations
with Decreased Mean Wage with Increased Mean Wage
(115 Occupations) (82 Occupations)
Variable 1983-85 2000-02 Change 1983-85 2000-02 Change
Female .2777 .3426 +.0649 .6586 .6625 +.0039
(.2391) (.2718) (.2902) (.2646)
Black .1269 .1377 +.0108 .1157 .1230 +.0073
(.0643) (.0618) (.0783) (.0735)
Hispanics .0764 .1554 +.0790 .0563 .1116 +.0553
(.0364) (.0862) (.0389) (.0932)
Other Races .0239 .0413 +.0174 .0292 .0490 +.0198
(.0110) (.0205) (.0177) (.0296)
BA+ .0965 .1226 +.0261 .3186 .3774 +.0588
(.1498) (.1640) (.3447) (.3461)
Edu. Div. .6391 .6330 −.0061 .6210 .6098 −.0112
(.0374) (.0332) (.0993) (.1235)
South .3344 .3537 +.0193 .3318 .3446 +.0128
(.0608) (.0486) (.0562) (.0419)
Public Sector .1323 .1172 −.0151 .2709 .2494 −.0215
(.1845) (.1848) (.3020) (.2956)
Part Time .1134 .1047 −.0087 .2830 .2163 −.0667
(.1325) (.1078) (.1818) (.1349)
Union .3443 .2036 −.1407 .1961 .1726 −.0235
(.1664) (.1409) (.2055) (.1926)
Manufacturing .5326 .4381 −.0945 .0444 .0302 −.0142
(.3515) (.3696) (.1097) (.0794)
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Table 6.3: Change of Percent of Workers Among High-Income Jobs and Low-
Income Jobs
High-Wage Occupations Low-Wage Occupations
(59 Occupations) (39 Occupations)
Variable 1983-85 2000-02 Change 1983-85 2000-02 Change
Female .3005 .3957 +.0952 .6793 .6393 −.0400
(.1476) (.1661) (.2592) (.2437)
Black .0473 .0737 +.0264 .1517 .1538 +.0021
(.0221) (.0243) (.0865) (.0812)
Hispanics .0273 .0498 +.0225 .0896 .1991 +.1095
(.0080) (.0124) (.0463) (.1096)
Other Races .0315 .0637 +.0322 .0362 .0574 +.0212
(.0232) (.0457) (.0153) (.0237)
BA+ .5793 .6224 +.0431 .0500 .0670 +.0170
(.2065) (.1872) (.0341) (.0393)
Edu. Div. .6580 .6387 −.0193 .6458 .6562 +.0104
(.1459) (.1552) (.0387) (.0265)
South .3091 .3350 +.0259 .3521 .3461 −.0060
(.0413) (.0338) (.0592) (.0338)
Public Sector .2263 .1801 −.0462 .0833 .0664 −.0169
(.2571) (.2342) (.1148) (.0992)
Part Time .0601 .0642 +.0041 .4085 .3163 −.0922
(.0758) (.0707) (.1651) (.1226)
Union .1222 .0851 −.0371 .1318 .0788 −.0530
(.1194) (.1030) (.0890) (.0499)
Manufacturing .2767 .2035 −.0732 .0818 .0381 −.0437
(.2194) (.1747) (.2346) (.1508)
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contributing to the widening between-occupational wage gap. Contrary to %
union, the proportion of manufacturing sectors diminished more among high-
wage occupations than among low-wage occupations; thus, whether the change
of % manufacturing sector causes the rise of inequality or not can not be easily
induced from this findings. Multivariate analysis may be required.
The changes of the % race variables do not substantially differ between
mean-wage-growing and mean-wage-declining occupations. Neither the change
of % south nor the change of % public sector shows notable difference between
the two occupational categories.
6.1.2 Multivariate Analysis: Multilevel Growth Models
Table 6.4 shows the results for the multi-level growth models of mean wage,
as shown by equation 3.12. Although not a direct decomposition, the findings
in Table 6.4 provide some indirect evidence about the sources of between-
occupational wage inequality because the latter reflects variation between oc-
cupations in their mean wages. In regard to the Baseline Model, the effect of
year is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no increase in the
occupation-specific mean wage over this time period.
According to Full Model 2 in Table 6.4, a 1 percentage point increase
in female employment in an occupation reduces growth in the mean wage by
.0293 dollars. In Model 2, an interaction term is added to indicate female
employment in high-wage occupations (i.e., occupations where the mean wage
is more than 1 standard deviation above the grand mean). The results for
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Table 6.4: Models of Mean Wage Change over Time
Base Model Full Model 1 Full Model 2 Full Model 3
(Weight On) (Weight Off) (Weight On)a (Wt+Interact)
Intercept 16.1214∗∗∗ 13.2158∗∗∗ 13.4359∗∗∗ 13.0746∗∗∗
Year -.0033 .3412∗∗∗ .3432∗∗∗ .3517∗∗∗
Slope Change by the Change of Proportion
Femalejt -.0263∗∗∗ -.0293∗∗∗ -.0205∗
Blackjt -.0255∗∗∗ -.0098 -.0135∗
Hispjt .0033 .0167
∗∗ .0147∗
Othersjt .0039∗∗∗ .0538∗∗∗ .0510∗∗∗
Southjt .0050 -.0001 .0011
BA+jt .0724∗∗∗ .0736∗∗∗ .0749∗∗∗
Edu.Divjt -.0058 .0085 .0088
Publicjt -.0468∗∗∗ -.0409∗∗∗ -.0541∗∗∗
PartTimejt -.0071 -.0181∗∗∗ -.0265∗∗∗
Unionjt .0759∗∗∗ .0816∗∗∗ .0847∗∗∗
Manufjt .0202∗∗∗ .0201∗∗∗ .0188∗∗∗
Femalejt × HighWagej -.0406∗∗∗
PartTimejt × HighWagej .0696∗∗∗
Publicjt × LowWagej .0666∗∗∗
Unionjt × LowWagej -.0441∗∗
Yearly Slope Change of Group Mean
YEARt × BA+j. .0010∗∗∗ .0012∗∗∗ .0012∗∗∗
YEARt × Edu.Divj. -.0048∗∗∗ -.0049∗∗∗ -.0050∗∗∗
YEARt × Publicj. -.0002 -.0003 -.0003
YEARt × PartTimej. -.0001 -.0003 -.0005
YEARt × Unionj. -.0012∗∗ -.0011∗ -.0011∗∗
YEARt × Manufj. -.0006∗∗ -.0007∗∗∗ -.0007∗∗∗
Effect of Group Mean
Femalej. -.0061 -.0022 -.0085
Blackj. -.0903∗∗ -.1086∗∗∗ -.1006∗∗∗
Hispanicj. -.1592
∗∗∗ -.1767∗∗∗ -.1659∗∗∗
Othersj. .0162 -.0541 -.0615
Southj. .0105 .0146 .0128
BA+j. .0578∗∗∗ .0546∗∗∗ .0627∗∗∗
Edu.Divj. .0460∗ .0320 .0374
Continued on next page
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Base Model Full Model 1 Full Model 2 Full Model 3
(Weight On) (Weight Off) (Weight On)a (Wt+Interact)
Continued from previous page
Publicj. .0264∗ .0206† .0290∗∗
PartTimej. -.0656∗∗∗ -.0536∗∗∗ -.0583∗∗∗
Unionj. -.0031 -.0101 -.0125
Manufj. -.0160∗ -.0153† -.0151†
σ2int 30.9396
∗∗∗ 7.6519∗∗∗ 7.6116∗∗∗ 8.0224∗∗∗
σint,t -.0549∗ -.1555∗∗∗ -.1317∗∗∗ -.1208∗∗∗
σ2t .0187
∗∗∗ .0093∗∗∗ .0067∗∗∗ .0061∗∗∗
σtoep(2) .0003∗∗∗ .1951∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗ .0003∗∗∗
σ2e .0007
∗∗∗ .4292∗∗∗ .0006∗∗∗ .0006∗∗∗
r2 bint .7618 .7540 .7407
r2 ct .5753 .6417 .6738
-2LL 13609.2 12225.5 11904.9 11870.7
AIC 13623.2 12295.5 11941.9 11880.7
BIC 13649.8 12428.5 11933.9 11899.7
Note: (a) Weight variable is share of occupations at given years.
(b) Pseudo-R2 (PRE) calculated by (σ2int,BaseModel − σ2int,FullModel)/σ2int,BaseModel)
(c) Pseudo-R2 (PRE) calculated by (σ2t,BaseModel − σ2t,FullModel)/σ2t,BaseModel)
† < .10, ∗ < .05, ∗∗ < .01, ∗∗∗ < .001
Full Model 3 shows that the coefficient for Female × HighWage is negative
and significant. (The interaction for female employment and low-wage occu-
pations was not statistically significant and thus deleted from the model.) For
high-wage occupations, a 1 percentage point increase in female employment
therefore reduces growth in the mean wage by .0611 dollars (i.e., .0205 +
.0406). I thus conclude that increasing female employment tends to decrease
between-occupational inequality because the mean wages of high-wage occu-
pations are brought down more than are the mean wages of non-high-wage




By contrast, the mean wage tends to increase in occupations that expe-
rience an increase in manufacturing employment. The results for Full Model
3 in Table 6.4 show that a 1 percentage point increase in manufacturing em-
ployment increases the growth in mean wage by .0188 dollars. In general,
manufacturing employment has traditionally provided higher paying jobs for
workers without a college degree (e.g., laborers and semi-skilled blue-collar
workers) who would otherwise have few desirable job opportunities. There-
fore, it is most likely that declining employment in the manufacturing sector
contributes to growing between-occupational inequality by increasing the num-
ber of workers with wages below the overall mean. This result is consistent
with Hypothesis 2-B, which is derived from the deindustrialization view.
Another interesting result in Table 6.4 is the statistically significant and
negative net effect of the interaction between year and the mean of manufactur-
ing employment. This finding indicates that, over this time period, the mean
wage for manufacturing workers has been declining net of other changes (i.e.,
in unionization, female employment, education, part-time employment, and
public sector employment). Although not formally hypothesized in my dis-
cussion, this decline in the mean wage of manufacturing workers may reflect
increasing foreign trade and global competition, particularly within develop-
ing countries (e.g., China), where the wages for manufacturing workers are
considerably lower.
The results for public sector employment indicate that a 1 percentage
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point increase in public sector employment in non-low-wage occupations, de-
creases the mean wage by .0541 dollars, as is evident in Full Model 3 of Table
6.4. In occupations that are not low-wage, private sector workers tend to have
higher wages than public sector workers. Full Model 3 also includes, how-
ever, a statistically significant interaction effect for Public × LowWage. This
result implies that in low-wage occupations, a 1 percentage point increase in
public sector employment increases the mean wage by .0541 + .0666 = .0125
dollars. Thus, for low-wage occupations, the net effect of public sector employ-
ment is opposite of that for non-low-wage occupations. These findings suggest
that privatization (i.e., reductions in public sector employment) will increase
between-occupational inequality because the mean wages of workers in low-
wage occupations will be reduced while the wages of higher-wage workers will
be increased.
Regarding the effect of unionization, the results for Model 2 in Table
6.4 indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in union membership in a non-
low-wage occupation will increase its mean wage by .0847 dollars. In low-wage
occupations, a 1 percentage point increase in union membership will increase
mean wages by .0847 + ( .0441) = .0406 dollars. To the extent that unioniza-
tion tends to most benefit the wages of blue-collar workers, who would other-
wise typically have few desirable alternative employment prospects, I interpret
these results as supporting Hypothesis 3-B, that reductions in unionization in-
crease between-occupational inequality.
The net effects of part-time employment also vary depending on an in-
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teraction, as is shown in Full Model 3 of Table 6.4. In occupations that are
not high wage, a 1 percentage point increase in part-time employment reduces
the growth in mean wage by .0265 dollars, whereas in high-wage occupations,
a 1 percentage point increase in part-time employment increases the growth in
mean wage by .0265 + .0696 = .0431 dollars. These results suggest that con-
tingent work in high-wage occupations often refers to specialized, high skilled
jobs that command wage premiums, as was discussed by Hipple and Stew-
art (1996). By contrast, in occupations that are not high wage, increased
part-time employment tends to reduce mean wages. These opposing trends
imply that increasing part-time employment increases between-occupational
inequality as was proposed by Hypothesis 4-B.
In terms of temporal changes in occupation-specific mean wages, the
results in Table 6.4 provide greater support for the SBTC view. A 1 per-
centage point increase in college-educated workers increases the mean wage by
.0749 dollars in Model 2. Thus, increases in the educational level of an oc-
cupation increase its mean wage. Furthermore, the interaction between year
and the average proportion of workers who are college educated is positive and
statistically significant in Table 6.4. This interaction coefficient indicates an
increasing return to the educational attainment of college-educated workers
over this time period and therefore directly supports the SBTC view and Hy-
pothesis 5-B. This widening wage gap by educational level probably increases
between-occupational inequality.
Multivariate analysis of Table 6.4 does not provide direct evidence to
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support Hypothesis 6-B. Descriptive statistics of Table 4.1, however, offer a
valuable support of Hypothesis 6-B. the explanatory power of occupations has
diminished by 30 percent among college or more educated workers while it is
down by 26 percent among high school or less educated workers. That is, the
occupational wage difference among highly educated workers has been reduced
more than it has among less educated workers.
These models do fairly well in explaining changes in occupation-specific
mean wages. As shown in Table 6.4, Full Model 3 explains 74.1 percent of the
variance of the intercepts across occupations and 67.4 percent of the variance of
the slopes. Chi-square test statistics indicate that Full Model 3 is statistically
significant relative to Full Model 2 and the Baseline Model. Thus, changes of
occupational mean wage over time for this period are well explained by the
predictors included in the models of Table 6.4. These results are contradic-
tory to the disaggregate structuration view that predicts R-squareds for these
models of mean wages to be relatively low.
Table 6.5 shows how much variation in the mean-wage growth rate can
be accounted for by each variable. Similar to what was discovered in Table
5.6 of the variation of the inequality growth rate, education variables and
unionization are the two most powerful variables in explaining the variation
of mean-wage growth rate as well. Unlike in the variation of the inequality
growth rate, however, industrial sector variables and percent female also play
significant roles in explaining the variation of the mean-wage growth rate.
When education variables are excluded from the model, the variation of slopes
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Table 6.5: Explanatory Power of Predictors on the Variation of Growth
Excluded Time-Variant
Predictor







If the following variables are excluded,
Education .01051 +.00380 .17351
Union .01021 +.00350 .15981
Sectore .00815 +.00144 .06575
Part Time .00653 −.00018 −
Female .00706 +.00035 .01598
Race .00665 −.00006 −
Notes: (a) σ2,RestrictedModelt − σ2,FullModelt
(b) r2 calculated by (σ2,RestrictedModelt − σ2,FullModelt )/σ2,BaseModelt
(c) Baseline Model in Table 6.4.
(d) Full Model 2 in Table 6.4
(e) Both pulbic sector and manufacturing sector.
is increased to .01051, which is a .00380 increase from .00671 of the full model.
Thus, education variables account for 17.4 percent (.00380/.02190) of the total
variation of mean-wage slopes. If we omit % union from the predictors, the
variation of slopes is up by .00350. This accounts for 15.9 percent of the total
variation.
The change of % public sector and % manufacturing sector combined
explains 6.6 percent of the total variation. When we leave them out of the
model, the variation of slopes increases by .00144. Also, the changes of %
female account for 1.6 percent of the total variation of slopes. If we run a
model without % female, the variation of slopes goes up from .00671 to .00706.
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6.1.3 Counterfactual Analysis
Although informative, Table 6.4 does not provide direct estimates of the effects
of independent variables on between-occupational inequality. To overcome this
shortcoming, I estimate the counterfactual between-occupational inequalities
from the predicted occupational mean wages. Occupational mean wages for
1983-1985 and 2000-2002 are estimated using the coefficients of Full Model
2 in Table 6.4, and between-occupational Gini indexes are then calculated
using those estimated occupational mean wages. In Table 6.6, the estimated
between-occupational Gini for 1983-1985 is .18422, and it is .19608 for 2000-
2002, which is a .01186 point increase. The between-occupational Gini using
actually observed occupational mean-wage is .16969 for 1983-1985 and .21391
for 2000-2002. Thus, the predicted Gini indexes reflects the actual trend of
growing between-occupational inequality, although the estimated Gini indexes
are a little smaller than actual Gini indexes.
In order to examine the effect of each predictor on between-occupational
inequality, the between-occupational Gini indexes are estimated with the con-
dition that only the individual predictor changes between 1983-1985 and 2000-
2002 while all the other predictors are fixed to the 1983-1985 figures. The mid-
dle row of Table 6.6 shows the results. The results of Table 6.6 are congruent
with what we inferred from Table 6.4. The changes of % female reduce the
between-occupational inequality for the given period by .00800. The increases
of part time workers are conducive to the growth of between-occupational in-
equality, and the declines in manufacturing sectors cause the rise of between-
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Table 6.6: Counterfactual Analysis of Between-Occupational Inequality
Predicted Predicted Change
Between-Occupational Gini from 1983-1985
Predicted Gini in 1983-1985 .18422
(Actual Gini in 1983-1985) (.16969)




Part Time .18764 +.00342
Public Sector .18328 −.00094
Manufacturing .18617 +.00195
Predicted Gini in 2000-2002 .19608 +.01186
(Actual Gini in 2000-2002) (.21391) (+.01583)
Notes: Actual Gini in parenthesis are calculated with the observed occupa-
tional mean wages, not estimated mean wages using Model 2.
occupational inequality, as expected.
The changes of % BA+ and % union are the two biggest predictors. The
amount of the effects of the two are similar. The changes of % BA+ for this
period cause an increase of .01047 in the between-occupational Gini inequality.
The changes in unionization bring about a growth in the Gini inequality by
.01109. Thus, education variables and unionization are the two most inequality
growth inducing variables in regards to both within-occupational and between-
occupational inequalities.
The only unexpected result in Table 6.4 is the effect of public sector.
The reduction in % public sector for this time period does not increase between-
occupational inequality but instead decreases it. This may be partially because
% public sector is reduced more among high-wage occupations than among low-
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wage occupations. A more reasonable cause, however, may be that I applied
the coefficients of Full Model 2 instead of the coefficients of Full Model 3.
That is, the interaction effects of % public sector and high-wage occupations
are not reflected. Indeed, when interaction effects are included, the changes
of public sector turn out to increase the between-occupational inequality for
this period. In sum, except for the change of % female, all other hypothesized
variables are contributing to the rise of between-occupational inequality.
6.2 Summary and Discussion
The results of multivariate analyses presented above provide empirical evidence
and counter-evidence for the hypotheses on growing between-occupational in-
equality.
Disaggregate structuration. According to this view, with the progress
of occupationalization, increases or decreases in occupational mean wage will
be achieved by diverse kinds of occupation-specific actions rather than by the
results of changes of other social and economic elements such as race, gender,
or industrial composition. Therefore, the total variation in the changes of
occupational mean wage over time explained by other variables (i.e., R-squared
for models of the changes of occupational mean wages) should be small.
The R-squared of Table 6.4 is .75 for the variation across occupation-
specific intercepts and .64 for the variation over time. The majority of variation
can be explained by demographic and institutional variables. That is, the
changes in occupational mean wages are a function of gender, race, general
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skill (education), and institutional factors such as unionization and industrial
mix. The assumption of disaggregate structuration is not supported again for
the models of mean wage, as it is not supported for the models of within-
occupational inequality.
Hypothesis 1-B: The increase of % female will cause the rise of between-
occupational inequality. This is not supported. Contrary to the expectation,
the increase of % female is likely to decrease the between-occupational inequal-
ity. The increase of % female in an occupation tends to decrease the mean wage
of that occupation. The negative interaction effect of female and high-wage
occupations indicates that the increase of female would pull down the wages
further for high-wage occupations relative to non-high-wage occupations. The
answer to the question of whether the increase in % female would bring about
the growth/reduction of between-occupational inequality depends on among
which occupations the female labor force increases more during this period.
Juhn and Murphy (1997) report that since the late 1970’s wives of
high-earning husbands have entered into labor markets more than have wives
of low- or middle-earning husbands and that the skill levels of these wives
are competitive with high-skilled male workers. Maxwell (1990) also find that
increased female labor force participation reduces the income share of the top
quintile. Congruent with my result, Juhn and Kim (1999) state that, since the
1980’s, female participation has contributed more at higher-skill job categories.
The uniqueness of the female labor force participation since the 1980’s is not
its augmented quantity but its compositional change, specifically the increase
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in the proportion high-skilled. Juhn and Kim (1999) also state that college-
educated women have substituted for college-educated men, indicating that the
increased labor supply has not increased wage inequality among male workers
in the last two decades.
Similar to the results for within-occupational inequality, the results for
between-occupational inequality also show that the increase of female labor
force participation does not increase inequality but that it decrease inequality.
Before moving to the next topic, I want to caution the reader not to con-
clude that this association between female participation and inequality can
necessarily be applied to the causal study of increasing household inequality.
Household income is a joint distribution of male and female earners. Thus,
although female participation decreases individual inequality, the same factor
could bring about an increase in household inequality due to the associated
mating (Maxwell 1990; Hyslop 2001; Alderson and Nielsen 2002).
Hypothesis 2-B: The decrease in employment in the manufacturing sec-
tor will increase the between-occupational inequality. This hypothesis is marginally
supported. Contrary to the results for within-occupational inequality, the
decline of the manufacturing sector explains a portion of the rise in between-
occupational inequality for this time period. The amount of inequality increase
due to the decline of the manufacturing sector, however, is marginal. Out of
a total of .0119 increase in the Gini between 1983-1985 and 2000-2002, only
at best can .0020 be accounted for by the decline of the manufacturing sector
(Table 6.6).
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This finding is consistent with the results of economic studies (e.g., Git-
tleman 1994; Juhn 1999; Danziger and Gottschalk 1993). The majority of in-
equality growth has occurred within industries rather than between industries
(Gittleman 1994). And changes of between-industrial inequality is mainly due
to employment shifts within industries, not to deindustrialization (Raffalovich
1993). In almost all industries, college-educated workers have been increasing,
and this within-industrial change of occupational mix accounts for more than
80 percent of the occupational changes (Danziger and Gottschalk 1993). The
reduction in the demand for middle skilled male workers in all industries con-
tributes more to the growth of inequality than does the decline in employment
in the manufacturing sector (Juhn 1999). That is, the compositional change
effect does not provide a tangible explanation either for within-occupational
inequality or for between-occupational inequality.
Hypothesis 3-B: The decline of % union will increase between-occupational
inequality. This hypothesis is supported. Decreased union density is strongly
correlated with the reduction of occupational mean wage. A 1 percentage
point decrease of union density is likely to lower the occupational mean wage
by .09 dollars. Union density is down by only 2 percent among occupations
with increased mean wages, but it is down by 14 percent among occupations
with decreased mean wages. Furthermore, union density has diminished more
among low-wage occupations. The significantly negative effect of the inter-
action variable of union density and low-wage occupations implies that if
union density declines equally across occupations, union density will decrease
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between-occupational inequality rather than increase it. In total, for the given
period, the decrease of union membership is estimated to cause a .011 point
increase in the between-occupational Gini.
Hypothesis 4-B: The increase of % part-time workers will bring about the
rise of between-occupational inequality. Supported. The effects of part-time
workers are conditional on the type of occupations. High-wage occupations
gain mean wages with the increase of part-time workers, while non-high-wage
occupations lose mean wages. That is, high-skilled workers actually earn more
in contingent labor arrangements (Hipple and Stewart 1996; Polivka 1996).
The total effect of the change of part-time workers on between-occupational
inequality, however, is not large, since part-time workers have decreased dur-
ing this time period. Furthermore, reduction rate is higher among low-wage
occupations. Indeed, insecure employment relations have a strong potential
to drive up inequality if contingent labor arrangements rise. A cross-sectional
study comparing U.S. counties by McCall (2000) shows the same possibility.
Hypothesis 5-B: The increase of % college educated workers will in-
crease between-occupational inequality. Supported. Contrary to the results of
within-occupational inequality, the SBTC view is well supported in explain-
ing between-occupational inequality. The higher the % college-educated in an
occupation, the higher the mean wage of that occupation. Considering that
% college-educated is higher among high-wage occupations in any give time
and that the growth of college-educated workers is also bigger among high-
wage occupations, it is apparent that the positive coefficients of BA+ will bring
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forth an increase in between-occupational inequality. Counterfactual analysis
of Table 6.6 confirms these reasonings.
Hypothesis 6-B: Among highly-educated workers between-occupational
inequality decrease faster. Not supported. Both highly-educated workers and
less-educated workers show a decline in the portion of between-occupational
inequality (Table 4.1). Although the amount of decline is bigger for the college
or more educated in Table 4.1 than for the high school or less educated, the dif-
ference does not seem to be substantially wide. That is, occupational barriers
become lower than before regardless of the level of educational attainment.
If the organizational change view is not wrong, there could be two pos-
sible explanations as to why Hypothesis 6-B is not supported in my analysis.
First, there is the possibility of a ‘flooring effect.’ Jobs for less educated work-
ers are most likely to be low-wage jobs. Thus, the decreased demand for these
jobs lowers the wages of jobs that have wages well above the minimum wage
to near minimum wage yet does not change the wages of jobs whose wage
rates are already near the minimum wage. The distribution of mean wages
therefore becomes narrower. A second possible explanation is that organiza-
tional changes are likely to equally affect both well-educated and less-educated
workers. In other words, organizational changes require versatile multi-tasking
ability among low-skilled workers as well as among high-skilled workers, so that
workers with these abilities earn more.
Although the proportion of between-occupational inequality grows for
both less-educated and highly-educated workers, the growth for less-educated
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workers is due to the decline of between-occupational inequality. For highly-
educated workers, by contrast, the growth is due to the increase of within-
occupational inequality. Within-occupational inequality for less-skilled work-
ers was .0912 during 1983-1985, and it stays at a similar level of .0974 during
2000-2002 (7 percent increase), while between-occupational inequality has de-
creased from .0416 for 1983-1985 to .0334 for 2000-2002 (20 percent decline).
For highly-educated workers, within-occupational inequality has grown sub-
stantially, as it increases to .1403 in 2000-2002 from .1112 during 1983-1985
(26 percent increase). However, between-occupational inequality is down by
only 6 percent (from .0359 to .0338). That is, no significant growth of within-
occupational inequality is observed for less-skilled workers during this period.
Therefore, considering the results of the inequality decomposition, the first




7.1 Summary of Findings
The foregoing results provide considerable new insight into the role of occu-
pation as a mediating structure in the growth of wage inequality in recent
decades. In terms of a bivariate association, my findings indicate that oc-
cupations are becoming less directly associated with wages, even when us-
ing a large number (i.e., 331) of detailed occupational categories, as sug-
gested by the “disaggregate structuration” approach. From 1983 to 2002, the
between-occupational variance declined while the within-occupational variance
increased to approximately three-fourths of the total variance. In terms of the
decomposition of measures of inequality, five out of the six measures show
an increase in the proportion of wage inequality within occupations (i.e., to
about 65 percent or 75 percent) over this time period. Furthermore, all of
the measures indicate that most of the increase in wage growth over this time
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period was within occupations. These results show that increasing within-
occupational wage inequality is generally consistent with the basic conclusion
of Table 4.3, that inequality in occupational status has actually not increased
over this period (despite increases in wage inequality of 12 percent to 33 per-
cent, according to the results in Table 4.4).
In terms of the multivariate analysis of growing wage inequality within
occupations, my multi-level growth model reveals some unexpected results.
Contrary to hypothesized predictions, the growth of wage inequality within
occupations was actually reduced by the employment of women, increased by
a larger unionized work force, and unaffected by reductions in manufacturing
employment or by changes in the distribution of education. Increased part-
time employment did increase the growth of wage inequality but only outside
of sales and service occupations. Perhaps the least surprising finding is that
public-sector employment reduces wage inequality.
The hypothesized predictions were somewhat more evident in regard to
the growth in mean wages and between-occupational inequality. As expected,
the growth in mean wages and between-occupational inequality was decreased
by reductions in manufacturing employment and by increased unionization.
Increased part-time employment increased between-occupational inequality by
increasing mean wages in high-wage occupations and by reducing mean wages
elsewhere. Increasing returns to education were also evident, as mean wages
increased faster in occupations with more college graduates and in occupa-
tions with more growth in the employment of college graduates. Although
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the decrease in between-occupational inequality due to increases in female
employment was not formally hypothesized, in retrospect, this finding is cer-
tainly reasonable, given the large negative effect on the growth in mean wages
that results from increased female employment in high-wage occupations. As
for privatization, it clearly increases between-occupational wage inequality.
7.2 Implications for Disaggregate Structura-
tion
As noted earlier, Grusky and Sørensen (1998:1191) claim that detailed occupa-
tions are, among other things, “positional sources of exploitation and inequal-
ity.” My results indicate, however, that most wage inequality is within detailed
occupational categories and that most of the growth in wage inequality has
been within them as well. In other words, most wage inequality cannot be
directly explained by detailed occupations, these detailed occupations are in-
creasingly becoming decoupled from wages. Occupation-specific skills become
less determinant of wages, while general skills increase their influence.
The argument that occupations become classes through ‘occupational-
ization’ is not supported in multivariate analysis. Demographic, educational,
and institutional variables could not account for the within-occupational vari-
ation, while the same variables cannot explain most changes in occupational
mean wages over time. That is, an occupation does not turn out to be a ho-
mogeneous community net of ‘other variables,’ and occupational mean wages,
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which are a clear occupational common interest, are not explained by occu-
pational activities themselves but instead by ‘other variables.’ These findings,
therefore, do not support the strong version of the “disaggregate structuration”
view.
I suggested earlier that a weaker form of “disaggregate structuration”
assumes that occupations may still be seen as fundamental if they are a useful
unit of analysis for explaining wage inequality, even if statistically there is more
variance in wages within rather than between detailed occupations. Evaluating
this weaker form of “disaggregate structuration” is more a matter of opinion
regarding what constitutes being “useful.” I suggest that the explanatory
power resulting from the use of detailed occupations as the unit of analysis in
predicting wage inequality is far from conclusive.
Although my investigation has yielded some important findings about
the net effects of various variables, these results do not provide unequivocal
support for the view that occupations may be construed as the primary “posi-
tional sources of exploitation and inequality,” to the exclusion of other aspects
of class structure, because over three-quarters of the variation in the growth
of within occupational inequality still remains statistically unexplained in my
models. While I do not doubt that occupations have and will continue to serve
important roles in both descriptive and analytical studies of social inequality
and stratification, my results nonetheless do not support taking this usefulness
to the logical extreme of postulating that detailed occupations represent the
only important feature of the class structure and that they override the need
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to theoretically incorporate other, perhaps equally important, labor market
variables.
7.3 Implications for Understanding the Sources
of Growing Wage Inequality
Female. The educational attainment of female workers at the level of college or
more and their labor market participation has reduced individual inequality in
the last two decades. These findings signal that the effects of female labor force
participation are much more complicated than we expected. Unlike Topel’s
(1994) assertion, highly educated female workers are not competing with low-
skilled male workers; rather, they are substituting for their equally educated
male counterparts (Juhn and Kim 1999). Thus, the influx of female workers
is likely to put downward pressure on the wages of high-skilled male workers
at the upper tail of the distribution. This inequality-reducing effect of female
workers, however, cannot be assumed to extend to household/family inequality.
The amount of household income increased by assortative mating may well
exceed the amount of the diminished income of male counterparts (Maxwell
1990; Hyslop 2001).
Skill-Biased Technological Change. To be sure, my results do find some
limited support for the SBTC view in that mean wages increased faster in
occupations with more college graduates or with more growth in the employ-
ment of college graduates. Therefore, strictly speaking, my findings are not
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entirely inconsistent with the SBTC argument. As I have shown, however,
most of the growth in wage inequality has been within occupations, and this
latter phenomenon is not explained by the SBTC hypothesis, which empha-
sizes increasing returns to education.
These findings call into question the strength of the SBTC argument
that has been popular in economics (e.g., Murphy and Welch 1997; Juhn et al.
1993). My findings may be more consistent with the argument of Fernandez
(2001). In the context of a case study of a food processing plant, Fernandez
argues that firm organization heavily mediates the relationship between the
distribution of human capital and wage dispersion.1 Although my data do
not pertain to firms, Fernandez’ (2001) argument refers the determination
of the distribution of jobs (and hence occupations) as one of the processes by
which organizations serve as an intermediary between human capital and wage
dispersion. Consistent with that argument, my results may be interpreted as
indicating that occupations represent a structural buffer between wages and
the distribution of human capital among workers.
This latter interpretation is evident in the findings, reported above,
which indicate that the educational diversity index and the proportion of
college-educated workers in an occupation do not explain changes in within-
occupational wage inequality. My analysis thus suggests that the institutional
features of occupations serve as one of wedges between education and wages be-
cause within-occupational wage dispersion appears to be relatively unaffected
1More systematic and precise empirical evidence for this general view is provided by
Hedstöm’s (1991) analysis of a large sample of firms in the Swedish manufacturing sector.
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by the within-occupational distribution of education. Although my investiga-
tion has not fully uncovered all of the relevant institutional processes, it does
at least imply that the SBTC perspective is at best only a limited and partial
explanation of growing wage inequality.
Furthermore, the lack of an effect of the distribution of schooling on
within-occupational wage inequality suggests that sociologists need to revisit
the classic concern in the labor market literature regarding the mechanism
by which schooling affects wages. If the effect derives from a competitive
labor market for human capital (as is assumed in the SBTC argument), then
its theoretical and policy implications regarding inequality are quite different
from those that follow if education serves primarily as a screening or rationing
device for a relatively small number of “good jobs” (Thurow 1975; Sørensen
1977; Sørensen and Kalleberg 1981; Sakamoto and Powers 1995; Collins 1979).
While these two different processes are not mutually exclusive, the effectiveness
of altering the distribution of education to reduce wage inequality is diminished
to the extent that the screening role of schooling is larger (Jencks et al. 1972).
This disconnection between changes in the distributions of schooling and wages
is precisely what is observed in my results for within-occupational inequality
but which is unexpected according to the general human capital theory of
income distribution (Becker and Chiswick 1966).
Unions. My findings suggest a major change in the relationship between
unions and labor market inequality. As noted above, the traditional view has
been that unions tend to increase equality due to reduced wage dispersion
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within the unionized sector (relative to the non-unionized sector), increased
wages for workers with lower skill levels, and improved wages in the non-union
sector due to spillover effects. However, using a more multivariate and system-
atic model of the growth in wage inequality for a longer time period, my results
indicate that, given the current level of unionization, increases in unionization
actually increase wage inequality within an occupation2, and that inequal-
ity within the union sector has been growing. Although in the cross-section,
occupations with more unionized workers tend to have greater wage equality,
increases in unionization lead to increases in within-occupational wage inequal-
ity. Increases in unionization do, to some extent, reduce between-occupational
inequality, as is expected by the traditional view, but between-occupational
inequality is relatively small and is declining over time.
These results suggest the increasing significance of the monopolistic or
social closure perspective discussed by Weeden (2002) and by Freeman and
Medoff (1984). According to this view, unions work as a barrier against non-
union members in an occupation, so the net effect of unionization is to raise
inequality. Rather than having a large spillover effect, the more an occupation
becomes unionized, the more unequal the occupation becomes. The increasing
2In order to assess whether there is a non-linearity in the effect of unionization (depend-
ing upon the current level of unionization in the occupation) that could result in the effect
becoming negative, I estimated another multi-level model that included an interaction be-
tween highly unionized occupations and YEAR × Union. A highly unionized occupation is
defined as one with a unionization level of more than 51.2 percent (i.e., two standard devi-
ations above the mean level). The results indicate that the coefficient for this interaction
term is not statistically significant at the .05 level. Furthermore, although negative, the
estimated coefficient is still less than the positive coefficient for the “main effect,” indicating
that the net effect of increases in unionization is still positive, even in occupations with high
levels of unionization.
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inequality within the unionized sector over time further suggests that unions
are losing their power to set universal wage standards among the broad ranks
of its members. The latter trend may reflect declining union membership
and political influence. In sum, my results suggest that unions in the U.S.
labor market have arrived at a new era. They have gone from being the great
equalizer to a weak but monopolistic institution that struggles to increase
wages whenever it can, and in doing so, leads to greater inequality in a period
when most less-educated workers are not unionized and when their wages are
being diminished.
Before moving to the next discussion, I would like to note that the effect
of industry which is closely correlated with the distribution of occupations in
American economy is not fully investigated in this study. I have limited my
research on the effect of % manufacturing sector. Although an important
subject, this is above the scope of this study and needs a bigger data which
contains enough sample of each occupation in different industries. I leave this
topic for a future research.
7.4 Further Implications Regarding Inequal-
ity in the “New Economy”
The “New Economy” is a term that has been used to refer to the U.S. economy
since 1980, when inequality, as I have shown, began substantially increasing.
There is some debate as to exactly what characteristics underlie and define
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the “New Economy” (e.g., Hollister 2004). Most accounts often include, how-
ever, such changes as heightened market competition due to improvements in
information and transportation, increasing application of computer and other
advanced production technologies, reduced internal labor markets and greater
inter-firm mobility, “lean and mean” firm organization (i.e., flatter managerial
hierarchies), declining unions, rising globalization and international compe-
tition, and downsizing and outsourcing (e.g., Cappelli 1999; Kalleberg 2001;
Hollister 2004; Levine et al. 2002; McCall 2000; Neumark 2001; Osterman
1999).
The implications of the “New Economy” for traditional thinking about
occupations and “disaggregate structuration” have not been addressed in the
sociological literature. Given my results about the limited capacity of detailed
occupations to explain the growth in wage inequality, I propose the hypothe-
sis that firms and organizations are becoming more important in determining
labor market outcomes. Firms have become more heterogeneous, and occupa-
tional boundaries have become increasingly blurred in the “New Economy.”
Wage inequality is increasingly less dependent upon an individual’s measured
occupational category and more dependent upon the firm in which one is em-
ployed, as well as in one’s bargaining power within the firm.
As discussed by Lindbeck and Snower (1996, 2000), many firms have
moved from Tayloristic to holistic organizational structures during the period
of the “New Economy.” Tayloristic firms are organized around the principle
of promoting the specialization of labor that is “micro-managed” by a steep
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hierarchy of managerial control. This organizational approach assumes the
traditional economic model of a fixed technology with highly specialized la-
bor that is concerned with cost minimization in the context of a stable market
environment with known factor costs and well-defined consumer demand func-
tions. A worker’s productivity is supposed to be strictly determined by the
successful execution of the specific job tasks that the worker is hired to per-
form. Employers are supposed to set the worker’s wage equal to the market
rate for persons who carry out those specific job tasks. A worker’s produc-
tivity is closely aligned with the particular job that the worker is assigned to
perform.
By contrast, holistic firms arise due to heightened market competition
derived from product or production innovations, the use of computerized in-
formation and communication systems by the firm, the changing demands of
consumers, who often directly communicate their concerns to the firm, and
ever evolving production technologies. Holistic firms are characterized by a
flatter management structure, greater production flexibility, more individual-
istic treatment of employees, team work and job rotation, multi-tasking over
occupational or divisional boundaries, and the involvement of employees in
decision making. In a holistic firm, productivities are enhanced by making
greater use of workers’ information about the production system, reducing
management costs, and by promoting workers’ understanding of the broader
production process (Black and Lynch 2001; Krafcik 1988; Lindbeck and Snower
2000; Pfeiffer 1994). Because a worker’s tasks are not limited to one division of
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the firm, a worker’s productivity is judged broadly, as technology develops and
changes. Workers’ wages are based on assessments of a worker’s productive ef-
forts in comprehensive terms rather than in a strictly determined bureaucratic
manner based on the execution of a narrow range of job tasks.
Holistic firms remind us of Japanese labor markets. Although changing
recently, Japanese workers in large firms experience an extensive job rotation.
Their wages are associated primarily with their ranks in firms, not with jobs
(Sakamoto and Powers 1995:225). Firm-specific work skills are another crucial
component determining their wages (Sørensen and Kalleberg 1981). Because
of high employment security and wages not depending on job titles, Japanese
workers do not fear from technological changes, thus the Japanese employment
system is more conducive to the introduction of new technology (Sakamoto
and Powers 1995:226). Regarding growing inequality, I want to recall Dunne
et al.’s (2004) finding that virtually the entire increase in overall dispersion in
hourly wage is accounted for by the between-plant components. One crucial
difference of holistic firms of New Economy from Japanese firms might be
that Japanese firms do not try to associate individual worker’s wage with her
individual productivity, while holistic firms strongly do.
In contrast to traditional human capital theory, the theory of holistic
organizations assumes that the college premium arises not so much because
college graduates are learning particular work skills that are demanded by the
labor market but because colleges are serving to screen and certify workers’
aptitudes regarding versatility, the ability to learn, communication and social
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skills, general analytical capacities, and creativity. For this reason, the role of
educational attainment in a labor market of holistic organizations reflects a
screening process mentioned above. Human capital theory is still also relevant,
however, to the extent that schools augment students’ basic abilities relating
to the aptitudes mentioned above.
Given the rise of holistic organizations, occupational distinctions have
become obscured, and within-group inequality has increased because workers
of a given category (e.g., educational, occupational, industrial) have varying
abilities in regard to versatility, multi-tasking, communication, creativity, ca-
pacity to learn new skills, and other characteristics that are not well measured.
Furthermore, organizations may vary in the extent that they reward these sorts
of skills or provide individuals with the opportunities for utilizing them. In
short, the structural bases for a close association between equal pay for equal
work are eroded by holistic organizational change. The decline of centralized
bargaining among unions and growing wage inequality within the unionized
sector is simply a reflection of this change.
7.5 Conclusion
Writing before the 1980’s, an eminent economist once remarked that the dis-
tribution of income in the U.S. has changed so little that studying it is like
“watching the grass grow” (Aaron 1978:17). By contrast, the post-1980 expe-
rience might be characterized as a time-elapsed film that shows grass spurting
up by leaps and bounds within a few seconds. This phenomenon of rapidly in-
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creasing inequality (or at least aspects of it) has been referred to by economists
as the “Great U-Turn” (Harrison and Bluestone 1988) and the “quiet de-
pression” (Levy 1987). On the other hand, as noted by Morris and Western
(1999:624), “if you had been reading only the flagship journals in sociology, you
probably would not know about these trends. Sociologists have been strangely
and remarkably silent on this issue.”
In order to improve the sociological understanding of wage inequality, I
have investigated the role of occupational structure and how it mediates the
effects of other relevant labor market variables. My results have shown that the
effects of education and manufacturing have been somewhat overemphasized,
at least after taking occupation as a given, and that part-time employment,
privatization, and even unions lead to increased growth in wage inequality.
However, rather than increasing wage inequality, the rising employment of
women appears to reduce inequality. Future research on wage inequality should
build upon these findings in order to explicate them more fully.
Meanwhile, the direct correlation between wages and occupations ap-
pears to be declining, even when the latter are investigated at the detailed
three-digit level. As increasingly more of the variance in wages is within oc-
cupations, sociologists need to develop broader theories to better understand
the causes of growing wage inequality. Although occupational structure is
certainly one of these causes, my results imply that sociologists should not









Administrators and officials, public
administration
5 5
Administrators, protective services 6 6
Financial managers 7 7
Personnel and labor relations managers 8 8
Purchasing managers 9 9
Managers, marketing, advertising, and
public relations
13 13
Administrators, education and related
fields
14 14
Managers, medicine and health 15 15
Managers, properties and real estate 16 18
Funeral directors 18, 19 19
Other Managers, service organizations,
administrators, and legislators n.e.c.
3, 4, 17, 22 3, 4, 17, 21, 22
Accountants and auditors 23 23
Underwriters 24 24
Other financial officers 25 25
Management analysts 26 26
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Personnel, training, and labor relations
specialists
27 27
Buyers, wholesale and retail trade except
farm products
29 29
Purchasing agents and buyers, n.e.c. 33 33
Construction inspectors 35 35
Inspectors and compliance officers,
except construction
36 36
Management related occupations, n.e.c. 28, 34, 37 28, 34, 37
Architects 43 43
Aerospace 44 44
Metallurgical and materials 45 45
Chemical 48 48
Civil 53 53
Electrical and electronic 55 55
Industrial 56 56
Mechanical 57 57
Engineers, n.e.c. 46, 47, 49, 54,
58, 59
46, 47, 49, 54,
58, 59
Computer systems analysts and scientists 64 64
Operations and systems researchers and
analysts
65 65
Mathematical scientists, n.e.c. 66-68 66-68
Chemists, except biochemists 73 73
Geologists and geodesists 75 75
Physical scientists, n.e.c. 69, 74, 76 69, 74, 76
Agricultural and food scientists 77 77
Biological and life scientists 78 78
Forestry and conservation scientists 79 79
Medical scientists 83 83
Physicians 84 84
Health diagnosing practitioners, n.e.c. 85-89 85-89
Registered nurses 95 95
Pharmacists 96 96
Dietitians 97 97
Respiratory therapists 98 98
Occupational therapists 99 99
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Physical therapists 103 103
Speech therapists 104 104
Therapists, n.e.c. 105 105
Physicians’ assistants 106 106
Natural science teachers, n.e.c. 113-117 113-117
Social science teachers, n.e.c. 118-126 118-126
Other teachers, postsecondary, n.e.c. 127-153 127-153






Teachers, elementary school 156 156
Teachers, secondary school 157 157
Teachers, special education 158 158
Teachers, n.e.c. 159 159










Social workers 174 174
Recreation workers 175 175
Clergy 176 176
Religious workers, n.e.c. 177 177
Lawyers and Judges 178 178
Technical writers 184 184
Designers 185 185
Musicians and composers 186 186
Actors and directors 187 187




Artists, authors, dancers, performers,
and related workers, n.e.c.
183, 193, 194 183, 193, 194
Editors and reporters 195 195
Public relations specialists 197 197
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Announcers 198 198
Athletes 199 199
Clinical laboratory technologists and
technicians
203 203
Dental hygienists 204 204
Radiologic technicians 206 206
Licensed practical nurses 207 207
Health technologists and technicians,
n.e.c.
205, 208 205, 208
Electrical and electronic technicians 213 213
Engineering technicians, n.e.c. 214-216 214-216
Drafting occupations 217 217
Surveying and mapping technicians 218 218
Biological technicians 223 223
Chemical technicians 224 224
Science technicians, n.e.c. 225 225
Airplane pilots and navigators 226 226
Air traffic controllers 227 227
Computer programmers 229 229
Legal assistants 234 234
Technicians, n.e.c. 228, 233, 235 228, 233, 235
Supervisors and Proprietors, Sales
Occupations
243 243
Insurance sales occupations 253 253
Real estate sales occupations 254 254
Securities and financial services sales
occupations
255 255
Advertising and related sales occupations 256 256
Sales occupations, other business services 257 257




Sales workers, motor vehicles and boats 263 263
Sales workers, apparel 264 264
Sales workers, shoes 265 265
Sales workers, furniture and home
furnishings
266 266
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Sales workers, radio, TV, hi-fi, and
appliances
267 267
Sales workers, hardware and building
supplies
268 268
Sales workers, parts 269 269
Sales workers, other commodities 274 274
Sales counter clerks 275 275
Cashiers 276 276
Street and door-to-door sales workers 277 277
News vendors 278 278
Demonstrators, promoters and models,
sales
283 283
Auctioneers, and other sales support
occupations, n.e.c.
284, 285 284, 285
Supervisors, general office 303 303
Supervisors, financial records processing 305 305
Supervisors, distribution, scheduling, and
adjusting clerks
307 307





Hotel clerks 317 317




Information clerks, n.e.c. 323 323
Order clerks 327 327
Personnel clerks, except payroll and
timekeeping
328 328
Library clerks 329 329
File clerks 335 335
Records clerks 336 336
Bookkeepers, accounting, and auditing
clerks
337 337
Payroll and timekeeping clerks 338 338
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Billing clerks 339 339
Cost and rate clerks 343 343
Billing, posting, and calculating machine
operators
344 344
Duplicating machine operators 345 345





equipment operators, n.e.c. and other





Postal clerks, except mail carriers 354 354
Mail carriers, postal service 355 355
Mail clerks, except postal service 356 356
Messengers 357 357
Dispatchers 359 359
Production coordinators 363 363
Traffic, shipping, and receiving clerks 364 364
Stock and inventory clerks 365 365
Meter readers 366 366




Material recording, scheduling, and
distributing clerks, n.e.c.
374 374
Insurance adjusters, examiners, and
investigators
375 375
Investigators and adjusters, except
insurance
376 376
Eligibility clerks, social welfare 377 377
Bill and account collectors 378 378
General office clerks 379 379
Bank tellers 383 383
Data-entry keyers 385 385
Statistical clerks 386 386
Teachers’ aides 387 387
Administrative support occupations,
n.e.c.
384, 389 384, 389






Continued from previous page
Private household cleaners and servants 403-407 403-407
Supervisors, firefighting and fire
prevention occupations
413 413
Supervisors, police and detectives 414 414
Supervisors, guards 415 415
Fire inspection, fire fighting, and fire
prevention occupations
416, 417 416, 417
Police and detectives, public service 418 418
Sheriffs, bailiffs, and other law
enforcement officers
423 423
Correctional institution officers 424 424
Crossing guards 425 425
Guards and police, except public service 426 426
Protective service occupations, n.e.c. 427 427




Waiters and waitresses 435 435
Cooks 436, 437 436
Food counter, fountain and related
occupations
438 438
Kitchen workers, food preparation 439 439




Dental assistants 445 445
Health aides, except nursing 446 446
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants 447 447
Supervisors, cleaning and building
service workers
448 448
Maids and housemen 449 449
Elevator operators and janitors and
cleaners
453, 454 453, 454
Pest control occupations 455 455
Supervisors, personal service occupations 456 456
Hairdressers and cosmetologists 458 458
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Attendants, amusement and recreation
facilities
459 459
Public transportation attendants 463 463
Welfare service aides 465 465
Early childhood teacher’s assistants 467 467
Child care workers, n.e.c. 468 468








Groundskeepers and gardeners, except
farm
486 486
Animal caretakers, except farm 487 487




Forestry, fishing, and hunting related
workers
494-499 494-499
Supervisors, mechanics and repairers 503 503
Automobile mechanics 505 505
Bus, truck, and stationary engine
mechanics
507 507
Aircraft engine mechanics 508 508
Small engine repairers 509 509
Automobile body and related repairers 514 514
Heavy equipment mechanics 516 516
Farm equipment mechanics 517 517
Industrial machinery repairers 518 518
Electronic repairers, communications and
industrial equipment
523 523
Data processing equipment repairers 525 525
Household appliance and power tool
repairers
526 526
Telephone line installers and repairers 527 527
Telephone installers and repairers 529 529
Miscellaneous electrical and electronic
equipment repairers
533 533
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Heating, air conditioning, and
refrigeration mechanics
534 534
Office machine repairers 538 538
Millwrights 544 544






Not specified mechanics and repairers” 549 549
Supervisors, electricians and power
transmission installers
555 555
Supervisors, construction, n.e.c. 558 558
Brickmasons and stonemasons 553, 563, 564 553, 563, 564
Tile setters, hard and soft 565 565
Carpet installers 566 566
Carpenters 554, 567, 569 554, 567, 569
Drywall installers 573 573
Electricians 575 575
Electrician apprentices 576 576
Electrical power installers and repairers 577 577
Painters, construction and maintenance 556, 579 556, 579
Plasterers 584 584
Plumbers, pipefitters, and steamfitters 557, 585, 587 557, 585, 587
Concrete and terrazzo finishers 588 588
Glaziers 589 589
Insulation workers 593 593
Roofers 595 595
Sheetmetal duct installers 596 596
Structural metal workers 597 597




Supervisors, extractive occupations 613 613
Drillers, oil well 614 614
Mining machine operators 616 616
Mining occupations, n.e.c. 617 617
Tool and die makers 634, 635 634, 635
Machinists 637, 639 637, 639
Boilermakers 643 643
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Precious stones and metals workers
(Jewelers)
647 647
Sheet metal workers 653, 654 653, 654
Cabinet makers and bench carpenters 657 657
Dressmakers 666 666
Upholsterers 668 668
Optical goods workers 677 677
Dental laboratory and medical appliance
technicians
678 678
Electrical and electronic equipment
assemblers
683 683
Butchers and meat cutters 686 686
Bakers 687 687
Food batchmakers 688 688
Inspectors, testers, and graders 689 689












Water and sewage treatment plant
operators
694 694
Power plant operators 695 695
Stationary engineers 696 696
Miscellaneous plant and system operators 699 699
Lathe and turning machine operators 704 704
Punching and stamping press machine
operators
706 706
Grinding, abrading, buffing, and
polishing machine operators
709 709
Miscellaneous metal, plastic, stone, and
glass working machine operators
715 715
Molding and casting machine operators 719 719
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Printing press operators 734 734
Photoengravers and lithographers 735 735
Miscellaneous printing machine operators 737 737
Winding and twisting machine operators 738 738
Knitting, looping, taping, and weaving
machine operators
739 739
Textile sewing machine operators 744 744
Pressing machine operators 747 747
Laundering and dry cleaning machine
operators
748 748
Miscellaneous textile machine operators 749 749
Packaging and filling machine operators 754 754
Extruding and forming machine
operators
755 755
Mixing and blending machine operators 756 756
Separating, filtering, and clarifying
machine operators
757 757
Painting and paint spraying machine
operators
759 759
Furnace, kiln, and oven operators, except
food
766 766
Crushing and grinding machine operators 768 768
Slicing and cutting machine operators 769 769
Photographic process machine operators 774 774
Miscellaneous machine operators, n.e.c. 777 777
Machine operators, not specified 779 779














Welders and cutters 783 783
Assemblers 785 785
Miscellaneous hand working occupations 794, 795 795
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Production inspectors, checkers, and
examiners
796 796
Production testers 797 797






Graders and sorters, except agricultural 799 799
Supervisors, motor vehicle operators and
Motor transportation occupations, n.e.c.
803, 814 803, 814
Truck drivers 804, 805 804
Driver-sales workers 806 806
Bus drivers 808 808
Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs 809 809
Parking lot attendants 813 813
Railroad conductors and yardmasters 823 823
Locomotive operating occupations 824 824
Operating engineers 844 844








Crane and tower operators 849 849
Excavating and loading machine
operators
853 853
Grader, dozer, and scraper operators 855 855













Garbage collectors 875 875
Stock handlers and baggers 877 877
Machine feeders and offbearers 878 878
Freight, stock, and material handlers,
n.e.c.
876, 883 876, 883
Garage and service station related
occupations
885 885
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Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners 887 887
Hand packers and packagers 888 888




Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics for Socioeconomic Index for the Labor
Force Employed in 331 Occupations, 1983-85 to 2000-02
Total 1983-1985 2000-2002
Meanwage Mean 15.508 15.136 16.720
(sd. dev.) (5.741) (5.344) (6.403)
Min 5.46 5.84 6.19
Max 45.89 45.89 43.19
Female Mean .477 .464 .483
(sd. dev.) (.312) (.329) (.299)
Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 0.99
Black Mean .112 .105 .118
(sd. dev.) (.063) (.067) (.062)
Min 0 0 0.01
Max 0.42 0.38 0.34
Hispanic Mean .088 .060 .060
(sd. dev.) (.063) (.037) .060 (.062)
Min 0 0 0.01
Max 0.64 0.32 0.64
Continued on next page
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Total 1983-1985 2000-2002
Continued from previous page
Other race Mean .035 .026 .047
(sd. dev.) (.022) (.016) (.029)
Min 0 0 0
Max 0.29 0.12 0.19
South Mean .344 .335 .350
(sd. dev.) (.048) (.057) (.042)
Min 0.12 0.16 0.13
Max 0.96 0.92 0.96
Lee than High School Mean .116 .153 .094
(sd. dev.) (.125) (.143) (.111)
Min 0 0 0
Max 0.66 0.55 0.66
High School Graduate Mean .356 .381 .325
(sd. dev.) (.168) (.158) (.172)
Min 0 0 0
Max 0.69 0.67 0.67
Some College Mean .279 .248 .300
(sd. dev.) (.118) (.104) (.125)
Min 0 0 0
Max 0.77 0.59 0.76
BA + Mean .248 .218 .282
(sd. dev.) (.271) (.263) (.281)
Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Educational Diversity Mean .640 .642 .639
(sd. dev.) (.073) (.070) (.079)
Min 0.09 0.17 0.11
Max 0.78 0.78 0.77
Public Sector Mean .171 .176 .163
(sd. dev.) (.234) (.232) (.233)
Continued on next page
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Total 1983-1985 2000-2002
Continued from previous page
Min 0 0 0
Max 1 0.99 1
Part Timer Mean .153 .165 .136
(sd. dev.) (.146) (.164) (.123)
Min 0 0 0
Max 0.94 0.94 0.78
Unionization Mean .182 .225 .152
(sd. dev.) (.165) (.181) (.150)
Min 0 0 0.01
Max 0.94 0.89 0.87
Manufacturing Sector Mean .247 .281 .215
(sd. dev.) (.303) (.317) (.290)
Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Inequality and Mean Wage
Table C.1: Changes of Inequality and Mean Wage by Occupation
Mean Wage Total
Inequality Decrease No Change Increase
(1) Managerial and Professional
Decrease 2 2 2 6
No Change 4 16 9 29
Increase 5 18 23 46
Total 11 36 34 81
(1-a) Executive Administration, Managerial Occupations Only
Decrease 1 2 1 4
No Change 3 2 1 6
Increase 2 7 2 11
Total 6 11 4 21
(1-b) Professional Only
Decrease 1 0 1 2
No Change 1 14 8 23
Increase 3 11 21 35
Total 5 25 30 60
Continued on next page
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Mean Wage Total
Inequality Decrease No Change Increase
Continued from previous page
(2) Technical, Sales, and Administrative Support
Decrease 9 11 2 22
No Change 9 18 8 35
Increase 4 13 12 29
Total 22 42 22 86
(2-a) Sales Only
Decrease 1 2 0 3
No Change 0 4 3 7
Increase 0 7 5 12
Total 1 13 8 22
(2-b) Technicians Only
Decrease 0 1 0 1
No Change 3 5 1 9
Increase 1 1 5 7
Total 4 7 6 17
(2-c) Administrative Support Only
Decrease 8 8 2 18
No Change 6 9 4 19
Increase 3 5 2 10
Total 17 22 8 47
(3) Services
Decrease 4 2 0 6
No Change 3 2 8 13
Increase 3 5 7 15
Total 10 9 15 34
Continued on next page
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Mean Wage Total
Inequality Decrease No Change Increase
Continued from previous page
(4) Precision Production, Craft
Decrease 5 4 0 9
No Change 15 17 4 36
Increase 11 8 0 19
Total 31 29 4 64
(5) Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers
Decrease 18 3 1 22
No Change 18 9 2 29
Increase 5 3 1 9
Total 41 15 4 60
Note: Numbers in Table are numbers of occupations.
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